Formal Analysis Sample Clauses

Formal Analysis. In this subsection, we analyze IoTMAKA using BAN logic. BAN logic analyses protocols by using axioms to verify message origin, message freshness and trustworthiness of the origin of the message [8]. We use the following notations in formal security analysis using the BAN logic: • Q |≡ X: Principal Q believes the statement X. • #(X): Formula X is fresh. • Q| X: Principal Q has jurisdiction over the statement X. • | Q: Principal Q has a public key K. • Q X: Principal Q sees the statement X. • Q| X: Principal Q once said the statement X. • (X, Y): Formula X or Y is one part of the formula (X, Y). • : Formula P combined with the formula Q. • : Principal Q and R may use the shared session key, SK to communicate with each other. The session key SK is good, in that any principal except Q and R. will never discover it. In addition, we use the following BAN logic rules to prove that IoTMAKA provides a secure mutual authentication among IoT device, CS and SS: 1. Message-meaning rule: 2. Nonce-verification rule: 3. Jurisdiction rule: 4. Freshness rule: In order to show that IoTMAKA provides secure mutual authentication among IoT device with MC, CS and SS, we need to achieve the following goals: Goal 1: |≡( ) Goal 2: |≡(SS ) Goal 3: |≡ |≡(SS ) Goal 4: |≡ |≡ ( ) Idealized form: The arrangement of the transmitted messages among IoT device with MC, CS and SS in IoTMAKA to the idealized forms is as follows: Message 1. CS: <EIDi′>KCS, <M1>KCS, <M2>KCS, <M3>KCS Message 2.

Formal Analysis. With the formal validation BAN logic, we provide the proof of correctness of M2MAKA-FS. We demonstrate that a SK with FS can be agreed successfully after the process of mutual authentication among MC and SS. Now, the basic notations of BAN-logic are given below: • P |≡ X: P believes X. • P𝝰X: P sees X. i.e., P has received message containing X. • P|~ X: P said X. i.e., P has sent message containing X. • #(X): X is fresh. i.e., X is usually a temporary value. • P|⟹X: P has jurisdiction over X. • (X, Y): X or Y is part of message (X, Y). • 〈𝑋〉𝑌: X is encrypted with Y. • 𝐾 𝑃 ↔ 𝑄: P and Q can communicate with the shared secret key K. Next, we introduce some BAN logic rules as follows: 𝐾 1. Message meaning rule: 𝑃|≡Q↔𝑃, P𝝰〈𝑋〉𝐾 P|≡Q|~𝑋 If P believes that K is a shared secret key between P and Q and P has received messages X containing K, P believes that Q has sent message X. 2. Nonce-verification rule: 𝑃|≡ #(𝑋), P|≡𝑄|~𝑋 If P believes that X is a fresh message and Q has sent messages containing message X, P believes that Q believes message X. 3. Jurisdiction rule: P|≡Q|⟹𝑋,P|≡𝑄|≡𝑋 If P believes that Q controls message X and Q believes message X, P believes message 4. Freshness rule: P|≡ #(𝑋) 𝑃|≡ #(𝑋,𝑌) If P believes that X is a fresh message, P believes (X, Y) is fresh message. 5. Belief Rule: P|≡ (𝑋,𝑌) 𝑃|≡ (𝑋) If P believes message (X, Y), P believes message X. M2MAKA-FS needs to satisfy the following goals to ensure its security under BAN logic, using the above assumptions and postulates. a. AKA-goals AKA-Goal 1: AKA goals𝑀𝐶|≡(𝑀𝐶 ↔ ��𝑆) AKA-Goal 2: 𝑆𝑆|≡(SS↔ ��𝐶) AKA-Goal 3: 𝑀𝐶|≡𝑆𝑆|≡(SS↔ 𝑀𝐶) AKA-Goal 4: 𝑆𝑆|≡𝑀𝐶|≡ (𝑀𝐶 ↔ 𝑆𝑆) b. Key agreement with FS goals AKA-FS-Goal 1: CS|≡( 𝑑𝑖 𝐶𝑆 ↔ 𝑀𝐶) AKA-FS-Goal 2: CS|≡( 𝑑𝑠

Formal Analysis. In The AVISPA tool [23], security protocols are speci ed us- ing the High Level Protocol Speci cation Language (HLPSL). The HLPSL speci cation is translated into an Intermediate Format (IF). The current version of the AVISPA tool integrates four back-ends: OFMC, CL-ATSE, SATMC and TA4SP. Before we run veri cations from AVISPA [23], [24], our protocol was written in the High Level Protocol Speci cation Language, or HLPSL. A ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ model was written in order to be suitable for the OFMC validation. Once the HLPSL speci cation was debugged, it was checked automatically for attack detection using the AVISPA veri cation tools. Figure 7 shows the corresponding execution with AVISPA's OFMC tool. No reveals attacks were found, and the security goals concerning privacy and anonymity are reached. The protocol is also safe and a mutual strong authentication is established

Formal Analysis. What: Formal analysis of the SFE Survey data involves all analysis being conducted after the close of the survey and should be guided by the report template provided in Appendix E. In other words, the aim of formal analysis is to generate results that can be included in the full and targeted SFE reports in a similar format as to previous reports. Please refer to the 2012 Full Report for appropriate formatting. Who: The GRA is responsible for conducting all formal analysis. When: Formal analysis should begin either at the close of the SFE Survey or by the 3rd week of November at the latest. Formal analysis should be concluded no later than the end of January. IX. Issue Specific Follow-up Email Communication Task 14 – Follow-up Email Lists What: Two separate follow-up lists should be compiled. The first list should Who: The GRA should compile both lists. When: The follow-up email lists should be compiled before the 1st week of February. Task 15 – Follow-up Email Communication by DGS and/or ADAP When: Follow-up emails pertaining to mental health, harassment and other extraordinary events should be sent between the 1st and the 4th week of February. Task 16 – Follow-up Email Communication by GRA What: Individual follow-up emails should be sent to all host agency/organization POCs to inquire as to whether the agency/organization is interested in receiving another RSPH student in the future. A simple spreadsheet should be generated to include names and emails of those persons contacted and their response (i.e. yes, no, other). Who: The GRA is responsible for sending follow-up emails to host agency/organization POCs; however, the content of these emails should be discussed with and approved by the DGS. When: Follow-up emails to host agency/organization POCs should be sent between the 1st and the 4th week of February. X. Preparation of SFE-Related Content ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ – SFE Information Table What: The SFE Information Table is a reference tool for students seeking to