Common use of Our Contributions Clause in Contracts

Our Contributions. We provide definitions and constant-round protocols for key agreement from noisy pass-strings that: – Have well specified composition properties via the UC framework [Can01]. Instead of imposing entropy requirements or other requirements on the dis- tribution of pass-strings, our protocols are secure as long as the adversary cannot guess a pass-string value that is sufficiently close. There is no requirement, for example, that the amount of pass-string entropy is greater than the number of errors; in fact, one of our protocols is suitable for iris scans. Moreover, our pro- tocols prevent off-line attacks, so each adversarial attempt to get close to the correct pass-string requires an on-line interaction by the adversary. Thus, for example, our protocols can be meaningfully run with pass-strings whose entropy is only 30 bits—something not possible with any prior protocols for the noisy case.

Our Contributions. We provide definitions and constant-round protocols for key agreement from noisy pass-strings that: – Have well specified composition properties via the UC framework [Can0117]. Instead of imposing entropy requirements or other requirements on the dis- tribution of pass-strings, our protocols are secure as long as the adversary cannot guess a pass-string value that is sufficiently close. There is no requirement, for example, that the amount of pass-string entropy is greater than the number of errors; in fact, one of our protocols is suitable for iris scans. Moreover, our pro- tocols prevent off-line attacks, so each adversarial attempt to get close to the correct pass-string requires an on-line interaction by the adversary. Thus, for example, our protocols can be meaningfully run with pass-strings whose entropy is only 30 bits—something not possible with any prior protocols for the noisy case.

Our Contributions. We provide definitions and constant-round protocols for key agreement from noisy pass-pass- strings that: – Have well specified composition properties via the UC framework [Can01]. Instead of imposing entropy requirements or other requirements on the dis- tribution distribution of pass-strings, our protocols are secure as long as the adversary cannot guess a pass-pass- string value that is sufficiently close. There is no requirement, for example, that the amount of pass-string entropy is greater than the number of errors; in fact, one of our protocols is suitable for iris scans. Moreover, our pro- tocols protocols prevent off-line attacks, so each adversarial attempt to get close to the correct pass-string requires an on-line interaction by the adversary. Thus, for example, our protocols can be meaningfully run with pass-pass- strings whose entropy is only 30 bits—something not possible with any prior protocols for the noisy case.