Common use of Intelligence and understanding Clause in Contracts

Intelligence and understanding. The initial inability to understand the local dynamics of Helmand by the British Task Force has been well documented. In the analysis of the inadequacies of the intelligence process, several causes were identified. Primarily, the British troops generally lacked interaction with the local population as they were spread too thinly and were predominantly conducting clearance operations.1426 A second deficiency was that the focus of the intelligence process was on the adversary instead of the operational environment as a whole. As a result, the intelligence process in the initial years was insufficient in providing a thorough understanding of the dynamics in Helmand. Thirdly, the intelligence process was not organized for a counterinsurgency campaign. Initially intelligence was structured top-down instead of bottom up. This meant that the headquarters of TFH had access to highly classified intelligence from sensitive sources that originated at higher echelons. Consequently, intelligence personnel were preoccupied with analyzing this stream of information, to the detriment of intelligence derived from patrols and other open sources. Essentially, the deficiencies in the intelligence process in Afghanistan were a continuation of those experienced in Iraq. Best practices picked up in Northern Ireland, such as decentralized intelligence processes, the importance of interaction with the local population and the study of open sources, had seemingly been forgotten. 1427 In comparison to the Dutch Army, the British Army had a separate intelligence corps at the time of the ISAF-campaign. The Intelligence Corps thus could serve as a natural anchor point for knowledge acquired in Helmand. As such, intelligence personnel received consistent 1426 See for this notion: Martin. An Intimate War; Ledwidge. Losing Small Wars; Emile Simpson (2012). War from the ground up: Twenty-first-century comabat as politics. London: Hurst. 1427 British Army. Herrick Campaign Study, p. 3-1_5. training in their specialty. Moreover, these service members could pursue an established career path in this branch and build experience. However, these specialists were initially concentrated at the TFH/brigade level.1428 In contrast, in the battle groups, the intelligence section (S2) were staffed by officers and NCOs from the own regiments (thus mainly infantry and cavalry). In theory, these personnel were trained for their intelligence roles prior to deployment. Unfortunately, this was not always the case due to last minute shifts in personnel. Moreover, intelligence positions in battle groups were not necessarily coveted by the organic battalion personnel, as command or operations (S3) billets were perceived to hold more allure. At the company level, the problems with intelligence position were even more pronounced as the small number of positions had to be filled by relatively junior personnel.1429 As such, the preparation and quality of the intelligence personnel at the battle group level and below were inconsistent. This factor impeded the processing and analysis of the information that was acquired by the units in the field and thus affected the intelligence position of TFH as a whole. The lack of understanding of Helmand was widely recognized in the early rotations. For instance, battle group commanders requested to embed personnel from the intelligence corps in their units. This became practice after 2009 as part of Operation Entirety. The battle groups were reinforced with intelligence support detachments (BGISD). This was replicated at replicated at the company level with intelligence support teams (COIST).1430 These small detachments consisted of officers and enlisted personnel from the Intelligence Corps and were meant to augment the organic intelligence sections.1431 In practice, many battalion intelligence officers were repurposed to fill other billets or replace casualties. The establishment of BGISDs and COISTs resulted in mixed teams of Intelligence Corps personnel and organic battalion personnel.1432 In essence, the BGISD and COISTs meant a qualitative improvement of the intelligence process at the tactical level. Quantitatively speaking, their contribution was modest with just one or two individuals per unit.1433 As TFH increasingly concentrated in central Helmand, the interaction with local population increased and patrols generated more data. With the eventual augmentation of specialized personnel, processing and analysis of this enlarged data flow improved.1434 Still, the addition of Intelligence Corps personnel to manoeuvre units meant that they had to be integrated during their predeployment phase. Consequently, personnel had to receive specific training while at the same time help to prepare their new 1428 Interviews British army staff officer 13; British army staff officer 11. 1429 Interviews British army staff officer 15; British army staff officer 13; British army staff officer 11. 1430 British Army. Herrick Campaign Study, p. 3-1_7. 1431 Intelligence Brigade. Intel Best Practices, p. 10-3. 1432 Interviews British army staff officer 15; British army staff officer 13; British army staff officer 11. 1433 Intelligence Brigade. Intel Best Practices, p. 10-3. 1434 British Army. Herrick Campaign Study, p. 3-1_5. units with understanding their area of operations. Within the Intelligence Corps it was acknowledged that attachment to an infantry company or battalion required different competencies from its personnel than a position as an analyst at higher headquarters. Therefore, personnel for the BGISDs and COISTs were specifically selected for their ability to connect with tactical commanders and work in austere conditions.1435 Additionally, BGISDs and COISTs were attached to Afghan National Army units to enhance their intelligence processes. As the campaign progressed in time, the training of intelligence personnel was slowly adapted. However, this lagged behind the developments in-theater. For instance, the training of battalion S2s in 2008 was overwhelmingly geared at finding and fighting insurgents; it had little to offer on local dynamics and identifying IED networks. Consequently, these officers found that they were ill-prepared for their role in Helmand.1436 Curiously, the secondary training of new Intelligence Corps officers was even more hidebound. During this training, the focus was on the role of intelligence in conventional war. The junior officers had to study the Military Intelligence Field Manual (colloquially known as the “pink pillow” due to its size and hue of the pages) that was essentially a relic of the Cold War, focused on the organization and doctrine of Soviet Army formations.1437 This did little to prepare the young officers for deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan. By 2010-2011 a shift became visible in these training efforts towards more contextual understanding of the wider human terrain.1438 Gradually, the population and the social dynamics became the subject of intelligence training, driven by demand from the field and by instructors who had served in Afghanistan and Iraq.1439 In 2011, the centrality of comprehensive understanding of the human terrain was incorporated into various doctrinal documents.1440 The increased attention for the human terrain and cultural knowledge for understanding of the operational environment in Helmand is further illustrated by the establishment of the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU) in 2010. This new unit was the result of a combination of formal and informal processes within the armed forces.1441 Recognizing the value of linguistic skills in-theatre, service members could volunteer to attend courses in Dari or Pashtu. There was a basic course of ten weeks and a proficiency course of 18 months. Although this initiative was commendable it was initially impeded by a lack of cultural awareness. This