Common use of Sub conclusion Clause in Contracts

Sub conclusion. The British effort in Helmand was marred from the outset by a lack of understanding and an under-resourced yet over-ambitious campaign plan. Moreover, the initial campaign plan was immediately discarded by the first rotation in Helmand as a result of the pressures posed by the local dynamics. The jettisoning of the initial campaign plan was not redressed, as each incoming brigade brought a distinct plan for its own rotation which precluded any continuity beyond six months. In part this haphazard approach was driven by the regimental cultures, which entailed nuanced distinctions. PJHQ was initially unable to impose a new, feasible campaign on the early TFH rotations. In part, this can be explained by the violent character of the operation in which the British forces struggled to control their enlarged area of operations. A first adaptation thus was the gradual yet consistent increase in troop 1522 See Farrell. Unwinnable, p. 344. 1523 See ISAF data IEDs in Helmand in British Army. Herrick Campaign Study, p.3-6-E_1. 1524 Ministry of Defence. IED events, p. 4. numbers, from 3,000 in 2006 up to 10,000 in 2009. This was made possible by the concurrent withdrawal from Iraq. Yet, this growth in troop levels was unable to hold cleared areas, let alone develop them. Moreover, as the British were unable to withdraw from peripheral districts, TFH had to repeatedly conduct new clearance operations. Beyond the futility of this approach, such operations had an adverse effect on escalating the violence in Helmand and impaired the perception of the international effort by its population. More resources were needed, but due to the growing unpopularity of the Afghanistan campaign, the cabinet was unwilling send further reinforcements, despite public requests for further reinforcements by generals and the Americans. A further fundamental flaw in the campaign was the lack of a working assessment process that informed commanders of the effect of their activities and could guide their plans. The Army did not adopt the informal initiative of the Tactical Conflict Analysis Framework; moreover, the later Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme was predominantly used by the PRT and had little effect on the military operations. As such, this deficiency in understanding the effect of operations was not addressed. As the campaign made little lasting progress from 2006 to 2009, various adaptations were initiated to address deficiencies. These areas included training, doctrine, intelligence, non- kinetic activities, and interagency cooperation. Although some of these adaptations were successful, they were often impeded by a lack of central guidance. The primary exception to this situation was measures pertaining to force protection such as counter-IED efforts and the acquisition of protective vehicles. Protecting troops from harm was not only a prime consideration within the MoD, but also garnered significant political attention. Through bottom-up development of new TTPs and the procurement of vehicles and other equipment via the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process, these problems were gradually addressed.