SBA Sample Clauses

SBA. Lender has received a license from the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to extend loans as a small business investment company (“SBIC”) pursuant to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended, and the associated regulations (collectively, the “SBIC Act”). Portions of the loan to Borrower will be made under the SBA license and the SBIC Act. Addendum 1 to this Agreement outlines various responsibilities of Lender and Borrower associated with an SBA loan, and such Addendum 1 is hereby incorporated in this Agreement.
SBA. 1. delegates to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for re- delegation to all warranted Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s contracting officers, its authority under section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act to enter into 8(a) prime contracts, and its authority under section 8(a)(1)(B) of the Act to arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts by eligible 8(a) Participants. In accordance with 13 C.F.R. §124.501(a), SBA delegates its 8(a) contract execution function. SBA remains the prime contractor on all 8(a) contracts and the 8(a) Participant remains the SBA’s subcontractor;
SBA in round 3 + s for each honest party Pi, so that Pi outputs v from Πta,ts Πta,ts . This proves asynchronous network. SBC
SBA. Assume that that at most ta parties are corrupted in an execution of Πta,ts Πta,ts over an [weak validity] Assume the sender P∗ is honest and has input v∗. Up to (and including) round 3, an honest party Pj sets bj := v 𝖳 only if they receive a message (v, σ) such that ∈ Vfy(v, σ, pk∗) = 1. Since corrupted parties cannot forge an honest sender’s signature, bj SBC SBC SBC { 𝖳} 𝖳 ∈ { 𝖳}a j SBC SBA v∗, in round 3 for each honest party Pj. Observe that, if bj = in round 3, party Pj does not send a message whenever they are supposed to share their input in Πta,ts ; this does not break ta-weak validity of Πta,ts , since messages can be arbitrarily delayed by the adversary. Therefore, t -weak validity of Πta,ts guarantees that b v∗, in round 3 + s for each honest party Pj. In conclusion, each honest party Pj outputs either v∗ or 𝖳 from Πta,ts Πta,ts . This proves ta-weak validity, and concludes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔ H Proof of Lemma 6‌ We sketch the proof. Assume at most ts parties are corrupted and the network is synchronous. HMPC Then, ts-security of Πts,ta guarantees that each party receives the same correct output from − the computation of fGRBL in Step 1 (which takes into account the input of all honest parties). Therefore, each honest party encrypts their (authenticated) shares of each gate of circg and sends the resulting ciphertexts to all parties. synchrony of the network guarantees that each honest party receives at least n ts > ts valid (i.e. such that the information checking protocol succeeds) and consistent shares for each gate within one extra round. Since dishonest parties cannot forge authentication vectors, even a xxxxxxx adversary cannot compromise the reconstruction of the function table entries. Together with the masked inputs and the relative keys for each input wire, as well as the masks for the accessible output wires, the (only) reconstructed function table entry for each gate allows each honest party Pj to evaluate the garbled version of circg locally and recover the output. In particular, each honest party terminates. Now, Assume at most ta parties are corrupted and the network is asynchronous. Then, HMPC ta-security of protocol Πts,ta (circfGRBL ; circg; bj) guarantees that each honest party receives − − ≥ − ≥
SBA. Xxxxx 0, (xx Xxxxx 0), Xxxxx 2, and Lemma 14, guarantee protocol Πta,ts Πta,ts from Section G (that also runs in O(κ) rounds with respect to the number of parties n) achieves the security guarantees (ii). Combining this with Corollary 3, we obtain the following corollary. ≤
SBA. Then, protocol Πta,ts Πta,ts achieves the following security guarantees. – When run over a synchronous network: ts-validity and ts-consistency. – When run over an asynchronous network: ta-weak validity. a synchronous network. SBC
SBA. In Section G, we present a broadcast protocol Πta,ts Πta,ts running in a fixed number of rounds that is weakly valid in asynchronous networks. Our solution is inspired by a synchronous construction that obtains BC from BA, but requires some modifications to achieve security guarantees in asynchronous networks. Combining this with results from previous sections, we obtain an MPC protocol running in O(κ) rounds with respect to n. More specifically, HBA SBA ABA – Lemma 1 (or Lemma 9), Lemma 2, and Lemma 4, guarantee protocol Πta,ts Πta,ts , Πta,ts from Section 5 (which runs in O(κ) rounds with respect to the number of parties n) achieves the security guarantees (i); SBC
SBA. Pursuant to a Loan Agreement, dated April 12, 1994, by and between the Debtors and the United States Small Business Administration (the "SBA"), the SBA loaned South Pointe $1,000,000. Such loan is secured by a second lien on a portion of the collateral for the Ocean Bank Mortgage. The SBA asserted a $970,000 claim against the Debtors. The reorganized Debtors assumed the SBA loan, and S&W Miami and the Borrower guaranteed such loan. SENIOR SUBORDINATED NOTE PURCHASE AGREEMENT SCHEDULE 3.13 trade names, fictitious names, d/b/a's of Company and Subsidiaries: