Common use of The EAAG proviso Clause in Contracts

The EAAG proviso. A clear statement of the EAAG proviso is found in the fifth chapter of the Second Treatise: It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.32 What I take this to mean is that when you have mixed your labour with x, nobody except you has any right to x, at least in those cases in which your ownership of x does not prevent there being ‘enough, and as good’ for others. On this interpretation, ‘at least’ leaves open the possibility that you could also gain this kind of exclusive and exclusionary ownership with some thing in some cases in which you do not leave EAAG. This means, on ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ own account, that there is doubt as to whether EAAG is a necessary condition of ‘others-costs-addressed’ individual ownership; if we take ‘as least’ at face value, it seems as if it is not. Relevantly, ▇▇▇▇, amongst others, has suggested that we should assume that ▇▇▇▇▇ holds that certain further details of the possibilities of legitimate acquisition and ownership will arise consensually in non-state-of-nature societies.33 I shall return to this idea in my 31 See, e.g., ▇▇▇▇, “▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ on Property.” 32 ▇▇▇▇▇, Second Treatise, 19 (§27). final chapter, contending that such an interpretation works on a Lockean-liberal account, whether or not ▇▇▇▇ is right that it is what ▇▇▇▇▇ held. Beyond this, whether EAAG is a sufficient condition of all cases of ‘others-costs-addressed’ individual ownership depends on what the costs are that are in need of addressing on each kind of such ownership. But I shall contend below that even if EAAG did suffice to address all such costs, this would not also make EAAG a sufficient justification for individual ownership, because there are important questions to be answered regarding justification beyond matters of addressable cost. It also seems important to note that ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ direct emphasis within the EAAG proviso is not on the right-holder, but on everyone else. That is, the proviso serves specifically to provide clarification on a particular instance in which everyone else does not have the right in question: ‘so no other man can have a right to anything the labour is joined to — at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others’.34 The upshot of this is that, in any instance of EAAG having being left, the right-holder’s right is held exclusively and to the exclusion of the others, and the particular obligations that correlate with the right-holder’s right, whatever they are, are borne by the others. Finally, whilst I shall address below different interpretations of the term ‘enough, and as good’, it is relevant to emphasise upfront that both parts of the term — ‘enough’, with its requirement for sufficiency, and ‘as good’, with its requirement for certain standards — are entirely focused on addressing the loss to others that has been imposed, by ensuring that what is left behind makes up for this loss. I shall return to EAAG below, and now turn to two other ‘provisos’.