Incorrectness Sample Clauses
Incorrectness. Hare’s account of weakness of will is not sufficiently determined to test it against empirical evidence. The models of Plato’s Socrates and Spinoza, however, can be discussed in light of contemporary empirical findings, and the consistencies can sometimes be surprising. In this section, I argue that Plato’s Socrates and Spinoza’s models correctly capture at least two out of these three aspects of valuation-based models:
1. Conceptions of value,
2. Measurement of value, and
3. Corresponding approach and withdraw behaviors. At the same time, the main source of incorrectness in both of these accounts lies in their belief that valuation and decision-making rely on a single specialized mechanism. Contemporary findings strongly indicate that human beings rely on multiple interacting valuation systems. In Part II of the dissertation, I argue that these interactions can in turn cause suboptimal behaviors including weakness of will.
Incorrectness. Nevertheless, a mechanism schema that is on the right track can identify accurate functional sub-mechanisms and yet be unable to characterize them, thus remaining incomplete while being correct as far as it goes. In this sub-section, I want to conclude by suggesting that syllogism-based models of weakness of will are not only incomplete but also incorrect; that is, that they are directly at odds with established empirical evidence. In a recent article entitled “Moral Reasoning,” philosophers ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ argue that although the syllogism-based model of practical reasoning has been “highly influential” throughout the history of philosophy, “as far as we know, there is no empirical evidence that people always or often form moral judgments in the way suggested” by the syllogism-base model (2011, 214, 217).25 In a direct, empirically based critique, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and colleagues bring together several experiments indicating that people do not use syllogism-based reasoning to make decisions. First, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and colleagues refer to a study by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. (2008) suggesting that in real-life decision-making, the premises of an argument are frequently interdependent and consequently biased. On the traditional view, an agent draws on stable conceptual categories to make practical decisions; if she identifies an action that fits into an appropriate category, she acts accordingly. For example, imagine a student named ▇▇▇▇▇ debating whether or not she should cheat on an exam. ▇▇▇▇▇ may go through the following process of deliberation, with ‘cheating’ representing the category in question: I should not cheat. Looking at Kirstie’s exam paper is cheating. Therefore, I should not look at Kirstie’s exam paper. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and colleagues challenge this view, however. They propose that an agent first makes moral judgment, and then this judgment determines how we categorize a specific act. On their view, Sarah’s example would be more likely to play out as follows: I should not cheat. But looking at Kirstie’s exam paper isn’t really cheating, since I also read the book. Therefore, It is ok if I look at Kirstie’s exam paper. 25 ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. call the same model the ‘deductive’ model, but this does not cover all uses of the model, including Davidson’s inductive account in “How is Weakness of The Will Possible?” (1970). For this reason, I prefer the phrase ‘syllogism-based’ model and use it throughout. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al.’s findings support this latter ...