Common use of ANGOLA Clause in Contracts

ANGOLA. This case was about the head of state of a republic instead of a monarchy. In this case, Angolan citizen ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ complained that a number of his rights granted by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including that of free expression, were violated by the state of Angola. The background of this case is as follows. In 1999, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ wrote several articles that were critical of Angolan President ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ had written that the President was responsible ‘for the destruction of the country and the calamitous situation of State institutions’ and that he was ‘accountable for the promotion of incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social values.’455 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ was arrested and later charged with ‘materially and continuously committ[ing] the crimes characteristic of defamation and slander against His Excellency the President of the Republic and the Attorney General of the Republic.’456 Ultimately, he was convicted of ‘for abuse of the press on the basis of injury to the President.’ The Angolan Supreme Court ‘considered that the author’s acts were not covered by his constitutional right to freedom of speech, since the exercise of that right was limited by other constitutionally recognized rights, such as one’s honour and reputation, or by “the respect that is due to the organs of sovereignty and to the symbols 455 Human Rights Committee, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, par. 2.1. 456 Human Rights Committee, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, par. 2.6. of the state, in this case the President of the Republic.” It affirmed the prison term of six-month, but suspended its application for a period of five years, and ordered the author to pay a court tax of NKz. 20,000.00 and NKz. 30,000.00 damages to the victim.’457 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ lodged a number of complaints relating to the rule of law, including complaints about his arbitrary arrest and lack of a fair trial.458 With regard to his right to free expression, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ claimed that his criticism of the Angolan President was covered by article 19 ICCPR.459 In its assessment, the Human Rights Committee ‘[reiterated] that the right to freedom of expression in article 19, paragraph 2, includes the right of individuals to criticize or openly and publicly evaluate their Governments without fear of interference or punishment.’460 Moreover, the Committee ‘[noted] that the author’s final conviction was based on Article 43 of the Press Law, in conjunction with Section 410 of the Criminal Code. Even if it were assumed that his arrest and detention, or the restrictions on his travel, had a basis in Angolan law, and that these measures, as well as his conviction, pursued a legitimate aim, such as protecting the President’s rights and reputation or public order, it cannot be said that the restrictions were necessary to achieve one of these aims. The Committee observes that the requirement of necessity implies an element of proportionality, in the sense that the scope of the restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be proportional to the value which the restriction serves to protect. Given the paramount importance, in a democratic society, of the right to freedom of expression and of a free and uncensored press or other media, the severity of the sanctions imposed on the author cannot be considered as a proportionate measure to protect public order or the honour and the reputation of the President, a public figure who, as such, is subject to criticism and opposition. In addition, the Committee considers it an aggravating factor 457 Human Rights Committee, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, par. 2.12. 458 See Human Rights Committee, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, par. 3.1-3.7 459 Human Rights Committee, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ v. Angola, CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, par. 3.8.