Shared Keys Clause Samples
The Shared Keys clause establishes the rules and responsibilities regarding the use and management of cryptographic keys that are accessible to multiple parties. Typically, this clause outlines how such keys are generated, distributed, stored, and protected, and may specify who is authorized to use them and under what circumstances. For example, in a data-sharing agreement, both parties might use a shared encryption key to access sensitive information. The core practical function of this clause is to ensure security and accountability when multiple parties require access to the same cryptographic resources, thereby reducing the risk of unauthorized access or data breaches.
Shared Keys. For Licensed Products containing Shared Device Key Sets, Adopter shall order and use only Device Key Sets designated by AACS as “Shared Device Keys”. Adopter shall implement Proactive Renewal for all Licensed Products containing Shared Device Key Sets. A Licensed Product may implement Proactive Renewal only if the Licensed Product is capable of receiving Periodic Updates, including after a Shared Device Key Set has been Expired in accordance with Section
Shared Keys. For Licensed Products containing shared Device Key Sets, Adopter shall order and use only Device Key Sets designated by AACS as “Type C”.
Shared Keys. 6.2. Real life parameters and security. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [8] suggests that the success rate of a brute force attack decreases exponentially as the matrix order increases. In our context, this is irrelevant since the (X, Y) matrices are public and the security relies upon lambda and omega secret integers. Therefore, much attention must be paid to the pseudo-random number generator, since the security of the protocol depends sensibly on it, given the linear relationship between the public parameters (X, Y) and the private values (A, B). Since an attacker does not know (lambda, omega, A, B), a natural attack would be the systematic exploration of the space of the random constants (lambda, omega) which depend directly on the cardinal of the set ℤ𝑝 and in consequence the security against this attack is proportional to 𝑝2. We recommend using p ~ 264 as a minimum value. Thus, two random integers in ℤ𝑝 represent a 128-bit brute-force search. Consequently, overall security relies on the NP-hard nonlinear MPF [2] if the linear step becomes practically invulnerable.