Separation of Powers. Separate institutions for the administration of justice shall be established for the NorthEast, and judicial powers shall be vested in such institutions. The ISGA shall take appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the judges. Subject to Clauses 4 (Human Rights) and 22 (Settlement of Disputes), of this Agreement, the institutions created under this clause shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of this agreement and any other disputes arising in or under this agreement or any provision thereof.
Separation of Powers the roles of the main governance bodies In the HBP governance structure, the principle of “separation of powers” (or system of “checks and balances”) is achieved by allocating specific responsibilities to different bodies. The checks and balances are achieved, not within any single body, but in the interaction between the different bodies. This is best exemplified in the process for agreeing the scientific action plan and related budget for each Specific Grant Agreement (SGA) in the period covered by the FPA: The Science and Infrastructure Board (SIB) is composed of the SP Leaders, who are proposed by the Task and Work Package Leaders in each SP and co-opted in the SIB. The SIB proposes the work plan and related budget estimates for the different activities within a given SGA to the Directorate. The Directorate, which is led by a Director-General (DG) and includes – amongst others - the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Science and Infrastructure Board (SIB), executes on behalf of the SB and prepares the decisions for the SB. In particular, the Directorate will review the work plan and budget for achievability and compatibility with the long-term HBP objectives, as set out in the FPA. In the event of disparities or incompatible budget estimates, the Directorate will consult with the SIB and the HBP’s external advisory bodies, and then recommend possible solutions to the General Assembly (GA) - or Stakeholder Board (SB)- for a final decision. In all cases, final approval for the work plan and budget, plus any other major decisions, has to be given by the GA / SB, thereby providing the necessary “separation of powers”. The SB represents the owners of the HBP that are organized in a Legal Entity. The SB decides on strategy, budgets, and all senior appointments in the project. Until the SB is established, the GA will remain the supreme decision-making body of the HBP. In brief, the General Assembly (later the Stakeholder Board) fulfils the Supervisory Board function identified by the mediator, while SIB provides the scientific leadership and the Directorate the executive leadership. No single HBP Partner organisation should have its employees chairing more than one of the three main governance bodies of the HBP (SIB, DIR and SB).
Separation of Powers. 32.1 The power duties and obligation of the Landlord in the exercise of its functions or the exercise of its discretion as a local planning authority, highway authority or building regulation authority or as local authority under any other statutory provision and the rights statutes bye-laws orders and regulations of the Landlord under public and private statutes bye-laws orders and regulations may be as fully and effectively exercised in relation to the Property or any part of it as if the Landlord was not a party to this lease
Separation of Powers. To prevent tyranny and better protect the ideals of justice and individual liberties, constitutional democracies are founded upon the core principles of separate and independent government func- tions combined with checks and balances. The U.S. Congressional Research Service describes the historical intent of separation of powers as drafted into the U.S. Constitution: The framers viewed human nature as inherently bad, and sus- pected that the natural inclination of men is to abuse power. Tyranny, to them, was “the accumulation of all powers, legisla- tive, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands.” To separate the functions of government into independent branches was necessary but not sufficient. Each branch would also need the ability to stand as a check against the others. No branch, how- ever, would possess an overruling influence over the others, and each would be provided with the necessary means to resist encroachment from the others.137 In the 47th paper of The Federalist, Xxxxx Xxxxxxx explained, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judici- ary, in the hands of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elected, may justly be pronounced the very defi- nition of tyranny.”138 Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx also strongly supported the separation of powers between the three branches, and ex- pressed most concern regarding independence of the judiciary: 136. Id. (emphasis added). 137. XXXXXXX X. XXXXXXXX, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44334, SEPARATION OF POW- ERS: AN OVERVIEW (2016). 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (Xxxxx Xxxxxxx). 0000] XXXXXXXX XXXXX INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS 65 “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”139 Similarly, U.S. Senator Xxx X. Xxxxx, Xx., who was chairman of the Senate select committee that investigated the Watergate scandal, wrote: [J]udicial independence is the strongest safeguard against the exercise of tyrannical power by men who want to live above the law, rather than under it. The separation of powers concept as understood by the founding fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system free from outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and further assumed that each indi- vidual judge would be free from coercion even from his own brethren.140 In the instances when branch functions are shared the original intent at the country’s founding was that such overlap exists for the purpose of checks and balances: Madison recogn...
Separation of Powers. The power of government is divided between three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial
Separation of Powers. Receiver does not dispute, and hence concedes, that she never filed reports otherwise required by §447.539, that she never delivered the funds otherwise required by §447.543, that the moneys are being held to make refunds to utility customers (L.F.75), or that the moneys have been held longer than the statutory abandonment period. (Rec.Brf., 18). Thus, receiver concedes that the law has been violated. Nevertheless, receiver argues that, assuming the Treasurer has the authority to enforce her duty to receive unclaimed property, the circuit judge has superior authority to dispose of the funds (including interest thereon) in violation of the law. She cites cases invoking the separation of powers doctrine, but that doctrine is inapplicable here because the UPA does not permit the Treasurer to exercise powers constitutionally assigned to the judiciary.
