Unlinkability Sample Clauses
The Unlinkability clause is designed to ensure that data or information processed under an agreement cannot be traced back to specific individuals or entities. In practice, this clause requires that any identifying details are removed or obscured so that the data cannot be re-associated with its original source, even when combined with other datasets. Its core function is to protect privacy and confidentiality by preventing the re-identification of anonymized or pseudonymized information, thereby reducing the risk of data misuse or breaches.
Unlinkability. The "Unlinkability” data protection goal refers to the requirement that personal data must not be merged, i.e., chained. It must be implemented in particular when data to be merged were collected for different purposes.
Unlinkability. Any external entity except the trusted gateway node cannot determine whether two messages from distinguished authentication sessions are sent by the same entity.
Unlinkability. In our proposed scheme, the real identities or related information of all participants are not sent in plaintext over the insecure network because each transmitted message contains timestamps, random values and one-way hash function values. An outside adversary A cannot determine whether two or more authentication messages come from the same participant. Therefore, the transmitted messages cannot be linked by the adversary.
Unlinkability. Given two messages and their signatures, we cannot tell if the signatures were from the same signer or not.
Unlinkability. No one except the RA can determine whether two different signatures are from the same device.
Unlinkability. The "Unlinkability” data protection goal refers to the requirement that personal data must not be merged, i.e., chained. It must be implemented in particular when data to be merged were collected for different purposes.
a. Definition and determination of the processing purpose The processor uses appropriate measures to process the personal data processed on behalf of the controller only in the context of the contractually agreed purpose. These measures include: • Internal documentation and communication of the intended purpose in all data processing procedures • and regulated change-of-purpose procedures.
b. Measures to ensure purpose limitation The processor processes personal data exclusively for the contractually agreed purpose and gives access to the data only to persons/instances authorized to process them. In addition to the defined requirements for the data protection goals of availability, integrity, and confidentiality, the following measures were taken to avoid chaining data records with different purpose limitations: • Restriction of processing, usage, and transmission rights to the extent that is absolutely necessary for processing • Separation by organizational/departmental boundaries • Separation of environments by role concepts with tiered access rights on the basis of identity management and by means of secure authentication procedures • Development, testing, and operating environments must be separated logically at the least. Suitable access controls were implemented to ensure that access is restricted to properly authorized individuals. Within these environments, the processing of personal data was separated from other types of data. This separation was implemented either physically or logically. • If test or development networks or devices require access to the operating network, strict access controls were implemented. • Personal data cannot be processed in test and development environments. Necessary exceptions to this rule are only possible if based on separate, written instructions from the customer.
c. Definition, implementation, and use of anonymization procedures The processor organizes the data processing in such a way that personal data are processed only taking purpose limitation into account. If there is no purpose limitation, data that are not required are deleted. If it is not possible to delete the data, the relevant records are anonymized. Special-purpose pseudonyms, anonymization services, anonymous credentials, and the p...
Unlinkability. SD owns a number of pseudonyms and each pseudonym contains random number and times- ▇▇▇▇. Therefore, attackers cannot distinguish whether Pr[E1|E2] = P[E1] ≥ ‹