FTR definition
FTR means a Financial Transmission Right (as defined in the MISO Rules).
FTR means financial transmission rights.
FTR. UNSPEC" CNF="890" N="1">
Examples of FTR in a sentence
For each FTR, for each month, ”FTR Monthly Credit Requirement Contribution” shall mean the total FTR cost for the month, prorated on a daily basis, less the FTR Historical Value for the month.
The FTR target allocation is calculated hourly and is equal to the product of the FTR MW and the congestion price difference between sink and source that occurs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.
FTR auction revenues and excess revenues are carried forward from prior months and distributed back from later months.
An option provides only positive credits and options are available for only a subset of the possible FTR transmission paths.
FTR profitability is the difference between the revenue received for an FTR and the cost of the FTR.
More Definitions of FTR
FTR means a financial instrument that entitles the holder to receive compensation from PJM for certain congestion-related transmission charges that arise when the grid is congested and differences in locational marginal prices result from the redispatch of generators out of merit order to relieve congestion in the PJM day-ahead market.
FTR is defined in Section 3.26 of the Agreement.
FTR means a right to receive Transmission Congestion Credits as specified in Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 5.2.2 and the parallel provisions of Tariff, Attachment K-Appendix, section 5.2.2.
FTR. UNSPEC" CNF="890" N="30"> -30 - consequence of these actions, the more comprehensive and tightly drawn will be the covenants. The cost to the borrower of these constraints is generally referred to as the agency costs of financing. While this type of cost has been intuitively obvious for as long as finance has existed, it has only recently become a focal point of academic research in finance. An early treatment of the cost issue was presented by ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ who developed a linear programming model by which to estimate the cost of covenants. The cost is estimated in terms of opportunities foregone through the limitations imposed. By combining these estimated costs with the more explicit costs of the loan, the analyst is able to derive a sharper measure of the cost of the particular source of funds. [17] How does the EPA relate to the concept of agency costs? How can it be used to reduce monitoring costs? Why would the banker want to use EPA? Why would the borrower agree to its use as part of the loan contract? We shall approach these questions by considering how the EPA can help reduce the cost of controlling for the effects of the "asset substitution" source of conflict mentioned earlier. Let us first examine the position of a bank lending officer considering a loan to a relatively new and small business firm operated by a single ownermanager. The fundamental objective of the banker with respect to this loan is to collect the real value of the interest and retrieve the real value of the principal according to the maturity schedule. We will assume that the banker is familiar with the firm's industry, product and market and, based on this familiarity, accepts the operating plan (i.e., proposed use of the funds) put forth by the borrower.and decides to make the loan. </P> <P><PB REF="00000032.tif" SEQ="00000032" RES="600dpi" FMT="TIFF6.0" FTR="UNSPEC" CNF="869" N="31"> A major cause for concern in this case is the possibility that the ownermanager may depart from the accepted operating plan once the loan funds have been transferred. The banker has approved the loan and its price based on a certain level of perceived risk; by "changing the plans" the entrepreneur may increase the riskiness of the enterprise and the bank loan. The incentive for the entrepreneur to do this is based on the argument that by accepting projects with greater variance of expected returns, the possible return to the equity is higher. At the same time, of course, the greater variance incre...
FTR. UNSPEC" CNF="886" N="27"> -27 - why the EPA should pose any more of a problem regarding future financial structure flexibility than would any other type of financial instrument. As examples of the possible uses of the EPA arrangement —and the extent to which it represents an acceptable pricing arrangement —consider two examples: the First Pennsylvania financing and the current development of home mortgage loans in which lenders share in the equity appreciation of the home in exchange for a lower promised interest rate. In the First Pennsylvania case —discussed earlier —the continuity of the company (a large commercial banking company) was at stake. The "bail-out" accommodation, from FDIC and some 20 commercial banks, took the form, first and foremost, of granting a term loan at all and, secondly, of granting a below the market interest rate. The lenders received warrants to buy approximately 20 million shares of the companyfs stock (there were 13 million shares outstanding at the time) for an historically low price of $3 per share. The financial logic behind the loan is that the accommodation should be rewarded and the clear implication is that the form of the reward (an EPA) is both acceptable under legal and regulatory standards and acceptable to the lenders * and borrowers in lieu of a periodic interest payment. In the case of the home mortgage loan, it appears that the EPA argument has been accepted at the level of retail personal finance. While there are significant differences between the EPA which is functionally related to the performance of a business and one related to the price appreciation of a home, nonetheless the basic thrust is the same: there is an apparent willingness to trade-off a current interest rate for a deferred interest in the equity of the underlying property. The filing of several stockholder derivative suits in connection with this case indicates that not all stockholders are enthused about the transfer of equity control to the lenders. </P> <P><PB REF="00000029.tif" SEQ="00000029" RES="600dpi" FMT="TIFF6.0" FTR="UNSPEC" CNF="806" N="28"> -28 - Finally, the argument has been made that only those borrowers with strong growth prospects will qualify for EPA loans: otherwise the banker would not be interested. It is likely that high growth potential firms would be of greatest interest to banks. It is also likely that firms which promise to stabilize at very small size levels will be of least interest to EPA-...
FTR. UNSPEC" CNF="839" N="29"> -29 - 3. Asset Substitution —if a firm borrows money for the stated purpose of pursuing a low-risk business (say the buying and holding of U.S. Treasury bills) and —after receiving the money shifts to the pursuit of a high-risk business (say, race-track betting) the value of the stockholders equity rises and the value of the lender's claim falls. [16] 4. Underinvestment —the value of the lender's claim may decline if the stockholders reject projects which will benefit the debt-holders rather than the stockholders. Some or all of these potential conflicts may be present in any business loan being considered by a bank. The typical reaction of a lender is to impose controls in the form of restrictive covenants as part of the loan agreement. Examples of such covenants are: 1. Restrictions on the borrower's production and investment policies — essentially, by specifying the uses to which the firm may put the borrowed funds.
FTR means the Futures Trading Regulations (Cap. 116, Rg 1) in force immediately before 1st October 2002;