Definition 3 Sample Clauses
Definition 3 serves to clearly specify the meaning of a particular term or phrase as it is used throughout the contract. This clause typically assigns a precise interpretation to a word or expression, ensuring that all parties understand its intended use; for example, it might define what constitutes a "business day" or "confidential information" within the agreement. By establishing a shared understanding of key terms, Definition 3 eliminates ambiguity and reduces the risk of disputes arising from differing interpretations.
Definition 3. An MKEM is a public-key primitive with two algorithms MKEM = (kgc, decaps) that have the following syntax: – kgc. Take an (implicit) security parameter and a public key pk0 and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (▇▇▇, ▇▇▇, ▇▇▇, ▇▇▇). Here, (sk1, pk1) is a newly generated key pair. If pk0 =⊥ then ct1 = ss1 =⊥ (i. e., ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (▇▇▇, ▇▇▇, ⊥, ⊥) ← kgc(⊥)). Otherwise, use pk0 to generate a ciphertext ct1, in a way that pk1 and a shared secret ss1 can be retrieved from ct1 by invoking decaps. – decaps: receive a secret key sk0 and a ciphertext ct1 and retrieve the shared secret ss1 and pk1, i. e., (ss1, pk1) = decaps(sk0, ct1).
Definition 3. 1Definice
Definition 3. If is ϵ-ASU2 with ϵ = 1/ , then is called strongly universal2 (or strongly universal, SU2 for short). We denote strongly universal2 by SU2 and universal2 by U2 for convenience. The value 1/|B| is the minimal value of ϵ for any ϵ-AU2 and ϵ-ASU2.
Definition 3. A B3-set S ⊂ [n] is r-bounded if RS < r. The following corollary of Lemma 3.3.4 provides a conclusion that is stronger than Corollary 3.3.6 at the cost of requiring a better bound on RS.
Definition 3. Define P0 to be the set of all probability vectors p = (p1, p2, . . .)
Definition 3. 2. A tree T PT is called a Silver tree and we write T ST) if there is an infinite sequence of strings uk = uk(T ) 2<ω such that T consists of all strings of the form s = u0-i0-u1-i1-u2-i2- · · · -un-in and their substrings, where n < ω and ik = 0, 1. Then stem(T ) = u0 and [T ] consists of all sequences a = u0-i0-u1-i1-u2-i2- · · · ∈ 2ω, where ik = 0, 1 ∀ k. We put spln(T ) = lh(u0) + 1 + lh(u1) + 1 + · · · + lh(un−1) + 1 + lh(un). In particular, spl0(T ) = lh(u0). Hence spl(T ) = spln(T ): n < ω ω is the set of all splitting levels of T . Example 3.3. If s 2<ω , then the tree T [s] = t 2<ω : s t t s belongs to ST, stem(T [s]) = u0(T [s]) = s, and uk(T [s]) = Λ for all k ≥ 1. We note that T [Λ] = 2<ω and T [Λ]Ts = (2<ω )Ts = T [s] for all s ∈ 2<ω .
Definition 3. For every variable x defined in the described algorithms, we define xi to be node i’s x variable. For example, termination_timeεi is node i’s termination_timeε set. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇(▇▇, ▇) Input: A value v0 ∈ Rm , precision n. Output: A value v ∈ Rm in the convex hull of the valid inputs. 1: global r ← 0 2: global termination_timeε ← ∅ ⊲ all of the initializations are of multisets 3: global waiting_valueε ← ∅ ⊲ value messages waiting to be processed
Definition 3. 2 (pre-RCGS). A pre-RCGS structure is a tuple A, R, ρ, Q, Π, π, A , where: • A is a finite, non-empty set of players. • Q is the non-empty set of states. • R is a finite, non-empty set of roles. • ρ : Q × A → R assigning a role to an agent depending on the state. • Π is a non-empty set of propositional symbols. • π : Q → 2Π maps states to the propositions true at that state. • × → A : Q R N+ is the number of available actions for the agents in a given role at a given state. ⊆ A subset A A of agents is called a coalition. Given a pre-RCGS, we will need to be able to discuss certain specific coalitions. We introduce the following terminology.
A : = A ⊆ A coalition Aq,r := {a ∈ A | ρ(q, a)= r} agents from A in role r at q Notice particularly, that Aq,r is the set of all agents in role r at state q.
Definition 3. An IB-AAGKA protocol is said to be secure against semantically indistinguish- able chosen identity and plaintext attacks (Ind-ID-CPA), if no randomized polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the above game. In other words, any randomized polynomial-time Ind-ID-CPA adversary A has an advantage Adv(A) = |2 Pr[b = bj] − 1| In this paper, we only consider security against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) for our IB- ASGKA protocol. To achieve security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), there are some generic approaches that convert a CPA secure encryption scheme into a CCA secure one, such as the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [16,6].
Definition 3. For all sections of the DID and CDRL significant means: events that impact contractual requirements a. Technical (Impact on technical contractual requirements, such as TPM) b. Schedule (impact to schedules milestones identified in IMP, achievability of contractual schedule baseline and latest forecast, significant margin reductions, etc. If there is impact quantify duration)