State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 244, 264, 133 N.W.2d 753, 763 (1965): In the interest of better administration of criminal justice we suggest that wherever practicable the pros- ecutor should within a reasonable time before trial no- tify the defense as to whether any alleged confession or admission will be offered in evidence at the trial. We also suggest, in cases where such notice is given by the prosecution, that the defense, if it intends to attack the confession or admission as involuntary, notify the prosecutor of a desire by the defense for a special deter- mination on such issue. See also State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 553–556, 141 N.W.2d 3, 13–15 (1965): At the time of arraignment when a defendant pleads not guilty, or as soon as possible thereafter, the state will advise the court as to whether its case against the defendant will include evidence obtained as the result of a search and seizure; evidence discovered because of a confession or statements in the nature of a confession obtained from the defendant; or confessions or state- ments in the nature of confessions. Upon being so informed, the court will formally ad- vise the attorney for the defendant (or the defendant himself if he refuses legal counsel) that he may, if he chooses, move the court to suppress the evidence so se- cured or the confession so obtained if his contention is that such evidence was secured or confession obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. * * * The procedure which we have outlined deals only with evidence obtained as the result of a search and sei- zure and evidence consisting of or produced by confes- sion on the part of the defendant. However, the steps which have been suggested as a method of dealing with evidence of this type will indicate to counsel and to the trial courts that the pretrial consideration of other evi- dentiary problems, the resolution of which is needed to assure the integrity of the trial when conducted, will be most useful and that this court encourages the use of such procedures whenever practical.
State ex rel. Xxxxxxxx x.
State ex rel. American Family Mutual Ins. Co. x. Xxxxx, 988 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Xx.Xxx. 1998)
State ex rel. Comm'rs of the Land Office, 1994 OK 131, ¶ 16, 903 P.2d 259, 263.
State ex rel. Xxxxxxxxx v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. banc 1970) 44
State ex rel. Xxxxxxxxx v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. banc 1970) 48 State on Inf. of Attorney General v. Arkansas Lumber Co., 190 S.W. 894 (Mo. banc 1916) 53
State ex rel. Simmons v.
State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 01-2668, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 835 So. 2d 785, 797. With the proponents‟ burden of proof in mind, and in the absence of any legal error or gross factual error, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding Xx. Xxxxxx‟s proposed expert testimony on causation. And, on that account, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and the dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiffs‟ lawsuit against Trinity, Continental, Hartford, and Certain Underwriters at Xxxxx‟s London. We turn now to a more complete explanation of our decision. We first briefly review this matter‟s procedural history and examine the judgment under review. Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx was diagnosed with lung cancer on August 20, 2009, and died on May 10, 2010. On May 6, 2011, Xx. Xxxxxxxxx‟s three surviving children filed a petition for wrongful death and survival damages in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans against numerous parties that were, at one time, involved in the distribution, sale and ultimate use of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. Specifically, the Xxxxxxxxx family alleges that their father suffered substantial exposure to asbestos while working at the same shipyard in Harvey, Louisiana, for a succession of owner/employers, between 1963 and 2009. The petitions allege that Xx. Xxxxxxxxx began work at the Gretna Machine and Iron Works in 1963 as a painter, sandblaster, welder, tacker, and shipfitter. In 1981, Gretna Machine was purchased by Trinity Industries, Inc. In 1997, Xxxxxxx transferred ownership of the yard to Halter Marine, which in turn sold it to Xxxxxxxxx Shipyards in 2000. Xx. Xxxxxxxxx was still working in the shipyard at the time of his 2009 diagnosis. In 2011, the Xxxxxxxxx family brought strict liability claims against Xxxxxxx, as successor in interest to Gretna Machine, and Xxxxxxxxx, as successor in interest to Halter Marine.1 The family also sued Xxxxxxx‟s insurers – Travelers Casualty 1 The Boudreauxs also named several asbestos manufacturers, supply companies, former executive officers of Gretna Machine, and their respective insurers as parties‟ defendant. The record before us indicates that the Xxxxxxxxx family‟s claims against some of these defendants were dismissed prior the rendition of the judgment under review. In light of the fact that the Xxxxxxxxx family designated only a portion of the trial court‟s record for appeal, we cannot and Surety Company, Continental Insurance Company, E...
State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 03- 0680, p. 6 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536, 541. See also Xxxxxxxxx v.
State ex rel. Xxxxx v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. ED76054 (slip op. at 10, January 18, 2000) aff’d on other grounds, 34 S.W.3d 122 (Mo.banc 2000) 20
