Common use of Conclusions and Discussion Clause in Contracts

Conclusions and Discussion. For a long period of time, the idea prevailed that Dutch spatial planning is a public good that should be produced and managed by government authorities. However, the past decades have shown that governments are not always successful, as they tend to be inflexible and only slowly adapt to changing circumstances. Moreover, due to huge financial losses on their investments in public land development, local governments have become very reluctant and actually lack the money to continue with govern- ment-steered planning at the same scale as they used to do. Therefore, market-steered and self-regulated planning – defined as co-production in this article – have become attractive alternatives, at least from a government point of view. Co-production has been relatively uncommon in the field of Dutch public space, while shifting the responsibilities for public space away from the public sector is more generally accepted in liberal welfare states such as the United States. This paper has investigated three different forms of co-production of public space in NYC. The incentive zoning policy has led to the creation of over 500 publicly accessible spaces in a city that has a scarcity of available public space. Parks and squares that were run down in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Bryant Park and Times Square, have been redeveloped by means of additional tax raising in BIDs. The High Line is one more example in which new public space is created or existing public space is made more attractive through the involvement of individual citizens and corporations. However, opponents would claim that only a limited part of the population benefits from these new public spaces (▇.▇. ▇▇▇▇▇, 1995; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2008; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2014). This paper does not aim to advocate for the privatisation of public space. As indicated in the introduction, we feel there is a distinct difference between privati- sation and co-production. While the former is about handing over responsibility for public space to the market, the latter is about sharing costs, rights and responsibili- ties by individual citizens and/or non-state corporations. Although co-production might sound benign (as opposed to privatisation), we feel that it better reflects current trends of collaborative planning, in which more hybrid forms of cooperation between governments, markets and civil society occur. In this respect, we follow ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2014), who argues for a new, more nuanced narrative in public-space literature; one in which we should move away from the ‘idealised blueprint for the perfect public realm that is equally appealing to all’ (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2014, 26) and accept that users, stakeholders and partnerships are diverse and complex. Rather than neglecting this complexity, it could be embraced in the development and management of public space, allowing for institutional variations in the way different kinds of spaces are governed (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2007). Obviously, this would require monitoring to avoid negative externalities such as limited access, as happened in New York where the incentive zoning policy was revised multiple times (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2011). Moreover, it is important to stress here that negative externalities can also occur when spaces are under government authority. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2008, 328), for example, find that state actors are not a guarantee for public accessibility, since ‘the examples of the ‘privatisation’ of public spaces are most often projects of local governments’. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2007) expresses a similar argumentation when concluding that municipal governments monopolistically supplying public space are not innovative, while diver- sification of agencies and institutions are more likely to increase the quality of open space through competition. We are thus by no means the first to promote market- steered and self-regulated planning (e.g. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2007; Klemme et al., 2013), but the monopolistic position of Dutch municipalities in providing public space requires us to reinvigorate the debate. Perhaps a singular umbrella term such as co-production does not take into account the complexity and diversity of places. For example, even though both are regarded as co-production, POPS have a different purpose and institutional commitment than conservancies (Smithsimon, 2008). However, in essence, all examples expressed in this paper share that intersecting interests of different stakeholders can lead to new and improved public spaces in times when government funds are limited. Co-production might seem singular at first, but can in fact work out very differently on the ground, varying from place to place (Klemme et al., 2014). Again, we follow Carmona (2014, 27), who states that ‘critiques and celebrations of public spaces […] will always require questioning and interpretating in the light of local circumstances. ‘ However, how transferable are urban policies if co-production indeed differs from place to place? Though US and European planning (including Dutch planning) may to a certain extent have converged, obviously substantial differences still exist in terms of cultural, political and spatial background. Therefore, there is no point in literally copying New York’s policy, yet the idea that actors other than governments can be encouraged (rather than forced) to make voluntary investments in the public domain can in fact be ‘exported’. This would require a changing attitude of Dutch munici- palities, but does not leave them without any authority. On the contrary, their role does not decrease but changes from main financer and regulator to co-financer and stimulator, for example by providing incentives to developers to invest in public space, such as a certain level of authority or brand awareness. Yet, perhaps typical for Dutch planning traditions, the initiative for market-steered and self-regulated planning so far primarily seems to come from the government. The ‘traditional’ division of labour is still dominant in the minds of all involved actors, forming an institutional obstacle to the further introduction of co-production of public space in the Netherlands. Stakeholders might be reluctant towards the ‘invita- tion’ to self-governance by local governments, arguing why they should spend time and invest money to the kind of works that had always been done and financed by the municipality, while they have no guarantees about the actual benefits for themselves. As a typical example of institutional path dependency, neither the private sector nor ‘the community’ are already prepared or ‘organised’ well enough to take over the initiative, while municipalities at the same time still have the organisation (and the planning officials) for this more or less in place. Another barrier may be the precondi- tion to successful co-production of public space of profitable real estate developments and (expected) increasing real estate prices. In the Dutch real estate market, with housing prices down with 25 per cent since 2008 and 15–20 per cent vacancy rates in local office markets, this precondition is currently not met. The Netherlands is thus still far from converging to the United States in terms of planning culture, but there are signs of a shift towards more market-steered and self-regulated planning. The New York cases show that it is impossible to regard public space as government domain only or to assess co-production as automatically leading to undesired ▇▇▇▇▇- tisation. On the contrary, by involving other beneficiaries – both corporate and civil – public space could become more of and for the people rather than something that is lost in the process.

Conclusions and Discussion. For a long period of time, the idea prevailed that Dutch spatial planning is a public good that should be produced and managed by government authorities. However, the past decades have shown that governments are not always successful, as they tend to be inflexible and only slowly adapt to changing circumstances. Moreover, due to huge financial losses on their investments in public land development, local governments have become very reluctant and actually lack the money to continue with govern- ment-steered planning at the same scale as they used to do. Therefore, market-steered and self-regulated planning – defined as co-production in this article – have become attractive alternatives, at least from a government point of view. Co-production has been relatively uncommon in the field of Dutch public space, while shifting the responsibilities for public space away from the public sector is more generally accepted in liberal welfare states such as the United States. This paper has investigated three different forms of co-production of public space in NYC. The incentive zoning policy has led to the creation of over 500 publicly accessible spaces in a city that has a scarcity of available public space. Parks and squares that were run down in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Bryant Park and Times Square, have been redeveloped by means of additional tax raising in BIDs. The High Line is one more example in which new public space is created or existing public space is made more attractive through the involvement of individual citizens and corporations. However, opponents would claim that only a limited part of the population benefits from these new public spaces (▇.▇. ▇▇▇▇▇, 1995; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2008; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2014). This paper does not aim to advocate for the privatisation of public space. As indicated in the introduction, we feel there is a distinct difference between privati- sation and co-production. While the former is about handing over responsibility for public space to the market, the latter is about sharing costs, rights and responsibili- ties by individual citizens and/or non-state corporations. Although co-production might sound benign (as opposed to privatisation), we feel that it better reflects current trends of collaborative planning, in which more hybrid forms of cooperation between governments, markets and civil society occur. In this respect, we follow ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2014), who argues for a new, more nuanced narrative in public-space literature; one in which we should move away from the ‘idealised blueprint for the perfect public realm that is equally appealing to all’ (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2014, 26) and accept that users, stakeholders and partnerships are diverse and complex. Rather than neglecting this complexity, it could be embraced in the development and management of public space, allowing for institutional variations in the way different kinds of spaces are governed (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2007). Obviously, this would require monitoring to avoid negative externalities such as limited access, as happened in New York where the incentive zoning policy was revised multiple times (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2011). Moreover, it is important to stress here that negative externalities can also occur when spaces are under government authority. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2008, 328), for example, find that state actors are not a guarantee for public accessibility, since ‘the examples of the ‘privatisation’ of public spaces are most often projects of local governments’. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2007) expresses a similar argumentation when concluding that municipal governments monopolistically supplying public space are not innovative, while diver- sification of agencies and institutions are more likely to increase the quality of open space through competition. We are thus by no means the first to promote market- steered and self-regulated planning (e.g. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2007; Klemme ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2013), but the monopolistic position of Dutch municipalities in providing public space requires us to reinvigorate the debate. Perhaps a singular umbrella term such as co-production does not take into account the complexity and diversity of places. For example, even though both are regarded as co-production, POPS have a different purpose and institutional commitment than conservancies (Smithsimon, 2008). However, in essence, all examples expressed in this paper share that intersecting interests of different stakeholders can lead to new and improved public spaces in times when government funds are limited. Co-production might seem singular at first, but can in fact work out very differently on the ground, varying from place to place (Klemme ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2014). Again, we follow Carmona ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2014, 27), who states that ‘critiques and celebrations of public spaces […] will always require questioning and interpretating in the light of local circumstances. ‘ However, how transferable are urban policies if co-production indeed differs from place to place? Though US and European planning (including Dutch planning) may to a certain extent have converged, obviously substantial differences still exist in terms of cultural, political and spatial background. Therefore, there is no point in literally copying New York’s policy, yet the idea that actors other than governments can be encouraged (rather than forced) to make voluntary investments in the public domain can in fact be ‘exported’. This would require a changing attitude of Dutch munici- palities, but does not leave them without any authority. On the contrary, their role does not decrease but changes from main financer and regulator to co-financer and stimulator, for example by providing incentives to developers to invest in public space, such as a certain level of authority or brand awareness. Yet, perhaps typical for Dutch planning traditions, the initiative for market-steered and self-regulated planning so far primarily seems to come from the government. The ‘traditional’ division of labour is still dominant in the minds of all involved actors, forming an institutional obstacle to the further introduction of co-production of public space in the Netherlands. Stakeholders might be reluctant towards the ‘invita- tion’ to self-governance by local governments, arguing why they should spend time and invest money to the kind of works that had always been done and financed by the municipality, while they have no guarantees about the actual benefits for themselves. As a typical example of institutional path dependency, neither the private sector nor ‘the community’ are already prepared or ‘organised’ well enough to take over the initiative, while municipalities at the same time still have the organisation (and the planning officials) for this more or less in place. Another barrier may be the precondi- tion to successful co-production of public space of profitable real estate developments and (expected) increasing real estate prices. In the Dutch real estate market, with housing prices down with 25 per cent since 2008 and 15–20 per cent vacancy rates in local office markets, this precondition is currently not met. The Netherlands is thus still far from converging to the United States in terms of planning culture, but there are signs of a shift towards more market-steered and self-regulated planning. The New York cases show that it is impossible to regard public space as government domain only or to assess co-production as automatically leading to undesired ▇▇▇▇▇- tisation. On the contrary, by involving other beneficiaries – both corporate and civil – public space could become more of and for the people rather than something that is lost in the process.