Close reading. A close reading of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ texts will achieve such an integral approach to how ▇▇▇▇▇ developed his ideas. The preliminary reading of Spec. I, 235–238 has produced five sub-questions that need to be answered to understand the meaning of divine forgiveness in ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ works. These questions all involve themes on which ▇▇▇▇▇ reflects explicitly in his extant works. The approach of the present study will be to analyse sections from ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ treatises in which he engages these sub-questions, to ensure we remain as close as possible to ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ treatises themselves. ▇▇▇▇▇ advocates the third approach. Although I find the label ‘exegete’ not very informative, I will follow an approach like ▇▇▇▇▇’▇. A somewhat similar approach is followed by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ in his introduction to ▇▇▇▇▇ (see ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇). 161 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Introduction, pp. 9, 122. Jews, p. 161). I agree with ▇▇▇▇▇▇’ position, and would not go as far as ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Contrary to his view that there is no hint of tension between values in Philo, for example, ▇▇▇▇▇ finds it necessary to defend the custom of circumcision against ridicule (see Spec. I, 2), and he denounces the frivolity of banquets, as celebrated by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇, in Cont. 57–63 (see also ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ‘Hidden Tensions’). the way ▇▇▇▇▇ himself develops his thoughts. Crucial to this analysis will be to recognise the place the relevant passages have within the context of the whole treatise. To identify the place of a passage within the whole of a treatise, each treatise will be subjected to a structural analysis. The structural analysis makes use of the way ▇▇▇▇▇ himself, by using textual signals, structured the argumentation of the treatise. Similarly to the rhetorical style of other ancient authors, ▇▇▇▇▇ used Greek keywords to, for example, highlight a conclusion or to signal that he will engage a new topic. The reconstruction of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ argumentation based upon these keywords is supported by developments in Philonic research regarding ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ rhetorical abilities. These developments help to identify and appreciate how ▇▇▇▇▇ structured his argument.164 The approach of close reading, identifying when ▇▇▇▇▇ signalled conclusions or statements he thought important for his readers, differs from analysing the structure of a treatise on the basis of the perceived content of the treatise alone. The latter approach bears the risk of modern readers setting the agenda according to their own preferences, possibly overlooking what ▇▇▇▇▇ himself saw and marked as the key points of his discourse. A structural analysis of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ introduction to De Opificio Mundi (Opif. 1–12) serves as example to illustrate the benefits of this method.165 At first glance, these sections may look like a collection of somewhat disconnected statements.166 A structural analysis, however, reveals ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ artful composition and identifies the main points ▇▇▇▇▇ wanted to bring forward. The first of these appears in Opif. 4, where the combination of μέν and οὖν occurs. Here, ▇▇▇▇▇ writes that he can only present the highlights of ▇▇▇▇▇’ account of creation, because the ideas contained in that account are too numerous to be expressed in full. The second occurrence of οὖν, in Opif. 12, signals the conclusion of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ introduction to the treatise, with another main point he wants to highlight: the great ▇▇▇▇▇ has correctly apprehended that the world perceived by the senses must be created. 165 A full structural analysis of De Opificio Mundi is presented in Chapter 2 (see pp. 54–56). 166 In the analytical introduction to the translation of De Opificio Mundi, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ claims that in Opif. 1–20, ▇▇▇▇▇ wants to bring to the fore ‘two salient points’ that he attributes to ▇▇▇▇▇, namely that the Creator of the world has no origin and that he cares for his creation (▇▇▇▇▇▇/▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ vol. 1, p. 2). ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ then continues his summary of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ discourse with a list of somewhat disconnected statements. Before reaching that conclusion, ▇▇▇▇▇ has put forward two arguments why that world must indeed be created. He has placed one (in Opif. 6–9) before and one (in Opif. 12) after his main objection against the world was not created. This main objection, introduced in Opif. 10–11 with the combination of μέν and γάρ, is that if the world was not created, there would be no divine providence and therefore no sustained order in creation. Obviously Opif. 1–12 contain more than just these highlights. However, these brief structural observations show that the additional elements of this passage should be considered subsidiary arguments, put forward by ▇▇▇▇▇ in support of the conclusions most important to him. These structural observations allow us to discover the flow of ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ discourse, and to distinguish between main points and side issues. This again aids us in reconstructing key elements of the overall rationale implicitly present in the way ▇▇▇▇▇ develops his thinking.
Appears in 4 contracts
Sources: Philo of Alexandria on Divine Forgiveness, Philo of Alexandria on Divine Forgiveness, Philo of Alexandria on Divine Forgiveness