Change Analysis Sample Clauses
The Change Analysis clause defines the process for evaluating and assessing the impact of proposed changes to a contract, project, or scope of work. Typically, this clause outlines the steps required when a party requests a modification, such as submitting documentation, conducting an impact assessment, and obtaining necessary approvals. For example, if a client requests additional features or adjustments, the clause ensures these changes are formally reviewed for effects on cost, timeline, and deliverables. Its core function is to provide a structured approach to managing changes, thereby minimizing misunderstandings and disputes by ensuring all parties understand the implications before changes are implemented.
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Change Analysis. Contractor shall supply Software that enables users to compare imagery of an area over time in a side-by-side configuration. As an example, a user could type in an address or search on a map and see images from 2014 side-by-side with imagery from 2008. The user can then easily view and detect changes to properties and land over time. This application can be used with Pictometry oblique and orthogonal imagery from 2003, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, and 2020 (upon completion) under perpetual license from Pictometry International, as well as with any existing geo-referenced orthogonal imagery that the user may have.
Change Analysis. The Contractor shall analyze the CR and provide the technical approach to implement the change. The Contractor shall provide a detailed estimate of time, required skills and cost for the change, to include analysis, building, test, documentation and recording in the authoritative tracking tool(s). For trouble tickets and issues identified by the Contractor, the Contractor shall create a CR using the Serena Business Manager CR Workflow for trouble ticket investigation, RCA (CDRL A001), detailed estimate analysis, and RICECPW impact assessments. CDRL A001 – Scientific and Technical Report - (RCA Report)
Change Analysis. The principle of change analysis is to compare the accident timeline with some kind of baseline when the system was operating under normal conditions, for example the week before or according to the design. The differences are analysed to determine what kind of impact they have on the outcome. This of course requires some kind of mapping of events before it can be conducted. In the DOE framework it is used to identify additional causal factors after a preliminary ECFC has been done (DOE, 2012). A root cause analysis aims to identify fundamental deficiencies in safety management systems that affect several causal factors and which would prevent similar accidents if corrected (DOE, 2012). There is no real agreement on what a root cause is amongst practitioners (▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2008) and performing an analysis forces the investigator to use their own judgements (DOE, 2012). Again, this requires some kind of charting and analysis of events before a root cause analysis can be performed. The event tree analysis is mainly used as a risk assessment method, where the focus is on event sequences after an initiating event (Kjellén, 2000). An event sequence is affected by whether safety functions and barriers are successful or not (Sklet, 2004). According to Sklet it can also used as an investigation method, through the identification and illustration of the accident path. The method has some similarities to CascEff’s way of charting cascade effects (i.e. start with an event and map a sequence of events (cascade effects) that follows it), but takes little consideration to contextual factors. Like the ETA, the Acci-map is not a pure investigation method, but offers an interesting perspective (Sklet, 2004). It was developed by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and utilises an organisational perspective where the focus is on six levels of decision- making, from equipment and staff to regulatory and governmental level (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ & ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2000). The accident is mapped from left to right according to the levels, where arrows are used to indicate influences. The MTO-analysis, developed for the Swedish nuclear industry, is based on the idea that human, technical and organisational factors should be regarded as equal and interlocking parts of system safety (Rollenhagen, 2003). This is done by a structured analysis with event-cause- diagrams, a change analysis and a barrier analysis, complemented by a checklist for common failure causes (Sklet, 2004). The diagram is dr...