Interim conclusion Clause Samples
The "Interim conclusion" clause establishes a formal point at which certain aspects of an agreement or process are considered temporarily settled before the final conclusion is reached. In practice, this clause may specify that particular deliverables, milestones, or decisions are accepted as complete for the time being, allowing the parties to proceed with subsequent phases or obligations. Its core function is to provide clarity and structure during ongoing projects or negotiations, ensuring that progress can be recognized and relied upon even if the overall agreement is not yet fully finalized.
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Interim conclusion. Let me take stock. I have argued that the goal of conversation is agreement and this goal is theoretically possible if the discussants are able to communicate. I have examined a couple of passages of the Protagoras to provide some norms for the correct manner of conversation and inquiry. In addition, I have suggested that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ adopts the equal weight view, which renders Protagoras an epistemic peer and maintains the belief that Protagoras might have legitimate ground for holding 119 In the Gorgias, there are, for ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, questions which he asks for “further inquiry (sc. ἐπανερωτῶ)” even though something seems “clear (δῆλον)”. Such questions are not aimed at the opponent herself, but they allow ‘the discussion to proceed in due order (τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον)’. These questions also prevent us from being ‘accustomed to guess the other person’s meaning because of jumping to conclusions’. See Gorg. 453b9-c5. This remark neatly illustrates the necessity of critical reasoning although an argument seems to be clear and the advantage of understanding what the other’s argument is in its entirety. 120 Prot. 339e5ff. 121 However, note also that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ in the Gorgias stresses that an agreement should not result from having more than enough sense of shame (οὔτ᾽ αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ). Any agreement, for ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, should stem from “adequate testing” of an idea if the opponent does not lack wisdom and has the “appropriate” amount of shame. See Gorg. 487e1-e6. If this is so, giving credence to others’ skill and ideas does not mean underestimating one’s own skills. See also Ap. 34d9-35a5 for the fine line between arrogance (αὐθαδιζόμενος) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (δόξαν), and the relationship between ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and shame. Simply, losing one’s esteem, i.e. under-estimating oneself, is shame, or disgrace. the opposite view. I also showed that careful checking and critical thinking have a key role in attaining deeper understanding. As stated above, however, the discussion did not conclude with an agreement on whether excellence can be taught, which was the main point of disagreement. In fact, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ come to believe the opposite of their original opinion in the end: the latter believes that excellence can be taught while the former believes it cannot. Surely, the discussion is not totally in vain. On the one hand, each side has become aware of the fact that some cases or arguments do not support their original claim. On the other hand, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, for instance, ...
Interim conclusion. All Parties or Party groups refer in their submission to equity, CBDR/RC or fairness, as a guiding element for the 2015 Agreement. The distinction between these three notions is not clear and they are often used interchangeably. There is a tendency for industrialised countries to use the term ‘fairness’, as opposed to developing countries that more often point to ‘equity’ or ‘CBDR/RC’. All Parties seem to agree that differentiation across countries is an important element of operationalising equity. Mostly, equity, fairness and CBDR/RC are associated with distributing the burden of mitigation between countries. Some groups consider that equity is also reflected in a differentiation of adaptation and support contributions, or required for MRV or assessment provisions. As criteria for this differentiation, groups point to historical responsibility, future emissions, capability, needs, vulnerability or mitigation potential. Especially industrialised countries highlight that equity and CBDR/RC should be interpreted in a dynamic manner that reflects the development of responsibilities and capabilities. In contrast, some developing countries argue for using established categories (Annex I and non-Annex I) as a basis for differentiation. Some groups see equity as cutting across several elements of the 2015 Agreement, e.g. arguing that developing countries would only need to take mitigation action if adequate financial resources are provided by developed countries. Noteworthy is the perception that there is no ‘one-fits-all’ equity approach but that equity is guaranteed if each individual party considers its own contribution as fair. Proposals that each party should highlight, when submitting its intended nationally determined contribution, its own fairness indicators, point in a similar direction. Interestingly, unlike some of the literature on equity, the analysed submissions do not make reference in the direct context of equity to fair process, sustainable development, or intergenerational concepts, and only AILAC mentions the protection of vulnerable population as part of equity (see section below on ‘assisting the vulnerable’). We only analysed those parts of submissions that directly referred to equity, CBDR/RC or fairness. Since some Parties identify ‘equity’ as a cross-cutting principle that should guide all elements of the 2015 Agreement, it is possible that the understanding of ‘equity, CBDR/RC or fairness’ is broader than what was identified here. The f...
Interim conclusion. This section has elaborated on prospective developments of demographic, geographical, socio- economic and behavioural factors, as well as mobility aspects, influencing the demand for mobility in general and for air transport in particular with a focus on the years 2035 and 2050. Whereas some outlooks are rather vague, other developments are very well supported by data and several sources. Figure 31 summarises the essential drivers for future passenger demand and the potential developments. On the basis of these results, implications for future passenger profiles will be derived in the next sections.
Interim conclusion. There is consistent evidence for the potential benefits of mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) in depression. However, current empirical studies of MBI have several methodological limitations, including their reliance on TAU or waitlist control comparisons, which does not elucidate about active ingredients of mindfulness interventions. Attempts have been made to validate active control interventions that match MBI (e.g., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2012), but there are very few studies comparing the effects of MBI and an active control intervention for depression. The current study is an experimental study that will use an active control intervention- relaxation training using guided visual imagery. Therefore, one of the aims of the study is to overcome previous studies’ limitations by examining the relative efficacy of a mindfulness intervention.
Interim conclusion. This section examined the jurisprudence of the CJEU up to the inception of the GC in 1989. It found that the seminal case of STM outlined a comprehensive test in order to determine the object of an agreement. The STM Test was further fleshed out by subsequent judgments, which all focused on uncovering the rationale behind an agreement drawn from its legal and economic context. Put another way, is the agreement designed to restrict competition? This approach is referred to as the more analytical approach (the MAAP). Under the MAAP, to prove the ‘object’ of an agreement the following factors are taken into account:
a) The key question is: what is the “precise purpose” of the agreement?
b) Such purpose is extrapolated from:
i) the content of the agreement,
ii) the conduct of the parties to the agreement,
iii) an objective determination of the purpose of the agreement only drawing on the subjective intention of the parties if appropriate, and
iv) the circumstances of the agreement.
c) The purpose is assessed within the agreement’s specific legal and economic context, which takes account of:
i) The effect of the agreement on competition (both potential and even actual),
ii) The market structure, markets shares, definition of the market,
Interim conclusion. It has been established that, overall, there is little endorsement by the CJEU of the orthodox approach within its early jurisprudence. This is evidenced when the case law that focuses on those agreements that ‘by their nature’ restrict competition do not wholeheartedly align with the orthodox tradition. Instead, the case law focuses more heavily on understanding the aim or purpose of the agreement within its context. One case that bears more resemblance to the Commission’s interpretation of the object criterion is that of ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. However, even here the CJEU refers to the “intention” of the agreement. The value of these cases as precedents for the orthodox approach is therefore questionable. Conversely, the cases demonstrate how the CJEU adopts language that can be construed so as to support a more orthodox meaning. Nevertheless, the Court provides no definition for the phrase 108 (Odudu, 2001), ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): the Object Requirement Revisited’, p384; C-29&30/83 109 Ibid, (Odudu, 2001), p384. 110 Supra n108, CRAM, para 28. ‘by its nature’. This emphasises the Court’s own shortcomings in terms of clarity of the law and its contribution to the confusion surrounding the object concept. The lack of case law that unequivocally supports the orthodox approach is further confirmed in the next section, which substantiates the proposition that the MAAP forms the basis of the law on the object criterion.
Interim conclusion. Cost-effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation activities are, in general, treated as different issues in the submissions. Cost-effectiveness of mitigation activities is only highlighted directly by the EU and EIG. This suggests that cost-effectiveness is addressed especially by those that need to take emission reduction measures. Both the EU and EIG also suggest an analysis of costs and benefits. The EU explicitly highlights that it considers market mechanisms to be a cost-effective means to achieve emission reduction by implementing relevant projects where they are least costly. The LMDCs indirectly address the cost-effectiveness of mitigation activities by referring to Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC. Cost-effectiveness of adaptation measures is addressed in many of the submissions. The frequency of references to ‘cost-effectiveness’ in Parties’ submissions is summarised in Table 5. Table 5 Reference to cost-effectiveness in the Parties' submissions AGN AILAC AOSIS CHINA EIG EU LDCs LMDC UG US Reference to cost- effectiveness x x x x x x
Interim conclusion. ‘Environmental effectiveness’ and ‘ambition’ are frequently not separated accurately. This could be owed to the fact that the term ‘ambition’ is still in its infancy and not yet clearly defined. Overall, Parties stress that high ambition is essential for the 2015 Agreement. The frequency of references to ‘ambition’ in Parties’ submissions is summarised in Table 3. Table 3 Reference to level of ambition in the Parties' submissions AGN AILAC AOSIS CHINA EIG EU LDCs LMDC UG USA Reference to level of x x x x x x x x x ambition
Interim conclusion. We started section 2 with the normative intuition and hypothesis that it is a state’s causal powers in relation to an individual’s interests that justify the former to become a duty bearer and the latter a rights holder. We subsequently discussed the gradual nature of causal powers and held that, since causal powers entail duty, relations of duty ought to reflect the gradual nature of causal powers. To have a causal power means to have an ‘ability’ (dispositional element) to ‘cause’ or ‘bring about’ certain ‘outcomes’ or ‘effects’ in the world (causal element). Both agents and structures can have causal powers. Importantly, power is a gradual concept. The ability to bring about a state of affairs in a particular situation often depends on a whole variety of factors, including other causal factors which may dispose towards or away from that outcome. In the social sphere, ‘power’ and ‘influence’ are concepts that draw on causal powers but their conceptual difference lies in the degree to which they can bring about outcomes in the world. Our everyday legal language can be cast in the conceptual language offered by the scientific world view. To that end, is useful to list the conceptual vocabulary related to causal powers in the scientific world view … : - A cause is something that brings about an outcome to a certain extent; - A causal power (or ‘power to’) is an ability to bring about an outcome to a certain extent; - Causation is causal powers being exercised; - Power (or ‘causal power to effect’) is the ability to bring about an outcome to the full or a large extent; - Influence (or ‘causal power to affect’) is the ability to bring about an outcome to a limited extent; - Exercising power (or ‘having power over the outcome’ or ‘effecting’) is exercising the ability the bring about an outcome to a large extent (effecting); - Exercising influence (or ‘having influence over the outcome’ or ‘affecting’) is exercising the ability to bring about an outcome to a limited extent. - Agentive power or influence concerns the causal powers of actors; - Structural power or influence concerns the causal powers of social structures; - Omissions concern unexercised causal powers, be it power or influence; … and in the legal world view: - Authority (or ‘causal power to assert authority’) is a state’s ability or causal power to regulate things with a view to bringing about outcomes; - Exercising authority (or ‘authority over’ or ‘effecting through authority’) is a state regul...
Interim conclusion. Where Parties comment in their submissions on institutions, they mainly focus on dealing with and strengthening existing institutions. Different institutional bodies are distinguished, highlighting issues on, for example, financing and capacity-building institutions, climate finance institutions or institutions that serve to enhance efforts on different aspects relevant to adaptation to climate change. Certain groups also call for additional institutions. The African Group, for example, specifically calls for a Capacity Building Committee. The frequency of references to ‘institutional capacity’ in Parties’ submissions is summarised in Table 8. Table 8 Reference to institutional capacity in the Parties' submissions AGN AILAC AOSIS CHINA EIG EU LDCs LMDC UG USA Reference to institutional x x x x x x x x capacity