Security Evaluation Sample Clauses

Security Evaluation. An Overview

Security Evaluation s Cognizant shall periodically evaluate its processes and systems for compliance with obligations imposed by applicable data protection law or contract with respect to the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and security of Personal Data and Cognizant Infrastructure. Cognizant shall document the results of these evaluations and any remediation activities taken in response to these evaluations.

Security Evaluation. ─No later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, Amtrak, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), shall submit a report to Congress that contains─

Security Evaluation. From the evaluation in the last section, we find that the protocol is vulnerable to the attacks of case 3 (i.e., the general concatenation attack (Attack 7)) and case 4 (Attack 8) of the known-key attack and the second source substitution attack (Attack 9). Through the analysis in [10], the general concatenation attack is feasible to all two-party AK protocols which use only (general) commutative operations on random flips in the agreed key generation function, and Attack 7 echoes this point in the tripartite (so the group) key agreement protocols. In fact Attack 8 is also feasible to this type of protocol in the tripartite case. Because the existing formal models are sensitive to these attacks (i.e., the known- key attacks of case 3 and 4), we cannot use these formal models to prove the security of the protocol. The authors in [1] used a model without the Reveal query, which simulates the threat of compromising session keys, to prove the security of a tweaked version of ATK-2. They concluded that ATK-2 achieves the known session key security. However, Attack 6 on ATK-2 demonstrates that the security formulation without the Reveal query is problematic. Moreover, proposal 1 also shows one example in which the concatenation attack is not feasible while the general concatenation attack is applicable. Note that both the concatenation attack and the general concatenation attack are feasible to ATK-1. As Shim’s ([21]) and ▇▇▇▇▇ et al.’s ([24]) identity-based protocols use only (general) commutative computations on random flips as well, the attacks (Attack 7 and 8) are also applicable in these protocols even the messages are signed by the senders. Hence to design a protocol that is secure against these attacks, we have to introduce some noncommutative (asymmetric) computation on random flips in the key generation functions. A simple way to introduce the noncommutative computation is to apply a hash operation on the agreed secret and messages of a session to generate the session key (so called the session key derivation mechanism). Note that there is a slight difference in the tripartite case from two-party protocols to apply a hash operation on messages, because in the tripartite case each party’s received messages could be in different orders. Fortunately parties can use many ways to unify the message order, so as to obtain the same transcript. For example, parties can treat the message as multi-precision numbers and sort the messages according to the numbers’ v...

Security Evaluation. Security evaluation of the designed mechanism is as follows, To calculate the cluster key and session key—both of which cannot be solved in polynomial time, as we utilized the security factor based on the chaotic maps-based ▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and discrete logarithm problems. Considering the attacker has complete command to access the network and use an unsecured channel to carry out destructive actions. The attacker cannot obtain the knowledge necessary to calculate the cluster and session-keys, though. Our key generation technique offers lower key sizes, faster computation, less memory usage, and energy consumption than key generation algorithms like RSA and ECC, making it ideally suited for infrastructure-less networks. Since the session-key is created proactively rather than passively and no data is saved on the network, our architecture is resistant to both modification and stolen verification attacks. Because nodes can modify and revise the cluster key, our mechanism is resistant to guessing attacks. To assess the security strength of our proposed protocol, we implemented it within the AVISPA tool, which, in turn, executed the algorithm. The results of this evaluation are depicted in Figure 3, providing valuable insights into the security attributes and robustness of our protocol design. This formal analysis is instrumental in ensuring that our protocol meets the stringent security requirements essential for its intended application.