Our Proposed Protocol Clause Samples
Our Proposed Protocol. Let Ui (1 i n, 3 n) denote a set of participants sharing a secret password, π, selected from a password set, . Each participant, Ui, possesses an asso- ciated identity, IDi. We let A be the security parameter. In our protocol, the following system parameters are public.
1. Two large prime numbers p and q, where p = 2q + 1.
2. Three collision-resistant one-way hash functions, H0, H1, and H2, where H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}A, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}A. We throughout assume that U1 is the protocol initiator. Prior to the protocol execution, Ui (1 i n) computes g = 0(π IDu x) mod p, where IDu = ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇ IDn and x 0 is the smallest integer that makes g a generator of a multiplicative subgroup G of order q in GF (p)∗ . In the protocol execution, the indices of the user names and the values ex- changed between users are taken modulo n; and Ui (1 i n) performs the following steps.
Our Proposed Protocol. The calculation of transmission delay at Our protocol is very simple. It only takes 2 round for 1 bit key agreement. Under the requirement of 2 bit key agreement, the total transmission delay is 2 2 time unit. Each round should take a time unit. So, even the protocols [15]–[17] are great at “number of qubit measurement”. The property of round by round takes more time unit than our protocol. One of them [10] of “number of qubit measurement” is less than ours, because each participant can send their self key to others in one round for 1 bit key agreement. But our protocol should takes two. However, our protocol is more efficient than Liu et al. [10] at other indexes.
Our Proposed Protocol