Common use of United States x Clause in Contracts

United States x. Xxxxx, 873 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 125 (1989); United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 841 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). While the amendment will not affect a large num- ber of cases, it should remove the dilemma in those close cases in which the court would feel pressured into making an immediate, and possibly erroneous, decision or violating the rule as presently written by reserving its ruling on the motion. The amendment also permits the trial court to bal- xxxx the defendant’s interest in an immediate resolu- tion of the motion against the interest of the govern- ment in proceeding to a verdict thereby preserving its right to appeal in the event a verdict of guilty is re- turned but is then set aside by the granting of a judg- ment of acquittal. Under the double jeopardy clause the government may appeal the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there would be no neces- sity for another trial, i.e., only where the jury has re- turned a verdict of guilty. United States x. Xxxxxx Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Thus, the government’s right to appeal a Rule 29 motion is only preserved where the ruling is reserved until after the verdict. In addressing the issue of preserving the govern- ment’s right to appeal and at the same time recogniz- ing double jeopardy concerns, the Supreme Court ob- served: We should point out that it is entirely possible for a trial court to reconcile the public interest in the Government’s right to appeal from an erroneous conclusion of law with the defendant’s interest in avoiding a second prosecution. In United States x. Xxxxxx, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the court permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty, but it subsequently dismissed the indict- ment for preindictment delay on the basis of evi- dence adduced at trial. Most recently in United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), we described similar action with approval: ‘The District Court had sensibly made its finding on the factual ques- tion of guilt or innocence, and then ruled on the motion to suppress; a reversal of these rulings would require no further proceeding in the District Court, but merely a reinstatement of the finding of guilt.’ Id. at 271. United States x. Xxxxx, 437 U.S. 82, 100 n. 13 (1978). By analogy, reserving a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal strikes the same balance as that reflected by the Supreme Court in Xxxxx. Reserving a ruling on a motion made at the end of the government’s case does pose problems, however, where the defense decides to present evidence and run the risk that such evidence will support the govern- ment’s case. To address that problem, the amendment provides that the trial court is to consider only the evi- dence submitted at the time of the motion in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court would be similarly limited. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 29 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below. In Rule 29(a), the first sentence abolishing ‘‘directed verdicts’’ has been deleted because it is unnecessary. The rule continues to recognize that a judge may sua sponte enter a judgment of acquittal.

United States x. Xxxxx, 873 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 125 (1989); United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 841 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). While the amendment will not affect a large num- ber of cases, it should remove the dilemma in those close cases in which the court would feel pressured into making an immediate, and possibly erroneous, decision or violating the rule as presently written by reserving its ruling on the motion. The amendment also permits the trial court to bal- xxxx the defendant’s interest in an immediate resolu- tion of the motion against the interest of the govern- ment in proceeding to a verdict thereby preserving its right to appeal in the event a verdict of guilty is re- turned but is then set aside by the granting of a judg- ment of acquittal. Under the double jeopardy clause the government may appeal the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there would be no neces- sity for another trial, i.e., only where the jury has re- turned a verdict of guilty. United States x. Xxxxxx Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Thus, the government’s right to appeal a Rule 29 motion is only preserved where the ruling is reserved until after the verdict. In addressing the issue of preserving the govern- ment’s right to appeal and at the same time recogniz- ing double jeopardy concerns, the Supreme Court ob- served: We should point out that it is entirely possible for a trial court to reconcile the public interest in the Government’s right to appeal from an erroneous conclusion of law with the defendant’s interest in avoiding a second prosecution. In United States x. Xxxxxx, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the court permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty, but it subsequently dismissed the indict- ment for preindictment delay on the basis of evi- dence adduced at trial. Most recently in United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), we described similar action with approval: ‘The District Court had sensibly made its finding on the factual ques- tion of guilt or innocence, and then ruled on the motion to suppress; a reversal of these rulings would require no further proceeding in the District Court, but merely a reinstatement of the finding of guilt.’ Id. at 271. United States x. Xxxxx, 437 U.S. 82, 100 n. 13 (1978). By analogy, reserving a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal strikes the same balance as that reflected by the Supreme Court in Xxxxx. Reserving a ruling on a motion made at the end of the government’s case does pose problems, however, where the defense decides to present evidence and run the risk that such evidence will support the govern- ment’s case. To address that problem, the amendment provides that the trial court is to consider only the evi- dence submitted at the time of the motion in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court would be similarly limited. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT 1986 Amendment Subd. (d). Pub. L. 99–646 added subd. (d). Effective Date of 1986 Amendment Section 54(b) of Pub. L. 99–646 provided that: ‘‘The language of Rule 29 has been amended as part amendments made by this section [amending this rule] shall take effect 30 days after the date of the general restyling enact- ment of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic onlythis Act [Nov. 10, except as noted below. In Rule 29(a), the first sentence abolishing ‘‘directed verdicts’’ has been deleted because it is unnecessary. The rule continues to recognize that a judge may sua sponte enter a judgment of acquittal1986].’’

United States x. Xxxxx, 873 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 125 (1989); United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 841 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). While the amendment will not affect a large num- ber of cases, it should remove the dilemma in those close cases in which the court would feel pressured into making an immediate, and possibly erroneous, decision or violating the rule as presently written by reserving its ruling on the motion. The amendment also permits the trial court to bal- xxxx the defendant’s interest in an immediate resolu- tion of the motion against the interest of the govern- ment in proceeding to a verdict thereby preserving its Page 107 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 29.1 right to appeal in the event a verdict of guilty is re- turned but is then set aside by the granting of a judg- ment of acquittal. Under the double jeopardy clause the government may appeal the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there would be no neces- sity for another trial, i.e., only where the jury has re- turned a verdict of guilty. United States x. Xxxxxx Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Thus, the government’s right to appeal a Rule 29 motion is only preserved where the ruling is reserved until after the verdict. In addressing the issue of preserving the govern- ment’s right to appeal and at the same time recogniz- ing double jeopardy concerns, the Supreme Court ob- served: We should point out that it is entirely possible for a trial court to reconcile the public interest in the Government’s right to appeal from an erroneous conclusion of law with the defendant’s interest in avoiding a second prosecution. In United States x. Xxxxxx, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the court permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty, but it subsequently dismissed the indict- ment for preindictment delay on the basis of evi- dence adduced at trial. Most recently in United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), we described similar action with approval: ‘The District Court had sensibly made its finding on the factual ques- tion of guilt or innocence, and then ruled on the motion to suppress; a reversal of these rulings would require no further proceeding in the District Court, but merely a reinstatement of the finding of guilt.’ Id. at 271. United States x. Xxxxx, 437 U.S. 82, 100 n. 13 (1978). By analogy, reserving a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal strikes the same balance as that reflected by the Supreme Court in Xxxxx. Reserving a ruling on a motion made at the end of the government’s case does pose problems, however, where the defense decides to present evidence and run the risk that such evidence will support the govern- ment’s case. To address that problem, the amendment provides that the trial court is to consider only the evi- dence submitted at the time of the motion in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court would be similarly limited. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 29 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below. In Rule 29(a), the first sentence abolishing ‘‘directed verdicts’’ has been deleted because it is unnecessary. The rule continues to recognize that a judge may sua sponte enter a judgment of acquittal.

United States x. Xxxxx, 873 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 125 Page 95 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 30 (1989); United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 841 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1988). While the amendment will not affect a large num- ber of cases, it should remove the dilemma in those close cases in which the court would feel pressured into making an immediate, and possibly erroneous, decision or violating the rule as presently written by reserving its ruling on the motion. The amendment also permits the trial court to bal- xxxx ance the defendant’s interest in an immediate resolu- tion of the motion against the interest of the govern- ment in proceeding to a verdict thereby preserving its right to appeal in the event a verdict of guilty is re- turned but is then set aside by the granting of a judg- ment of acquittal. Under the double jeopardy clause the government may appeal the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there would be no neces- sity for another trial, i.e., only where the jury has re- turned a verdict of guilty. United States x. Xxxxxx Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Thus, the government’s right to appeal a Rule 29 motion is only preserved where the ruling is reserved until after the verdict. In addressing the issue of preserving the govern- ment’s right to appeal and at the same time recogniz- ing double jeopardy concerns, the Supreme Court ob- served: We should point out that it is entirely possible for a trial court to reconcile the public interest in the Government’s right to appeal from an erroneous conclusion of law with the defendant’s interest in avoiding a second prosecution. In United States x. Xxxxxx, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the court permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty, but it subsequently dismissed the indict- ment for preindictment delay on the basis of evi- dence adduced at trial. Most recently in United States x. Xxxxxxxxx, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), we described similar action with approval: ‘The District Court had sensibly made its finding on the factual ques- tion of guilt or innocence, and then ruled on the motion to suppress; a reversal of these rulings would require no further proceeding in the District Court, but merely a reinstatement of the finding of guilt.’ Id. at 271. United States x. Xxxxx, 437 U.S. 82, 100 n. 13 (1978). By analogy, reserving a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal strikes the same balance as that reflected by the Supreme Court in Xxxxx. Reserving a ruling on a motion made at the end of the government’s case does pose problems, however, where the defense decides to present evidence and run the risk that such evidence will support the govern- ment’s case. To address that problem, the amendment provides that the trial court is to consider only the evi- dence submitted at the time of the motion in making its ruling, whenever made. And in reviewing a trial court’s ruling, the appellate court would be similarly limited. COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2002 1986 AMENDMENT Subd. (d). Pub. L. 99–646 added subd. (d). EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1986 AMENDMENT Section 54(b) of Pub. L. 99–646 provided that: ‘‘The language of Rule 29 has been amended as part amendments made by this section [amending this rule] shall take effect 30 days after the date of the general restyling enact- ment of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic onlythis Act [Nov. 10, except as noted below. In Rule 29(a), the first sentence abolishing ‘‘directed verdicts’’ has been deleted because it is unnecessary. The rule continues to recognize that a judge may sua sponte enter a judgment of acquittal1986].’’