Common use of Our Contribution Clause in Contracts

Our Contribution. This paper introduces the Ironwood MKAAP, whose security is based on hard problems in group theory. Ironwood leverages the conjectured one-way function, E-Multiplication, but creates a different construction that removes some of the public information required to mount any of the previous attacks. In addition to being immune from previous attacks, it can be argued that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ is resistant to the current generation of quantum attacks. Specifically, Shor’s quantum algorithm [22] – which has been shown to break RSA, ECC, and several other public-key crypto systems – does not seem applicable for attacking Ironwood because the underlying group theoretic foundation of Ironwood is an infinite non-commutative group. Further, ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ quantum search algorithm [23] is not as impactful on Ironwood as it is on many protocols since the running time of Ironwood is linear in the key length and security strength, and hence the need to double the security level amounts to doubling the execution time. This stands in ▇▇▇▇▇ contrast to the rapid increase in execution time for standard protocols when the lengths of the private keys are doubled. This paper begins with a review of the braid group, the colored ▇▇▇▇▇ representation, and E-Multiplication. With these tools in place, we introduce the concept of a meta key agreement and authentication protocol (MKAAP), and present Ironwood. A discussion of security and our implementation experience follows.

Our Contribution. This paper introduces the Ironwood MKAAP, whose security is based on hard problems in group theory. Ironwood leverages the conjectured one-way function, E-Multiplication, but creates a different construction that removes some of the public information required to mount any of the previous attacks. In addition to being immune from previous attacks, it can be argued that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Ironwood is resistant to the current generation of quantum attacks. Specifically, Shor’s quantum algorithm [22] – which has been shown to break RSA, ECC, and several other public-key crypto systems – does not seem applicable for attacking Ironwood because the underlying group theoretic foundation of Ironwood is an infinite non-commutative group. Further, ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ quantum search algorithm [23] is not as impactful on Ironwood as it is on many protocols since the running time of Ironwood is linear in the key length and security strength, and hence the need to double the security level amounts to doubling the execution time. This stands in ▇▇▇▇▇ contrast to the rapid increase in execution time for standard protocols when the lengths of the private keys are doubled. This paper begins with a review of the braid group, the colored ▇▇▇▇▇ representation, and E-Multiplication. With these tools in place, we introduce the concept of a meta key agreement and authentication protocol (MKAAP), and present Ironwood. A discussion of security and our implementation experience follows.