Safety Assessment. APSA. Supporting procedures applicable to the Letter of Agreement published in MATS Part 2 ANNEX A PROCEDURES Effective: 24/02/2022
Safety Assessment. APSA. Supporting procedures applicable to the Letter of Agreement published in MATS Part 2 ANNEX A PROCEDURES Effective: 01/07/2021 A.1 Map of the Airspace
Safety Assessment. 1 Perform site specific safety hazard assessment related to project.
Safety Assessment. ACCIDENTS
Safety Assessment. The safety of DF treatment will be assessed by analysing:
Safety Assessment. A set of guidelines and considerations post-sexual assault that the responsible personnel des- ignated by the Installation Commander can follow to determine if a sexual as- sault survivor is likely to be in immi- nent danger of physical or psycho- logical harm as a result of being vic- timized by or reporting sexual as- sault(s). The guidelines and consider- ations consist of a sequence of ques- tions, decisions, referrals, and actions that responders can enact to con- tribute to the safety of survivors dur- ing the first 72 hours after a report, and during other events that can increase the lethality risk for survivors (e.g., ar- rests or command actions against the alleged perpetrators). Types of immi- nent danger may include non-lethal, xx- xxxx, or potentially lethal behaviors; the potential harm caused by the al- leged perpetrator, family/friend(s)/ac- xxxxxxxxxx(s) of the alleged perpe- trator, or the survivors themselves (e.g., harboring self-harm or suicidal thoughts). The safety assessment in- cludes questions about multiple envi- ronments, to include home and the workplace. Survivors are assessed for their perception or experience of poten- tial danger from their leadership or peers via reprisal or ostracism. The safety assessment contains a safety plan component that survivors can complete and take with them to help improve coping, social support, and re- source access during their recovery pe- riod. SAPR Integrated Product Team (IPT). A team of individuals that advises the USD(P&R) and the Secretary of De- fense on policies for sexual assault issues. The SAPR IPT serves as the im- plementation and oversight arm of the SAPR Program. It coordinates policy § 103.3 and reviews the DoD’s SAPR policies and programs and monitors the progress of program elements. For ad- ditional information see paragraph (c) of Appendix A to this part. SAPR Program. A DoD program for the Military Departments and the DoD Components that establishes SAPR policies to be implemented worldwide. The program objective is an environ- ment and military community intoler- ant of sexual assault.
Safety Assessment. Additional research is needed to identify how the capabilities of airborne wake vortex systems and vulnerability of follower aircraft can properly be taken into account in wake vortex safety assessments (see §6.2) and using which metrics (see §5.5.2.5). • Definition of means of compliance and safety case requirements Probably the biggest hurdle towards the development of airborne systems aiming at reducing wake turbulence separation requirements while assuring today’s safety level is the uncertainty with regard to means of compliance and safety case requirements. While there have been recent advances related to wake turbulence safety assessments (e.g. A380, WIDAO), these primarily take into account the characteristics of the wake vortex but not specifically the capabilities of the follower aircraft. Industry will remain cautious towards developing new aircraft wake vortex systems as long as it is unclear if and how such systems’ new capabilities will be taken into account in future separation standards and how such systems can be qualified.
Safety Assessment. The ENGINEER shall review the crash history within the corridor for the most recently- available ten (10) years to identify crash patterns, identify high crash locations, and identify potential near-term and long-term safety improvement strategies. The ENGINEER shall follow the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) systemic safety planning process to identify sites for potential safety improvement and suggest projects for safety investment not typically identified through the traditional site analysis approach. The systemic safety planning process builds on the FHWA guidance to develop State Highway Safety Programs (SHSPs) and structure a Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) using data-driven processes. The four-step process uses basic types of crash, roadway, and traffic volume data that are recommended by FHWA for use in safety analysis efforts. Systemic safety planning is the process of evaluating an entire system using a defined set of criteria to identify candidate locations for safety investments to reduce the occurrence of and the potential for severe crashes. The systemic approach to safety is a complementary analytical technique intended to supplement the traditional site analysis approach and results in a more comprehensive safety management program. The systemic approach to safety: Shall identify a "problem" based on system wide data, such as rural lane departure crashes, urban pedestrian crashes, or rural unsignalized intersection crashes. These crashes are often spread across the network with few or no locations experiencing a "cluster" of crashes during a typical 3 year analysis period. Shall look for characteristics (e.g., geometry, volume, or location) frequently present in severe crashes. These characteristics, also known as risk factors (For purposes of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool, the term "risk factor" DocuSign Envelope ID: 9E4E3B84-8519-409C-AEF8-0383FB0D2E89 refers to a common characteristic of the locations where severe crashes occurred; therefore, the presence of a risk factor at other locations is an indicator of the potential for a future severe crash.), can be used to identify and prioritize locations with few or no crashes that could be potential candidates for safety investments. Shall focus on deploying one or more low-cost countermeasures to address the underlying circumstances contributing to crashes on a majority of roads. Addressing crash types experiencing low densities (crashes per intersect...
Safety Assessment. The analysis used both deterministic methods and a level 1+ probabilistic safety assessment. A deterministic analysis of the behavior of the reactor and associated systems following a comprehensive range of identified Design Basis lnitiating Events was performed. All cases analyzed have been conservatively assessed with an assumed single failure of the protection/shutdown systems. The failure of one shutdown system and the need for a reactor shutdown by the second acting signal have also been assessed. The numerical calculations show that the reactor goes through a series of safe states following the occurrence of a Design Basis lnitiating Event. No significant core or rig damage occurs in any of the assessed transients. The assessment of individual safety systems was done by means of Failure Mode Effect Analyses. The core damage frequency of 4x10-7 per year fully complies with regulatory limits and the selected bounding sequences are well below the frequency-dose acceptance curve.
Safety Assessment. A safety assessment shall be made using Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System (SWITRS) collision data for the most recent three (3) years available. In conjunction with County’s most recent Accident Location Report, this assessment shall identify high collision locations based on statewide comparisons for like facilities. Identification of Deficiencies Existing deficiencies shall be identified based on County design standards and County’s General Plan LOS policy as follows: Policy TC-Xd: LOS for County-maintained roads and state highways within the unincorporated areas of County shall not be worse than LOS E in Community Regions or LOS D in the Rural Centers and Rural Regions except as specified in Table TC-2. LOS shall be as defined in the latest edition of the HCM (Transportation Research Board, National Research Council) and calculated using the methodologies contained in that manual. Determination of Improvement Projects For each deficiency type, KAI shall identify improvements to alleviate existing congestion and safety issues. KAI shall develop a list of potential improvement using County’s CIP and our local knowledge. KAI shall prepare a full qualitative assessment of the operational changes that may result from each improvement Project. A Project description containing project designs such as lane configuration, limits of widening, and length of turn bays, shall be prepared and submitted to County staff prior to further analysis.
