Common use of Edinburgh Clause in Contracts

Edinburgh. 1251 TFH. Trial Report, p. 13-15. 1252 Interview British army staff officer 7. 1253 LWC. Interview Commander ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 7, p. 13. 1254 TFH. Trial Report, p. 19. they ultimately discontinued the program.1255 One of the further identified problems with TCAF was that it led to inconsistent data as the soldiers made variations in how they queried Afghans. Moreover, despite the simplicity of the model, soldiers were not trained sufficiently to conduct the interviews. More fundamentally, 16 Brigade questioned the reliability of the answers to questions asked by foreign troops and the self-selection of individuals who could be interviewed. Another aspect of concern for 16 Brigade was that they introduced TCAF in more insecure districts where engaging in conversation with Afghans was at odds with force protection.1256 Finally, the detractors of TCAF argued that the framework did not measure against the lines of operation as had been set out by the new Helmand Road Map. Thus, 16 Brigade abandoned TCAF and instead opted for key-leader engagement through more in-depth conversations.1257 The subsequent rotation by 3 Commando Brigade had been instructed on TCAF during its predeployment training by personnel of 52 Brigade. However, when this rotation arrived in theater in the autumn of 2008, its personnel found that TCAF had been rejected by their predecessors. Understandably, the TCAF-initiative withered in Helmand and was seemingly abandoned by the British Army.1258 Curiously, TCAF did feature in the glossary of the new Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency more than a year later, but the concept did not appear anywhere else in the text. Still, despite the failure to implement TCAF across the British Army, it was adopted by the United States. When ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ visited 52 Brigade in Helmand, he was impressed by the promise of the concept. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ advocated its use to the US military and other government agencies and subsequently ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ were asked to brief on their experiences with TCAF.1259 It was quickly adopted by USAID (United States Department for International Development), who had shunned it previously, and the US military, as the Tactical Conflict Analysis and Planning Framework (TCAPF).1260 Although it was not used for campaign- level analysis, TCAPF was extensively used by American units throughout Afghanistan. In 2010, it was renamed the District Stability Framework.1261 Ironically, through this American connection, TCAPF even found its way back into British doctrine on operational intelligence. Here it was mentioned as a useful tool to acquire a basic understanding of the environment 1255 See ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇. Short-lived Panacea, p. 11. 1256 Ibidem, p. 12-14. 1257 Ibidem, p. 14-15. 1258 Interview British army staff officer 7 1259 LWC. Interview Commander ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 7.