EDITORIAL NOTE. On March 2, 1970, as talks between West German State Secretary Xxxx and Soviet Foreign Minister Xxxxxxx resumed in Moscow, the Embassy in Bonn submitted an assessment of “Soviet views on politi- cal agreements with [West] Germany.” Within the next few months, the Embassy suggested, the Soviet Union would decide whether to pro- ceed with negotiations not only in Moscow but also in Warsaw and East Berlin: “it appears likely that a decision to move or not to move will govern all three. Moscow, not Poland or the GDR, will make the final decision.” The Soviets were probing to determine what the West Germans would concede at the bargaining table, a process that, while advanced in Moscow, was just beginning in East Berlin. Although the available evidence was insufficient to determine the course of Soviet policy, the Embassy concluded that, since “losses from breaking off the negotiations outright appear to outweigh gains,” the Kremlin would allow the talks to continue. The outlook for a settlement on Berlin, which would be affected by success but not necessarily failure in Moscow, was less certain. The Embassy judged the “chances for agree- ment on limited practical improvements on Berlin whether in written form or not to be about fifty-fifty.” (Telegram 2295 from Bonn, March 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) The Embassy in Moscow contributed to the analysis, maintaining that the Kremlin would play a “waiting game” before making any deci- sions. According to the Embassy, the Soviets sought accommodation for several reasons—the domestic economy, the Chinese threat, a possible European security conference—but would probably insist on nothing less than “full acceptance by Bonn of Moscow’s view of the ‘realities’ ” of the Second World War. (Telegram 1212 from Moscow, March 11; ibid.) The Mission in Berlin emphasized East Germany and the quadri- partite talks as complicating factors and noted that: “we see little likeli- hood of the Soviets pressing the East Germans to modify substantially existing practices affecting Berlin to suit Western requirements.” The Mis- sion concluded: “This does not mean that we should not negotiate or not exploit the forthcoming discussions to see what benefits might be achieved. It means, however, that as we go into talks, we ought to have few illu- sions about what can be accomplished. While Soviets must carefully consider implications of Berlin talks for wider relationships, fact is that on Berlin Sovi...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 23, 1970, French President Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx arrived in the United States for 1 week of high-level consultations, including discussion with President Xxxxx, on matters relating to Germany and Berlin. The morning of his arrival, the National Security Council met to consider the role of France in the “Post-De Gaulle” era. The formal minutes of the meeting record the following conversation on the French attitude toward Germany: “R[ichard] N[ixon]—I would like to hear some comment on French/ German relations. “[Xxxxxx] Xxxxxxxxxxx—There is a growing resentment of Ger- many, especially among the Gaullists. There is a fear of German ex- pansionism. There is more and more thinking of the UK as a counter- weight in the Common Market. There is also concern over Germany’s Eastern policy. The French see that the Germans have more to offer than they do. “The French are worried that the Socialists will be led down the gar- den path by the Russians. They basically resent the German socialists. “[Xxxxx] Xxxxxxxxx—I agree. The more actively the Germans go to- xxxx the East, the more the French will countermove. The French are also worried about our Berlin overtures. This could lead to the French moving closer to the UK, and even to France/UK nuclear collaboration. “[Xxxxxx] Xxxxxxx—Could this also move them more toward the United States? “Xxxxxxxxxxx—I don’t think so. There is a growing acceptance of the removal of the U.S. They are hedging their bets and they foresee a weakened NATO.” (National Security Council, Minutes Files, Box 119, NSC Minutes, 1970 Originals) Xxxxxxxxx also raised the German question in a meeting with Pom- pidou on February 21 in Paris where Xxxxxxxxx was conducting secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese. According to the memoran- dum of conversation, Pompidou stated his belief that “Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx was sincere and that he dominated the Government by his per- sonality. He did not believe that Xxxxxx would ever betray the West.” (National Archives, Xxxxx Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK Memcons, The President and President Pompidou (Paris), 12 November 1970 [1 of 2]) In a briefing memorandum for the President’s meeting with Pompidou, Xxxxxxxxx doubted, however, that such confidence extended to Xxxxxx’x policy: “The French are concerned that Xxxxxx may be moving too fast in his Eastern policy (to some extent they resent that the Soviets now find the Germans more interesting to talk to than the French); ...
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, adopted on 30 June 1982, on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure is reproduced on p. 865 of Volume I.
EDITORIAL NOTE. Text of the heading as supplemented by the Single Article of the Council Decision of 21 February 1983 adding a number of products to the list in Annex I to the ECSC Treaty (OJ L 56, 3.3.1983).
EDITORIAL NOTE. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the SEA, and for historical reasons, the term 'Assembly' has not been replaced by the terms 'European Parliament'.
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of waiver regarding the requirements set forth in part 46, relating to protection of human subjects, as they pertain to dem- onstration projects, approved under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which test the use of cost—sharing, such as deductibles, copayment and coinsurance, in the Medicaid program. For further information see 47 FR 9208, Mar. 4, 1982. Subpart A—Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects SOURCE: 82 FR 7259, 7273, Jan. 19, 2017, un- less otherwise noted.
EDITORIAL NOTE. The reader will find below a complete amended version of the Treaty establishing the European Community as it results from Title IV of the TEU: Provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [Article I(1) to (29)].
EDITORIAL NOTE. After January 1, 1979, ‘‘Budget of Expenses and Rate of Assess- ment’’ regulations (e.g., sections .200 through .299) and ‘‘Handling’’ regulations (e.g., sections .300 through .399) which are in effect for a year or less, will not be carried Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA § 980.1 in the Code of Federal Regulations. For FED- ERAL REGISTER citations affecting these reg- ulations, see the List of CFR Sections Af- fected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at xxx.xxxxx.xxx. PART 980—VEGETABLES; IMPORT REGULATIONS Sec. 980.1 Import regulations; Irish potatoes. 980.117 Import regulations; onions. 980.212 Import regulations; tomatoes. 980.501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements.
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 10, 1970, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Xxxxxxx met Ambassador Xxxx in Moscow to deliver the Soviet response to the Western proposal of December 16 for talks on Berlin. (Telegram 715 from Moscow, February 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) The text of the Soviet aide-mémoire, Febru- ary 10, reads: “The Government of the USSR has acquainted itself with the United States Government aide-mémoire, which was the answer to its (Soviet) statement of September 12, 1969. It confirms the readiness ex- pressed in this statement for an exchange of views for the purpose of improving the situation in West Berlin and of eliminating frictions in this region. The Soviet Government is also guided by the fact that it is necessary to approach this question in the context of the tasks of nor- malizing the situation and of ensuring security in Europe. “Bearing in mind the purpose of the exchange of opinions, as it is formulated by the parties, the Soviet Government considers it impor- tant, first of all, to reach agreement on excluding activity incompatible with the international situation of West Berlin, which was and remains a source of tension existing here. In the conditions of the continuing occupation of West Berlin and the absence of other joint settlements, only the Potsdam and other quadripartite agreements and decisions can be the basis in principle during an examination, in particular, of practical questions regarding this city. It is self-evident, moreover, that questions of the communications of West Berlin and of access to it can- not be settled in isolation from the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic within which West Berlin is situated and whose lines of communications it uses for its external ties. “Corresponding to the subject of an exchange of views, the Soviet Government would agree that meetings of the representatives of the Four Powers should take place in West Berlin in the former Control Council Building. It appoints as its representative for conducting ne- gotiations P.A. Abrasimov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo- tentiary, who will be ready to enter into contact with the U.S. Repre- sentative empowered to do so, beginning in the second half of February 1970. Organizational and technical questions could be clarified through the usual channels.” (Attached to memorandum from Xxxxxxxxxx to Xxxxx, February 13; ibid., POL 38–6) In a February 13 memorandum to the Presi...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On March 19, 1970, West German Chancellor Xxxxx Xxxxxx and East German Premier Xxxxx Xxxxx met in Erfurt (East Germany) to dis- cuss the status of inner-German relations. The discussion was incon- clusive, leading only to agreement on holding a second meeting in Kas- sel (West Germany) on May 21. The significance of the meeting, the first between leaders of the two countries, was reflected rather in the tumultuous response Xxxxxx received from the East German citizenry, who first chanted “Willy” and then “Xxxxx Xxxxxx” to differentiate him from “Xxxxx,” his East German counterpart. The next morning, President Xxxxx read a staff report on U.S. television coverage the previous evening and underlined the passage: “All networks had footage from
