Common use of High Command Clause in Contracts

High Command. British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. London: ▇▇▇▇▇ 3 Company, p. 98; ▇▇▇▇▇▇. The Political Context, p. 13. 973 ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2013). Strategic Culture in the United Kingdom. In ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 3 ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ (Eds.), Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Politics Across the Continent. Wiesbaden: Springer, p. 377. 974 Grandia. Deadly Embrace, p. 102. 975 ▇▇▇▇▇▇. The Political Context, p. 13-15. 976 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, High Command, p. 98. was an all-volunteer force since 1960.977 Beyond these common traits the British armed forces were far from a monolithical organization. At the advent of the new millennium, the services that constitute the British armed forces had vastly different outlooks. Naturally, there was always some inter-service rivalry over budget and prominence. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were focused on the procurement of new platforms and adopting novel technologies to ensure their readiness.978 For the British Army, the situation was more diffuse. While the other services had been deployed to missions, the brunt of those had fallen on the Army. In particular, elements of the army had recently conducted stabilization and peace support operations in Northern Ireland (see section 5.2.2.1.) and the Balkans. However, another significant part of the army had largely fulfilled ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ duty in the “British Army of the Rhine “(BAOR) during the Cold War and beyond. The BAOR was forward-deployed in Germany to bolster NATO defenses in a potential attack by the Warsaw Pact. In 1991 the army fielded a division to fight in the ground campaign of the Gulf War (operation Granby). After the Cold War ended, a smaller British force remained in Germany.979 Thus the army combined in it two distinct strands of experiences: one of training for conventional war and another of conducting stabilization or peace support operations. By and large, the dominant strand in British Army culture was that of war fighting. Like other armies, the Army had to balance training for conventional war while deploying in peace operations.980 As ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ notes, the “warfighting ethos” is fundamental to British service members. Moreover, British officers are generally expected to demonstrate qualities associated with conventional combat such as initiative, decisiveness and offensive action. Not only are such elements central to officer education, but they are also prerequisite for promotion.981 Combined with the “Adaptive Foundational Training” that focused on combat skills, the conventional war fighting mindset was ingrained in the army’s personnel.982 Potentially, this war fighting ethos could become problematic in other types of conflict in which deliberation, political astuteness and a thorough understanding of the environment are called for. However, this predilection to conventional warfare is disputed by others who argue that it “remains a colonial army at heart”, based on the memorabilia from the imperial era displayed in regimental messes.983 Yet, exhibiting traditions and trinkets from irregular wars gone-by do not equate to proficiency in them. Moreover, the traits of the regimental 977 Cornish. Strategic Culture, p. 380-382. 978 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. High Command, p. 61-71. 979 ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, Soul of Armies, p 176-178; ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2017). Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in the 9/11 Wars. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 156-157. 980 ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2013). Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of modern warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, p 38-40. 981 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ (2010). Understanding the Helmand Campaign. International Affairs, 86(2), p. 323-325. 982 King. Helmand Campaign, p 313; See also Ledwidge. Losing Small Wars, p. 154-156. 983 ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ (2010). Colonial Warfare in a Post-Colonial State: British Military Operations in Helmand. Defence Studies, 10(1- 2), p. 241. forebears that are celebrated are audacity and initiative rather than keen understanding and a measured approach. Interestingly, at the time the British Army was more extolled for its proficiency in fighting irregular wars. Throughout its imperial period and the era of decolonization, the British Army had accumulated experience in fighting irregular wars. British scholars stated for instance that “the British Army has traditionally been culturally attuned to small wars”984 and that the British Army “excelled in [...] anti-guerilla warfare [and] other aspects of counterinsurgency”.985 Another important proponent of this premise is the US officer ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇. In his book “Learning to eat soup with a knife” he favorably contrasts the British counterinsurgency performance in Malaya to the American experience in Vietnam. To be sure, ▇▇▇▇ does not posit that the British Army had some innate traits that produced positive results, but rather that it was a learning organization that was able to enhance its performance and overcome earlier mistakes.986 However, from such readings of the British historical experience emerged the idea that this experience had coalesced into institutional memory.987 Moreover, a central aspect in the understanding of British counterinsurgency campaigns in the 20th century was that there was a distinct British approach which emphasized the use of minimum force. Ostensibly, this contrasted with the more brutal conduct of French forces during their (unsuccessful) wars of decolonization.988 However, more recent historical research shows that British (proxy) forces used considerable coercive measures in counterinsurgency wars such as Kenya and Malaysia.989 Furthermore, beyond the oft-flaunted cases of Malaysia and Northern Ireland, the British success rate in modern counterinsurgency campaign was slimmer than previously stated. 990 However, by the beginning of the 21st century, these nuances were largely glossed over. Beyond its recent experiences and general warfighting ethos, examining the British Army’s culture is a difficult proposition. Like most armies, it is divided into different arms and branches with specific roles on the battlefield. However, in the British Army, the manoeuvre units are further subdivided into regiments that have their own sense of history and tradition. Every army soldier, whether an officer or enlisted, is first and foremost part of a regiment or