Mutual Authentication. U With the received request message {EU, AIDU, hU, t1} U sent, GWN can compute N′ = dGWN EU = (N(x)′ , N(y)′ ) to get the values MU and KU and checks the validity of U via the equivalence U U U hU = h′ . After receiving the message {EU, EGWN, MGWN, hGWN, t2, t1} from GWN, the sensor U GWN GWN node S could obtain the values KGWN and N(x)′ and then computes h′ = H1 K′ IDS t2 GWN to verify the validity of GWN via the equivalence hGWN = h′ . Once receiving the message S S S {ES, t3, hS, AuthS} from S, GWN computes K′ and h′ = H1 K′ IDS t3 to check the validity S of S via the equivalence h′ = hS. Then, GWN sends message {ES, t3, t4, AuthS, AuthGWN} to U GWN U S U and U computes skU = (rU + N(x))ES, Auth′ = H1(dU EGWN M′ t4) and Auth′ = GWN H1(skU t3) and checks the validity of GWN and S by the equivalence Auth′ = AuthGWN and S Auth′ = AuthS. If the above verification processes are successfully completed, our protocol provides mutual authentication.
Mutual Authentication. In the proposed protocol, the goal of mutual authentication was to ensure that MU and HA are legitimate and to establish an agreed-upon session key between MU and FA for further communications.
Mutual Authentication. A According to lemma 1, no polynomial probability time adversary can fake a legal login or response information. Therefore, cloud service providers participating in the negotiation can authenticate each other by verifying the signed messages. So, the proposed PCAKA protocol supports the mutual authentication. Session Key Agreement. j j j According to the protocol specification, both the parties involved in the key negotiation process construct a session key using their own known information (without disclosing private information). For example, Ci finds out Rt = Aj +(βj · P )+(αj · Ppub), Xt = γj · Rt by the message Based on the above security analysis, the proposed PCAKA protocol provides mutual authentication between Ci and Cj. That is to say, no adversary can deceive either side. Thus, our scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attack. Impersonation attack. Based on the above analysis, we know that no PPT adversary A can forge a legal login information or a (σj, Vj, T 1) received from Cj and the known information. Thus the session key ski = H4(pidi, pidj, Ri, Rj, xi · Xt , T 1) corresponding response message, if it doesn’t have the secure key of Ci or Cj. Thus, the PCAKA protocol can also resist is calculated. In the same way, j j impersonation attack. Cj figure out i j skj = X0(xxxx, xxxx, Xx, Xx, xx · Xt , T 1). According to section 4,however,Xi = Xt (Xj = Xt ),
Mutual Authentication. According to Theorem 1, the pro- posed protocol is MA-secure that any polynomial adversary cannot forge a valid logic authenticator on a user’s side or forge a valid response authenticator on the server’s side. Therefore, the proposed protocol can support mutual authentication. Session Key Agreement: According to correctness analysis, both of the two communicating parties can compute a session key with the equal value to h4(IDi, IDS, ϕ, w), which will be used to encrypt the transmitted message in future commu- nications. Moreover, the Theorem 2 proves that the proposed protocol is AKA-secure. Therefore, the proposed protocol can support session key agreement. Two-factor Security: According to the Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, even if an adversary can controlled one of the two device DAi or DBi and obtain the partial private key stored in the corresponding mobile device, he/she cannot impersonate the user to generate a valid login authenticator that can pass the server’s authentication. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide two-party security. User Anonymity: According the description of the proposed protocol, the real identity of user Ui is masked by AIDi = ⊕
Mutual Authentication. In above section, we prove that A can generate the session key SK successfully, and impersonate the legitimate vehicle. Therefore, the protocol of Xxxxxxxxx et al. cannot achieve key agreement and mutual authentication.
Mutual Authentication. An entity that has entered into an MOU with the Department of Justice will need to have a private and public certificate pair. The entity will keep its private certificate and send the public one to the Department of Justice. This certificate pair will be used for encrypting and decrypting messages and authentication purposes. EXHIBIT D FEES AND PAYMENT Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11165.1(a)(1)(H), an entity that operates a HIT system “that is requesting to establish integration with the CURES database shall pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of establishing and maintaining integration with the CURES database.”
Mutual Authentication. The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication. Suppose if ℛ dispatches the Ciphertext Ψ1 = ( NON , Ω, Λ, , , ) to ℛ . After receiving the key 1, Xx performs the following computations:
Mutual Authentication. The enhanced scheme provides mutual authentication because legitimate participants verify each other, ensuring strong mutual authentication. This property secures our protocol and allows for the early detection of potential attacks such as replay attacks.
Mutual Authentication. The gate-way node GWN first checks whether the received timestamp T1 is valid as compare to the decrypted one from Di when receiving the message {Di, Ei, T1}. Next, GWN verifies = h(h(IDi, Xk), ri, T1) ? Ei. If both the condition are true, the validity of the user Ui is authenticated by ?
Mutual Authentication. When a mobile node roams to a foreign domain, it must be authenticated by the LAAA or MANET’s gateway in the foreign domain. However, some proposals schemes don’t provide the mutual authentication. In our scheme, we achieve mutual authentication for LAAA (MG) and MN. • First situation: MN first roams at foreign domain.
