Common Contracts
2 similar null contracts
THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSNovember 10th, 2004
This Article explains why rational states sometimes prefer to draft their agreements in such a way as to make them less credible and, therefore, more easily violated. In contrast to domestic law, where contractual violations are sanctioned through zero -sum payments from the breaching party to the breached -against party, sanctions for violations of international agreements are not zero -sum. To the extent sanctions exist, they almost always represent a net loss to the parties. For example, a reputational loss felt by the violating party yields little or no offsetting benefit to its counter -party.
The Design of International AgreementsNovember 10th, 2004
This Article explains why rational states sometimes prefer to draft their agreements in such a way as to make them less credible and, therefore, more easily violated. In contrast to domestic law, where contractual violations are sanctioned through zero -sum payments from the breaching party to the breached -against party, sanctions for violations of international agreements are not zero -sum. To the extent sanctions exist, they almost always represent a net loss to the parties. For example, a reputational loss felt by the violating party yields little or no offsetting benefit to its counter -party.
