Chapter Two. The End: Atrocity in a State of Exception, a State of Denial
Chapter Two. Taxation Environment
Chapter Two. Since its emergence as a theoretical field in the early 1990’s, third wave feminism has been the source of heated debate. Much of the anxiety surrounding the third wave comes from an attempt to define it as a theory, a philosophy, and a social movement. Proponents and authors of the third wave frequently posit it as a response to and critique of the second wave of feminism. Critics, on the other hand, frequently question the understanding of the third wave as an autonomous movement, one separate from the second wave, instead arguing that it is more appropriately defined as a continuation of the second wave. Much of this confusion is the result of a perceived lack of cohesion within the third wave that would allow for a simple definition. While other social movements are perceived as autonomous, cohesive, and centered around a philosophical or theoretical goal, the third wave seems to lack a central aim. In addition, participants in the third wave have not attempted to provide a singular definition, which adds to the confusion and ambiguity that often permeates the debate. Whereas the second wave of feminism was differentiated from the first by a temporal gap of at least 40 years, the third wave emerged when many second wave feminists were still writing, theorizing, and working. In order to utilize the concepts developed by the third wave for the purpose of analysis, it is necessary to analyze the work of third wave authors and activists, as well as the work of those who have sought to understand the third wave, in order to define the movement. In response to the exclusivity associated with the second wave, a variety of feminisms emerged to address experiences beyond those of middle-class white women and make feminism “more compatible with their unique perspectives.”93 These groups include “black feminists, Asian American feminists, Third World feminists, lesbian feminists, male feminists, ecofeminists, Christian feminists, Jewish feminists, Islamic feminists, and others.”94 The Black feminist movement is particularly important in the development of third wave theory. Work published by black feminists in the 1980s offered critiques of the second wave that illuminated the essentialist views of earlier theorists. Of particular note are the works of Xxxxxx Xxxxx (Women, Race and Class, 1981), the Combahee River Collective (A Black Feminist Statement, 1986), Xxxxx Xxxxx (Sister Outsider, 1984), and xxxx xxxxx (Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, 1984). Thes...
Chapter Two. The IRI Ideologies and Modernity in Contemporary Iran 1. The Ideologies behind Political Reform 59
Chapter Two. The Ideologies and Modernity in Contemporary Iran
Chapter Two. Where once it was the physician who waged bellum contra morbum, the war against disease, now it’s the whole society. -- Xxxxx Xxxxxx
Chapter Two. Literature Review 20 2.1. History of Values-Based Education 20
Chapter Two. The Power of Judgment In the previous chapter, I explained Kant’s earliest views about judgment. He regarded a judgment as a conceptual relationship that related a xxxx or property to an object. Furthermore, in The False Subtlety of Four Syllogistic, he argues that judgment is the basis for both distinct cognition and syllogistic reasoning. Distinct concepts are formed through judgments and syllogisms are actually a kind of judgment – they relate an object to a mediate xxxx. The understanding is the capacity for distinct cognition and reason is the capacity to make syllogistic inferences. Together these two faculties constitute the higher faculty of cognition. They are both exercised through judgments. Thus, Xxxx concludes that the higher faculty of cognition in general is a capacity for judgment [Vermögen zu urtheilen]. According to The False Subtlety, the higher faculty of cognition consists of just two faculties: the understanding and reason. This is different from what we find in Kant’s later critical works. The Critique of Pure Reason posits three higher cognitive faculties: the understanding, reason, and the power of judgment [Urtheilskraft].1 The Critique of Judgment also divides the higher faculty of cognition in this way,2 as does Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.3 In these later writings, Xxxx adds a third 1 “General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: understanding, the power of judgment, and reason” (Xxxx, Critique of Pure Reason, A 130/B 169). 2 “But in the family of the higher faculties of cognition there is still an intermediary between the understanding and reason. This is the power of judgment” (Xxxxxxxx Xxxx, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Xxxx Xxxxx and Xxxx Xxxxxxxx [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 5:177). See also idem, “First Introduction,” in Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Xxxx Xxxxx and Xxxx Xxxxxxxx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20:202. 3 Xxxxxxxx Xxxx, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7:196-197. faculty to the higher faculty of cognition, the power of judgment, which is absent from The False Subtlety. This raises two important questions. First, when does Xxxx introduce the power of judgment as a third higher cognitive faculty, alongside the understanding and reason? Second, prior to the introd...
Chapter Two. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING THE CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS IN THE EU The rules on choice-of-court agreements in the civil and commercial matters in the EU are regulated by three significant legal instruments: by the Brussels I(-bis) Regulation, (2007) Lugano Convention and by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. This chapter analyses all three legal instruments as to the rule on choice-of-court agreements, on the lis pendens rule in favour of the Member State courts and on the rule on parallel proceedings and the Third State courts in presence of the jurisdiction agreement. Lastly, the interrelationship between all three legal instruments is examined.
Chapter Two. Chronic Tension in a Diachronic Pandemic: Religious Morality in an HIV-Infected World The turn to religious entities as allies suggests a time when religious entities were not sought out as partners. Chapter two situates the turn to religion within a longer history of tensions—actual and perceived—animating the relationship between religious entities and global health organizations. The global response to the HIV pandemic is used as a lens for understanding these tensions. The first half of this chapter provides background on the scope and scale of the HIV pandemic. Though not intended as a comprehensive history of the pandemic, the snapshot of the current pandemic helps locate the changes taking place in the relationships among religious entities and global health institutions within the unique context of a chronic pandemic. The second half of the chapter focuses on a stigmatization of persons affected by HIV and AIDS as a particular examples of how theo-ethical commitments have functioned as a health liability in the global response to AIDS.
