Result 1 definition

Result 1. There is a coalition-proof equilibrium for the small economy in the non-cooperative Stackelberg game favorable to the preferential trade agreement if, and only if:

Result 1. From the 'local' version of the experiment (whose results are shown in (42) in the '1st gesture' and the '2nd gesture' panels) one can see that both second and third person gestures were found to be highly acceptable in the conditions in which no clash is expected (this includes the Gesture-Match condition for the 2nd gesture, as well as all the Gesture conditions for the judgments restricted to the 1st gesture). No difference was found across second and third person gestures (e.g., the difference in rating between 1st gesture and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition is not significant: F(1,41)=.094, p=.76), and similarly the control helicopter/plane gestures are equally acceptable (still comparing the 1st and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition, but now in the control condition, we obtain: F(1,41)=.032, p=.86). This weakly validates the stimuli and the methodology in suggesting that verbal predicates were well tolerated (we write 'weakly validates' because all sentences involved gestures, hence subjects would naturally have given high ratings to the best of them, especially since they were explicitly asked to "use the full extent of the scale so as to reflect the intuitive differences you find among these gestures").

Result 1. The participation decision of a firm does not directly depend on the effectiveness of the competition authority P or on firms' discount factor δ. In the Xxxx-equilibrium, condition (22) must apply for all firms. Therefore, the Xxxx- equilibrium is determined by the set of participation probabilities j that constitutes the global minimum of a function Ψ as defined in equation (23).  j =∑1− ⋅2 (23) In the Xxxx-equilibrium, i.e. the global minimum of Ψ, the condition  j =0 applies. To see this, consider that squaring ψi does not affect the root of function Ψ but prevents that positive values of ψi for firm i and negative values of ψ−i for some firm -i sum up to zero. Taking the sum of these squared terms ensures that a proposed solution j constitutes a Xxxx-equilibrium for all firms. If some firm considers participation in the cartel a dominant strategy (i.e. equation (18) applies) one can pre-assign this firm a probability of j i=1 . Firms of this type need not be considered in the calculation of other firms' optimal strategy. Therefore, an indicator-variable γi is defined that takes a value of 1 if some firm i considers cartel-participation a dominant strategy and a value of zero otherwise. Defining this objective function is one of the main contributions of this article. This is because previous literature defines functions of this type for Xxxx-Cournot equilibria in pure strategies only (see, e.g., Xxxx et al. (2007), Xxxxxxxxx et al. (2004), Xxxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx (2008) or Xxxxxxxxxx et al. (2010)). I argue that, from a computational point of view, determining a set of optimal participation probabilities is quite similar to the determination of a set of optimal output-quantities. Therefore, both problems can also be addressed by similar solution techniques as is shown in section 4.

Examples of Result 1 in a sentence

• Support costs (not to exceed 8% or the relevant donor percentage) Total Cost for Result 1 I, (Name) ___________ certify that I am (Position) ______________ of (Name of Organization) ______________; that by signing this proposal for and on behalf of (Name of Organization) _________________, I am certifying that all information contained herein is accurate and truthful and that the signing of this proposal is within the scope of my powers.

• Result 1 In an induced value second price auction, bidding behavior both with and without monetary incentives differs from perfect demand revelation.

• At the community and watershed levels, Paani increases the knowledge, engagement, and benefits of local water users in target river basins to build water management capacity (Intermediate Result 1).

• Enter the lower of Result 2 or Result 1, but if less than or equal to zero, enter zero.

• Together, the three Expected Results will be synergistic: improved capacity of the HPD and the local SBCC organization will directly serve as inputs for achieving Expected Result #1 and will contribute to sustaining related impact beyond the life of the project.

• Support costs (not to exceed 7% or the relevant donor percentage) Total Cost for Result 1 I, (Name) ___________ certify that I am (Position) ______________ of (Name of Organization) ______________; that by signing this proposal for and on behalf of (Name of Organization) _________________, I am certifying that all information contained herein is accurate and truthful and that the signing of this proposal is within the scope of my powers.

• A Time Penalties Chart should be followed as outlined in Annexure 8.2.02.08 Final Result 1.

• Result 1 Activities Result 1: Students in target academic units demonstrating market relevant skills increased.

• Result 1 shows that there is a significant share of principals who behave fairly and efficiently even in one-shot interaction.10 The result thus rejects Hypothesis 1 (pure self-interest), while it is consistent with Hypothesis 2 (social preferences).This raises the question whether the share of fair principals is sufficiently high so that agents are better off under employment contracts compared to sales contracts.

• This is Result 2• Enter the lower of Result 2 or Result 1, but if less than or equal to zero, enter zero.

More Definitions of Result 1

Result 1. Continued implementation by Canada of commitments under the Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Annex 5 –

Result 1. From the 'local' version of the experiment (whose results are shown in (44) in the '1st gesture' and the '2nd gesture' panels) one can see that both second and third person gestures were found to be highly acceptable in the conditions in which no clash is expected (this includes the Gesture-Match condition for the 2nd gesture, as well as all the Gesture conditions for the judgments restricted to the 1st gesture). No difference was found across second and third person gestures (e.g., the difference in rating between 1st gesture and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition is not significant: F(1,41)=.094, p=.76), and similarly the control helicopter/plane gestures are equally acceptable (still comparing the 1st and 2nd gesture judgments in the Gesture-Match condition, but now in the control condition, we obtain: F(1,41)=.032, p=.86). This weakly validates the stimuli and the methodology in suggesting that verbal predicates were well tolerated (we write 'weakly validates' because all sentences involved gestures, hence subjects would naturally have given high ratings to the best of them, especially since they were explicitly asked to "use the full extent of the scale so as to reflect the intuitive differences you find among these gestures").