Technical Overview at the commencement of this Agreement, the Licensor undertakes to provide technical overview, and materials in relation to the use of the Software, to nominated employees of the Licensee, such overview and materials to be determined at the discretion of the Licensor.
Technical Overview. We now proceed to present our results in greater detail. Succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures. Our first contribution is identifying and formalizing a cryptographic primitive that enables boosting from almost-everywhere agreement to full agreement on a value, with low per-party communication. The primitive—succinctly reconstructed distributed signatures (SRDS)—is a new type of a dis- tributed signature scheme, with a natural motivation: allowing a set of parties to jointly produce a signature on some message m, which can serve as a succinct certificate for proving that a ma- jority of the parties agree on m. Interestingly, this task does not seem to be attained by existing distributed signature notions, such as multi-signatures [60], aggregate signatures [12], or threshold signatures [43]. For example, while multi-signatures (and, similarly, aggregate signatures) can suc- cinctly combine signatures of many parties, to verify the signature, the (length-Θ(n)!) vector of contributing-parties identities must also be communicated.4 As discussed in the related-work sec- tion (Section 1.3), threshold signatures are implied by SRDS but also do not suffice: while identities of the signers are no longer needed to verify a combined signature, this information is necessary to reconstruct the combined signature in the first place (even within specific existing schemes, e.g., [50, 10]). We provide a more detailed comparison to different signature notions in Section 1.3. An SRDS scheme is based on a PKI for signatures, where every party is set with a secret signing key and a public verification key.5 The parties may receive additional setup information that may contain, for example, public parameters for the signature scheme or a common random string (CRS), depending on the actual construction. Given a message m, every party can locally generate a signature on m, and signatures on the same message can be succinctly aggregated into a new signature. The new aspect is that given a combined signature and a message m, it is possible to verify whether is was aggregated from a “large” number of “base” signatures on m, and both aggregation and verification can be done succinctly. Three properties are required from an SRDS scheme: robustness means that the adversary can- not prevent the honest parties from generating an accepting signature on a message; unforgeability prevents the adversary controlling a minority from forging a signature; and succinctness requires that the “fi...
Technical Overview. The GoldSeal VaaS offer functions as a standalone Virtual Meeting Room (“VMR”) for meeting participants to connect via video and audio across the open Internet. VMR features include: • Reservation-less, standard definition and high definition (up to 1080p30) video and audio conferencing with content sharing • Accessible by Polycom end-point portfolio, both hard and soft clients • H.323 and SIP standards-based connectivity • Browser-based soft client video endpoint support through web real-time communication (WebRTC) Interoperability with Lync endpoints available through Open Federation for Microsoft® Lync • Access to free versions of Polycom® RealPresence® Desktop and Polycom® RealPresence® Mobile o Soft clients available to employees (“Internal Users”) within a subscribing enterprise • Content sharing enabled through access to free versions of Polycom’s People+Content IP application • US and EMEA toll based audio dial-in access • Each VMR instance is assigned by the VMR system administrator, to a specific individual who is the owner and host of that VMR. Each VMR includes a unique bridge number and customer-enabled PIN code. • Soft endpoint registration included with VMRs, hard endpoint registration services available separately as an option for an additional fee. • Point-to-point dialing, dial-in and dial-out services available for registered endpoints • A end-user Portal is provided as an online resource for GoldSeal VaaS users to access support resources, including dialing instructions, documentation, live conference control capabilities, FAQs and access to submit support questions to our GoldSeal Technical Support team. • Demo and Trial services are offered free of charge to allow customers to try the service before they buy Monthly and Annual subscription options include: • Enterprise user license (“EUL”) - an “all-you-can-eat” VMR subscription with no overage fees, assigned to an individual user, for up to 25 participants per session o As an extension of EUL, Enterprise Wide Licensing is also available for parent company's willing to commit to the strategic growth and standardization of video technology across their complete user based. o Enterprise Wide pricing is only available in prepaid 1, 2 or 3 year plans. Contact us to see if you qualify • Fixed Capacity VMR is a VMR subscription service intended to be shared among teams. The Fixed Capacity VMR service has 3 different offerings based on the number of participants (up to 5, 10 or 25 participan...
Technical Overview. Our application consists of a proprietary algorithm which operates agnostically across several mobile platforms. The algorithm is designed to function with the majority of popular embedded codes and necessarily is scalable to accommodate the mass market. The algorithm is compatible with WiFi (Wireless local area network Wireless fidelity IEEE 802.11), 3G (3rd Generation WCDMA network incorporating HSDPA- High-Speed Data Packet Access and UTMS- universal mobile telephone system). The algorithm is compatible with proprietary GSM standards essentially utilizing EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for GSM). It represents a configuration of compiled data which interacts with wireless networks (including mobile telephony networks) and with internally hosted servers which correspond with mobile devices through multiple acccess sockets. Sockets are allocated primarily for proprietary applications. ARL (augmented reality link), VRL (voice recognition link) and GRL (geographic resource locator). A newly assigned algorithm includes a barcode scanner. The details of each facet are described below: ARL essentially utilizes Augmented reality (AR) and is a technology which provides a live direct or indirect view of a physical real-world environment whose elements are augmented by virtual computer-generated imagery. The link utilizes the mobile’s digital camera to take a photograph of an object, logo or word. The results are transmitted OA (over air) and submitted to a proprietary’s source database. Thereonafter, the information is balanced, moderated and processed within our vision cluster environment. Additionally, this link provides the user with an option to utilize image recognition both uplink and downlink interacting with proprietary server systems. By pointing the phone’s camera at the real world and receiving augmented information directly related to the view of the camera. This might include the position of points of interest or commercial outlets. Additional sockets are allocated for Voice Recognition Link (VRL) which uses the telephone’s inbuilt microphone to capture an audio file which is submitted it through to a proprietary server environment. This audio file specifically interacts between the production environment and the Nuance external voice recognition vocoding server. These same sockets are allocated for Geographic Resource Locator (GRL). This utilizes the telephone’s GPS (Global Position System) capabilities to correlate the location of the user and the search...
Technical Overview. We give an overview of the main techniques used in our protocol. Expand-and-Extract. Our starting point is the recent work by Xxxxx, Xxx- Xxxxx and Loss [FLL21], where the authors provide a new elegant way to design round-efficient BA protocols, called Expand-and-Extract. The Expand-and-Extract iteration paradigm consists of three steps. The first step is an expansion step, where an input bit is expanded into a value with range ℓ, via a so-called Proxcensus protocol. This protocol guarantees that the outputs of honest parties lie within two consecutive values (see Definition 2).
Technical Overview. We first describe our core protocol, which ensures agreement (referred to as safety for the rest of the paper) and termination as required by Byzantine broadcast/agreement, but provides a weak notion of validity. Specifically, it achieves – Termination: all honest parties eventually commit, – Agreement/safety: all honest parties commit on the same value, and – Validity: if all honest parties start with certificates for the same value v, and no Byzantine party starts with a certificate for a contradictory value, then all honest parties commit on v. In Section 4 we will describe how to obtain these certificates to solve Byzantine broadcast or Byzantine agreement. The core protocol runs in iterations. In each iteration, a unique leader is elected. Each new leader picks up the state left by previous leaders and proposes a value in its iteration. Parties then cast votes on the leader’s value v. In more detail, each iteration consists of 4 rounds. The first three rounds are conceptually similar to Xxxxx and PBFT: (1) the leader learns the states of the system, (2) the leader proposes a value, and (3) parties vote on the value. If a party receives f + 1 votes for the same value and does not detect leader 6 Xxxx and Xxx [19] did not analyze communication complexity in their paper. Based on our understanding, their unrolled protocol in the appendix can achieve O(n2) communication complexity by similarly incorporating threshold signatures and a quadratic common-coin protocol. equivocation, it commits on that value. We then add another round: (4) if a party commits, it notifies all other parties about the commit; upon receiving a notification, other parties accept the committed value and will vouch for that value to future leaders. Ideally, if the leader is honest, all honest parties commit v upon receiving f + 1 votes for v at the end of that iteration. A Byzantine leader can easily waste its iteration by not proposing. But it can also perform the following more subtle attacks: (1) send contradicting proposals to different honest parties, or (2) send a proposal to some but not all honest parties. We must ensure these Byzantine behaviors do not violate safety. The need for equivocation checks. To ensure safety in the first attack, parties engage in an all-to-all round of communication to forward the leader’s proposal to each other for an equivocation check. If a party detects leader equivocation, i.e., sees two conflicting signed proposals from the leader, it does no...
Technical Overview. We give now give a more detailed overview over our techniques.
Technical Overview at the commencement of this Agreement, Maxi Security undertakes to provide technical overview, and Software Documents, to nominated employees of the Client, such overview and materials to be deter- mined at the discretion of Maxi Security.
Technical Overview. The PENTRAN (Parallel Environment Neutral-particle TRANsport) code was initially developed with the following research goals and code development objectives in mind: RESEARCH GOALS
Technical Overview. We first describe our core protocol, which ensures agreement (safety)6 and termination as required by Byzantine broadcast/agreement, but provides a weak notion of validity. Specifically, it achieves – Termination: all honest parties eventually commit, – Agreement/safety: all honest parties commit on the same value, and – Validity: if all honest parties start with certificates for the same value v, and no Byzantine party starts with a certificate for a contradictory value, then all honest parties commit on v.
