Common use of Whilst Clause in Contracts

Whilst. the establishment of a de facto government by Sheikh Mujib was one dimension of the first phase of the revolution in Bangladesh, the other unique aspect of this phase was the militant mood of the common people. Every day from March 1 to March 25, 1971 innumerable processions chanting slogans like “Joi Bangla” (Glory to Bengal) or “Swadhin Bangladesh Zindabad” (Long Live Independent Bangladesh) paraded the streets of Dacca. These usually ended at Road 32 Dhanmandi (Mujib’s home), where the crowds received assurances from Sheikh Mujib that Mukti (emancipation) of Bangladesh would be achieved. Similar demonstrations took place in all other cities and towns of Bangladesh.164 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was mounting pressure on the central government through these street protests but refrained from making a unilateral declaration of 164 Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, pp. 79-80. independence for Bangladesh. The military regime organized three-way negotiations, among the Awami League, the PPP, and the government, with no settlement. In the course of the negotiations, military strength in East Pakistan was bolstered and plans drawn up to deal with the secessionist threat: The civil as well as the military officers who had gathered around Yahya Khan goaded him to take action. In their opinion the Awami League did not enjoy the support of the majority of the population of East Pakistan and the people did not have the stamina for prolonged opposition. Therefore, the upsurge of Bengali nationalism and their demands would cool down in a few days after military action. He was assured that short and harsh action taken would bring the situation under control and the politicians would be cowed down. The killing of a few thousand would not be a high price for keeping the country together. Handing over of power to Mujibur Rahman, a proved traitor would be a blunder and history would never forgive Yahya Khan for this. This advice, unfortunately, coincided with Yahya Khan’s own ideas. He believed, “show them the teeth and they will be all right.”165 The decision to use force against the Bengali people was not supported by those West Pakistani military officers who had served in the eastern wing for any length of time and therefore knew the local mood. The military governor of East Pakistan, Admiral S. M. Ahsan, and the military commander of East Pakistan, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, both argued that the political situation would not change with military measures. Yaqub Khan explained later that Yahya Khan: . . . thought a “whiff of the grapeshot” would do the trick and the reimposition of the rigors of martial law would create no problems . . . He remained adamant regarding postponement [of the National Assembly session] unless Mujib could be persuaded to make concessions on the Six Points to enable Bhutto and other West Pakistan leaders to attend the assembly session.166 Ahsan and Yaqub Khan both resigned and a new military commander, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, was brought in to enforce national unity. The attitude of the army was summed up by the general officer commanding, Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, who told an Awami League sympathizer within the hearing of fellow officers: “I will muster all I can—tanks, artillery and machine guns—to kill all the traitors and, if necessary, raze Dacca to the ground. There will be no one to rule; there will be nothing to rule.”167 The military crackdown, codenamed Operation Searchlight, began on the night of March 25, 1971. The operation’s basis for planning clearly stated: widespread 165 F. M. Khan, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, p. 51. 166 Zaheer, Separation of East Pakistan, p. 141. 167 Salik, Witness to Surrender, p. 53. support even amongst E. P. [East Pakistani] elements in the Army the operation has to be launched with great cunningness, surprise, deception and speed combined with shock action.”168 Troops moved with full force against Awami League supporters, students at Dhaka University, and Bengali Hindus. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and transferred to West Pakistan. Foreign journalists were rounded up and expelled from the province to prevent them from seeing the slaughter. Eyewitness accounts spoke of soldiers blowing up newspaper offices and several rooms in the university hostel shouting “Allah Akbar” (God is great)—the Muslim battle cry in the face of enemies of Islam. There is no evidence of the Awami League at this point having any military capability. Siddiq Salik, who worked as an officer in the Pakistan army’s public relations directorate and was present in Dacca cantonment throughout the military operation, offers the following account of the night of March 25, 1971: The first column from the cantonment met resistance at Farm Gate, about one kilometer from the cantonment. The column was halted by a huge tree trunk felled across the road. The side gaps were covered with the hulks of old cars and a disabled steam-roller. On the city side of the barricade stood several hundred Awami Leaguers shouting Joi Bangla slogans. I heard their spirited shouts while standing on the verandah of General Tikka’s headquarters. Soon some rifle shots mingled with the Joi Bangla slogans. A little later a burst of fire from an automatic weapon shrilled through the air. Thereafter it was a mixed affair of firing and fiery slogans, punctuated with the occasional chatter of a light machine gun. Fifteen minutes later the noise began to subside and the slogans started dying down. Apparently, the weapons had triumphed.169 The one-sided contest between slogans and guns, however, did not remain so for long. Many Bengali officers and soldiers of the Pakistan army deserted their units before they were disarmed. They, along with a large number of Awami League activists and East Bengali Hindus, went across to India and with Indian assistance formed the Mukti Bahini (emancipation army). India described the Pakistani military action as genocide of the Bengali people and used the presence of large numbers of Bengali refugees in India as the basis for involvement in internal developments in East Pakistan. Pakistan’s military had succeeded in transforming the political debate about Pakistan’s future constitution into a civil war as well as another contest between Islamic Pakistan and Hindu India. Admiral Ahsan (the military governor who conducted the elections and resigned on the eve of military action) admitted to U.S. officials later that “[p]rior to March at least, separation was 168 Ibid., p. 228, app. 3. 169 Ibid., pp. 74-75. not Mujib’s intention” and “India’s position has despite public outcry been relatively moderate and its hands before the events in March were relatively clean.”170