Colo. COLO will have the right to immediately terminate Customer's License if COLO loses rights to the Premises. COLO will offer any other available space to Customer on a right of refusal based on date of initial contract with COLO. Customer will have 48 hours to accept or decline such offer.
Colo. ).1 No other statement, promise, or agreement, either written or oral, made by any party or agents of any party that is not contained in this written Settlement Agreement, including its attachments, will be enforceable. Public Document. A copy of this document may be made available to any person upon request. Parameters of Agreement. This Agreement does not purport to remedy any other potential violations of the ADA or any other Federal law not specifically referenced herein. This Agreement does not affect the ACSO’s continuing responsibility to comply with all aspects of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 614 (Colo. 2005). Although this is not an explicit presumption of injury in favor of other vested water right holders in changes of water use or plan for augmentation cases, the water court correctly recognized that the prima facie burden on applicants of showing no injury acts similarly to such a presumption. We have, however, recognized an express presumption of injury with respect to groundwater depletion through well pumping. In Xxxxxxx v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 59 n.7 (Colo. 2003), we noted that: [A]bsent a showing to the contrary, Colorado law presumes that (1) groundwater is tributary to the stream, and (2) that where surface water is over- appropriated, groundwater depletion through well pumping causes material injury to senior appropriators. (internal citations omitted).
Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 100 P.3d 508, 518-19 (Colo. App. 2004) (regarding permanent injunctions). Additionally, we cannot conclude that the water court abused its discretion by not allowing certain evidence that Englewood alleges establishes its injury. Englewood sought to introduce at trial a document prepared by Denver anticipating a net gain of 3,000 acre feet for its In-between rights as a result of the Agreement. However, after Englewood admitted that such evidence was offered to show that Denver and the Companies were operating in violation of the one-fill rule and the water court confirmed that Denver and the Companies would stipulate that they would not operate in such a manner, the water court found such evidence unnecessary and decided not to admit it. Englewood later sought to introduce evidence that it claimed established that Denver diverted on average 7,400 acre feet of water on its In-between rights during the fill period for the 1885 Oasis storage right whereas those rights would have been out of priority prior to the Agreement because of the call on the 1885 Oasis storage right. The water court refused to allow this evidence because Englewood could not show that there was a 1909 call on the river at the time such that the diversions met the Agreement’s definition of In-between rights. Given the record, neither of these challenged evidentiary rulings are “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,” and we do not find that the water court abused its discretion in making them. See Xxxxxxx v. City of Brighton, 228 P.3d 957, 962 (Colo. 2010); Water Rights of Masters Inv. Co, 702 P.2d at 273-74. The water court also did not err in its determination that Englewood’s evidence of injury was “unconvincing for several reasons.” Englewood alleges that the water court ignored the evidence presented at trial that Englewood claims established that, as a result of the Agreement, the absence of a call on the 1885 Oasis storage right allows Denver to divert on its In- between direct flow and storage rights with the result of reduced flows to downstream reservoirs on the South Platte River. However, we cannot conclude that the water court’s factual finding of no injury based on the evidence was “‘so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.’” City of Black Hawk, 97 P.3d at 956 (quoting In re Xxxxx, 856 P.2d at 801). Instead, the water court explains in five paragraphs why the offer of proof of injury by Xxxxxxxxx is unconvincing, noting several da...
Colo. XXX xxx developed a business plan to prepare site space and neutral central office locations for telecommunication and data service providers.
Colo. XXX xxx Nortel desire to develop a mutually beneficial relationship whereby Nortel will purchase stock in COLO.XXX xxx COLO.XXX xxxl provide Nortel a right of first refusal for a portion of each of its sites and purchase a minimum amount of equipment from Nortel.
Colo. XXX xxxll use commercially reasonable best efforts to negotiate and execute the equipment sale and purchase agreement with Nortel described in Section 2.2 above by April 1,
Colo. XXX xxxeby grants Nortel a right-of-first refusal to lease site space on twenty percent (20%) of the space intended to be leased at each site prepared by COLO.XXX. Xxch right-of-first refusal shall be: (i) transferable to any Affiliate or customer of Nortel, (ii) survive for a period of eighteen months (18) from the date of completion of each site, (iii) be available for floor space and rack space cumulatively. When COLO.XXX xxx leased or committed to lease sixty percent (60%) the site, with the exception of the space reserved for Nortel or its customers, COLO.XXX xxx notify Nortel in writing that COLO.XXX xxx a customer to lease all or part of the reserved space. Upon receipt of such notification, Nortel shall have thirty (30) calendar days to either commence good-faith negotiations to lease the space or provide a customer to commence good-faith negotiations to lease the space. Such lease negotiations shall be completed no later than sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the receipt of the notice. At the expiration of the thirty (30) calendar day period, the sixty (60) calendar day period, or upon written notification by Nortel that it has neither a customer nor the intent to lease the reserved space, COLO.XXX xx no longer under any obligation to Nortel with respect to the space. Similarly, when COLO.XXX xxx leased or committed to lease sixty percent (70%) the site, with the exception of the remaining space reserved for Nortel or its customers, COLO.XXX xxx notify Nortel in writing that COLO.XXX xxx a customer to lease all or part of the remaining reserved space. Upon receipt of such notification, Nortel shall have thirty (30) calendar days to either commence good-faith negotiations to lease the space or provide a customer to commence good-faith negotiations to lease the space. Such lease negotiations shall be completed no later than sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the receipt of the notice. Such lease negotiations shall be completed no later than sixty (60) calendar days from the date of the receipt of the notice. At the expiration of the thirty (30) calendar day period, the sixty (60) calendar day period, or upon written notification by Nortel that it has neither a customer nor the intent to lease the reserved space, COLO.XXX xx no longer under any obligation to Nortel with respect to the remaining space.
Colo. XXX xxxll issue to Nortel a monthly report delineating the locations available, the percentage vacancy for each site, the tenants and percentage occupancy for such tenants of each site, and estimated completion date for future sites. COLO.XXX xxxl also provide to Nortel the briefing package to be provided to each member of the COLO.XXX xxxrd of directors as well as the minutes of the meeting of the COLO.XXX xxxrd of directors within fifteen (15) calendar days after the board meeting. In addition, within thirty (30) days after the Effective Date of this
Colo. XXX xxxees to, from time to time, designate an appropriate executive to meet with a Nortel designated executive, at a mutually agreeable time and location, to review and discuss the status of COLO.XXX xxx any other related aspects of the business relationship between the parties.
