Identified Barriers. The Dutch case study, conducted in the context of the task 6.4, focused on the identification of contextual factors that influenced the development of smart grids in the 5 The Dutch DSOs created a company called Energy Data Service Netherlands (EDSN) in 2002 that had initially been working with external IT partners to provide standardized bilateral communication between market entities. 6 The regulation is technology-neutral. It supports efficient investments, not considering their nature. “System network operators are currently expected to make the investments that are necessary to contribute to a more sustainable and renewable energy chain, for example, infrastructure for solar panels or wind farms. The method of regulation enables system operators to make an appropriate return on these investments”. (Autoriteit Consumert & Markt 2017) Netherlands. Relevant stakeholders expressed their perceptions on the main factors influencing smart grid deployment. As stated in the original analysis, “market and regulatory reform was the most important contextual factor for implementing Smart Grids” in the Netherlands (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Below we present and discuss the individual barriers, structured around the three categories presented in section 2, namely: (i) institutions and governance, (ii)innovation and investment-related issues and (iii) attitudes, behaviour and lifestyle. Concerns have been voiced for the current market and regulatory framework prescribing an unbundled energy market model that was characterized by Dutch stakeholders as a blocking factor since reportedly it limits free communication and collaboration among market entities, which is a prerequisite for the successful deployment of smart grids. The unbundling of the energy system made the adoption of smart grids a complex issue with many actors involved. The fact that grid operators are regulated public entities with limits to their cooperation with energy supplying companies, was especially considered to be in contrast to the mandate of smart grid technologies for close cooperation of these entities (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Dutch experts also highlighted that due to this limitation, DSOs are not allowed to provide smart devices to consumers as this would interfere with the competition of energy supplying companies, and they cannot exchange data with retailers. Furthermore, DSOs are not allowed to own, develop, manage or operate storage assets (eurelectric 2017). Such communication/technology dissemination restrictions between DSOs, utilities and consumers in the Netherlands are contrary to the operational requirements of smart grids, demonstrating that EU policies can cause significant barriers to technology diffusion if not co-designed with the active involvement of all member states. In regard to market and investment-related issues, the fact that fossil fuels remain widely used as a cheaper and more reliable supply source, despite their greenhouse gas emissions, was considered and highlighted as barrier to the evolution of smart grid technologies by stakeholders (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Smart grids can lead to significant GHG emission reductions from the power sector through increased energy efficiency (EE) and increased penetration of non-carbon-based, renewable-energy resources. Yet the willingness to invest in low-carbon technologies can indeed be mitigated by more competitive fossil-fuel supply technology alternatives, mainly due to lowered Operational Expenditure (OPEX) costs. At the same time, CO2 prices in the Emission Trading System (ETS) sector have been lower than expected in recent years, while the acceleration of the EU’s efforts to toughen up the GHG reduction regime demonstrates widespread acknowledgement of the need to encourage innovation and promote the use of low-carbon technologies. On the other hand, the impact of RES variability in the market as well as the effect of negative electricity prices was considered to further underline the necessity of smart grid deployment to enable demand response (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Simulations implementing the targets of the Netherlands to increase its renewables share have shown that very high and negative prices are likely occur especially post 2030 (Frontier Economics 2015). The possibility of negative electricity prices at times of low demand and high RE generation raised concerns among stakeholders, who were quoted as saying that “energy companies will have to pay users for using energy to relieve the grid from the stress” (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Although the occurrence of negative prices may incentivize consumers to shift their consumption patterns to benefit themselves with ‘free’ energy and further push the deployment of smart grids, a number of implications can be envisioned for other actors in the power market. On the one hand, negative prices are acceptable, and many times preferred by central fossil fuelled generation stations because it is cheaper to pay users to consume the ‘extra’ electricity for a little while, than to shut down and power up later. On the other hand, distributed renewable generators see negative prices as revenue loss since they have to return part of the infeed remuneration they have received. While this is a counter-incentive for renewable generators, it has the potential to act as a bottom-up auto-correction in case of allocation of a sum of small subsidies to many small RE power producers, which can lead to increased volume of subsidies (Benedettini and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2014). At the same time, policy incentives given to DSOs and ESCOs to invest in smart grids were deemed insufficient. Interviewees remarked that “Grid operators in the Netherlands (TSOs & DSOs) consider the development of smart grids to be crucial for the market survival however they claim that they are restricted by law”. It was also mentioned that if grid operators start developing smart grids, ESCOs will follow (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Lack of sufficient financial incentives was seen by stakeholders as an important constraint to smart grid deployment in the Netherlands for key market actors (i.e. both DSOs and ESCOs). We interpreted this barrier to relate to the state of the current regulatory framework with regard to the grid tariff structure, which would allow dynamic pricing, as well as other incentives of innovative grid works that can be introduced by governments to incentivize both DSOs and ESCOs to invest in smart grid business-cases. Finally, the public resistance to smart grid deployment already caused delay in the smart meter roll-out and mandates further action from the government to increase costumer awareness and participation. As highlighted in the Dutch case, the announcement of the roll-out of smart meters raised serious concerns and opposition from both the public and members of the government, mainly due to reasons of data privacy and consumer security in the Netherlands. This fact resulted in halting the original rollout phase (which was planned to begin in 2004) for 8 years. During this period, consumer organizations were formed which expressed worries about the fact that smart meters share consumption data with energy companies. These worries were also expressed by members of the Dutch parliament. Furthermore, smart grid expansion also met public resistance mainly due to cost and privacy issues or a lack of interest (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017).
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Identified Barriers. The Dutch In the Greek case study, as conducted in the context of the task 6.4, focused under D6.3 - Report on the identification knowledge gaps about key contextual factors (Fujiwara, Williges και ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017), a set of contextual factors that influenced inhibiting the development diffusion of smart grids building innovation and EE technologies in the 5 The Dutch DSOs created a company called Energy Data Service Netherlands (EDSN) building sector was analysed. Stakeholders engaged in 2002 that had initially been working with external IT partners the consultation process expressed concerns which were mainly relevant to provide standardized bilateral communication between market entitiesinstitutions and governance, innovation and investment- related issues in the domestic energy services market. 6 The regulation is technology-neutral. It supports efficient investmentsFactors related to attitudes, not considering their nature. “System network operators are currently expected to make the investments that are necessary to contribute to a more sustainable behaviour and renewable energy chain, for example, infrastructure for solar panels or wind farmslifestyle were also deemed quite influential. The method lack of regulation enables system operators an enabling institutional framework, with regard to make EPC and GPP, has been mentioned as an appropriate return on these investments”inhibiting factor to the diffusion of energy saving technologies across sectors. While an EPC framework for public buildings exists in Greece (Autoriteit Consumert & Markt 2017) Netherlands▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, et al. Relevant stakeholders expressed their perceptions on the main factors influencing smart grid deployment. As stated 2015), contracting is viewed as deficit in a municipality’s balance sheet, which has limits in the original analysis, “market and regulatory reform was amount of debt it can present at the most important contextual factor for implementing Smart Grids” in the Netherlands end of a fiscal year (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Below we present More specifically, the problem is that even though EPCs are paid via energy consumption reduction (no instant payment is done), municipal debt regulations restrict pubic debt (including contracted debt) to a percentage of the last year’s revenues, which can easily be surpassed with EPC projects. For the case of GPP, the lack in trained personnel to conduct GPP, with a parallel lack of coordination between pertinent authorities and discuss special services across ministries were mentioned as causes. On that subject, in the individual barriers4th NEEAP the General Secretariat for Trade and Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Economy, structured around Development and Tourism is assigned as the three categories presented in section 2, namely: (i) institutions and governance, (ii)innovation and investment-related issues and (iii) attitudes, behaviour and lifestyle. Concerns have been voiced pertinent authority for the current market development of a National Policy and the elaboration of a National Action Plan for the Promotion of GPP. The General Secretariat is expected to cooperate with all pertinent ministries, public and private sector bodies to promote the necessary legislative arrangements and to take the necessary measures required for the implementation of the relevant provisions for GPP. Additionally, where necessary, the ministry applies measures to remove regulatory framework prescribing an unbundled and non-regulatory barriers that hinder the implementation of EPCs and other energy market model that was characterized by Dutch stakeholders as efficiency services (ΥΠΕΚΑ 2018). Nevertheless, no coordination procedures are yet specified to ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and establish a blocking factor since reportedly it limits free communication more efficient cooperation across different authorities and collaboration among market public entities. The lack of ministerial coordination or established procedures between ministries regarding the design and implementation of EE measures in Greece, which is a prerequisite major obstacle for policy makers responsible for the successful deployment design of smart grids. The unbundling financial incentives for the promotion of the energy system made the adoption of smart grids a complex issue with many actors involved. The fact that grid operators are regulated public entities with limits to their cooperation with energy supplying companies, was especially considered to be in contrast to the mandate of smart grid building innovation technologies for close cooperation of these entities (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Dutch experts also highlighted that due to this limitation, DSOs are not allowed to provide smart devices to consumers as this would interfere with the competition of energy supplying companies, and they cannot exchange data with retailers. Furthermore, DSOs are not allowed to own, develop, manage or operate storage assets (eurelectric multEE 2017). Such communication/technology dissemination restrictions between DSOs, utilities The inefficient inter-ministerial coordination was attributed to (i) the lack of cooperation and consumers communication among ministries and authorities in the Netherlands are contrary to the operational requirements of smart grids, demonstrating that EU policies can cause significant barriers to technology diffusion if not co-designed with the active involvement of all member states. In regard to market and investment-related issues, the fact that fossil fuels remain widely used as a cheaper and more reliable supply source, despite their greenhouse gas emissions, was considered and highlighted as barrier to the evolution of smart grid technologies by stakeholders (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Smart grids can lead to significant GHG emission reductions from the power sector through increased energy efficiency (EE) and increased penetration of non-carbon-based, renewable-energy resources. Yet the willingness to invest in low-carbon technologies can indeed be mitigated by more competitive fossil-fuel supply technology alternatives, mainly due to lowered Operational Expenditure (OPEX) costs. At the same time, CO2 prices in the Emission Trading System (ETS) sector have been lower than expected in recent years, while the acceleration of the EU’s efforts to toughen up the GHG reduction regime demonstrates widespread acknowledgement of the need to encourage innovation and promote the use of low-carbon technologies. On the other hand, the impact of RES variability in the market different governance levels as well as the effect of negative electricity prices was considered to further underline the necessity of smart grid deployment to enable demand response (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Simulations implementing the targets of the Netherlands to increase its renewables share have shown that very high and negative prices are likely occur especially post 2030 (Frontier Economics 2015). The possibility of negative electricity prices at times of low demand and high RE generation raised concerns among stakeholders, who were quoted as saying that “energy companies will have to pay users for using energy to relieve the grid from the stress” (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Although the occurrence of negative prices may incentivize consumers to shift their consumption patterns to benefit themselves with ‘free’ energy and further push the deployment of smart grids, a number of implications can be envisioned for other actors in the power market. On the one hand, negative prices are acceptable, and many times preferred by central fossil fuelled generation stations because it is cheaper to pay users to consume the ‘extra’ electricity for a little while, than to shut down and power up later. On the other hand, distributed renewable generators see negative prices as revenue loss since they have to return part of the infeed remuneration they have received. While this is a counter-incentive for renewable generators, it has the potential to act as a bottom-up auto-correction in case of allocation of a sum of small subsidies to many small RE power producers, which can lead to increased volume of subsidies (Benedettini and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2014). At the same time, policy incentives given to DSOs and ESCOs to invest in smart grids were deemed insufficient. Interviewees remarked that “Grid operators in the Netherlands (TSOs & DSOs) consider the development of smart grids to be crucial for the market survival however they claim that they are restricted by law”. It was also mentioned that if grid operators start developing smart grids, ESCOs will follow (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017). Lack of sufficient financial incentives was seen by stakeholders as an important constraint to smart grid deployment in the Netherlands for key market actors (i.e. both DSOs and ESCOs). We interpreted this barrier to relate to the state of the current regulatory framework with regard to the grid tariff structure, which would allow dynamic pricing, as well as other incentives of innovative grid works that can be introduced by governments to incentivize both DSOs and ESCOs to invest in smart grid business-cases. Finally, the public resistance to smart grid deployment already caused delay in the smart meter roll-out and mandates further action from the government to increase costumer awareness and participation. As highlighted in the Dutch case, the announcement of the roll-out of smart meters raised serious concerns and opposition from both the public and members of the government, mainly due to reasons of data privacy and consumer security in the Netherlands. This fact resulted in halting the original rollout phase (which was planned to begin in 2004) for 8 years. During this period, consumer organizations were formed which expressed worries about the fact that smart meters share consumption data with energy companies. These worries were also expressed by members of the Dutch parliament. Furthermore, smart grid expansion also met public resistance mainly due to cost and privacy issues or a lack of interest (Fujiwara, Williges and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2017).as
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