Result 1 definition

Result 1. There is a coalition-proof equilibrium for the small economy in the non-cooperative Stackelberg game favorable to the preferential trade agreement if, and only if:

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Result 1. From the 'local' version of the experiment (whose results are shown in (42) in the '1st gesture' and the '2nd gesture' panels) one can see that both second and third person gestures were found to be highly acceptable in the conditions in which no clash is expected (this includes the Gesture-Match condition for the 2nd gesture, as well as all the Gesture conditions for the judgments restricted to the 1st gesture). No difference was found across second and third person gestures (e.g., the difference in rating between 1st gesture and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition is not significant: F(1,41)=.094, p=.76), and similarly the control helicopter/plane gestures are equally acceptable (still comparing the 1st and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition, but now in the control condition, we obtain: F(1,41)=.032, p=.

Result 1. Continued implementation by Canada of commitments under the Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Annex 5 –

Examples of Result 1 in a sentence

• The report is broken down into three main sections: (1) Core Administrative Activities; (2) Result 1 Activities; and (3) Result 2 Activities.

• Result 1: Students in target academic units demonstrating market relevant skills increased.

• According to Result 1, in Stackelberg equilibrium, the small economy will be indifferent between status quo (second integral on the left hand) and the PTA with the exclusion of sectors i ∈ [0, i**] (first integral on the left hand).

• The Result 1 of the portfolio focuses on decent employment creation and enhancement for youth and women in agriculture, tourism and the green economy.

• Result 1: Guidance are provided for the design, implementation and progress monitoring of the CSA component of the TEI.

• Result (1) characterizes which graphs are (isomorphic to) reduction graphs.

• This tender and activity will pour into result one of the projects: Result 1 - Increased access to general education in more conducive learning environments The core approach to help improve access to general education is through school infrastructure to be constructed, rehabilitated and/or extended in those regions with the most urgent infrastructure needs (East Jerusalem, Area C and Gaza).

• Result 1 – A binational state of groundwater science report, based on collecting and compiling groundwater science findings, is updated and made available.

• Public Health Promotion and Prevention, Result 1, Improved health outcomes for the people of New Mexico.

• By the end of Year 2, the Program made progress in both Result 1 and 2 in the three countries and worked on 88% of the activities (23 out of 26) included in the Year 2 workplan.

More Definitions of Result 1

Result 1. The participation decision of a firm does not directly depend on the effectiveness of the competition authority P or on firms' discount factor δ. In the ▇▇▇▇-equilibrium, condition (22) must apply for all firms. Therefore, the ▇▇▇▇- equilibrium is determined by the set of participation probabilities j that constitutes the global minimum of a function Ψ as defined in equation (23).  j =∑1− ⋅2 (23) In the ▇▇▇▇-equilibrium, i.e. the global minimum of Ψ, the condition  j =0 applies. To see this, consider that squaring ψi does not affect the root of function Ψ but prevents that positive values of ψi for firm i and negative values of ψ−i for some firm -i sum up to zero. Taking the sum of these squared terms ensures that a proposed solution j constitutes a ▇▇▇▇-equilibrium for all firms. If some firm considers participation in the cartel a dominant strategy (i.e. equation (18) applies) one can pre-assign this firm a probability of j i=1 . Firms of this type need not be considered in the calculation of other firms' optimal strategy. Therefore, an indicator-variable γi is defined that takes a value of 1 if some firm i considers cartel-participation a dominant strategy and a value of zero otherwise. Defining this objective function is one of the main contributions of this article. This is because previous literature defines functions of this type for ▇▇▇▇-Cournot equilibria in pure strategies only (see, e.g., ▇▇▇▇ et al. (2007), ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. (2004), ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2008) or ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. (2010)). I argue that, from a computational point of view, determining a set of optimal participation probabilities is quite similar to the determination of a set of optimal output-quantities. Therefore, both problems can also be addressed by similar solution techniques as is shown in section 4.