See, e g., Xxxxxxx x. Xxxx, 315 P.2d 314, 315 (Cal. 1957) (“The subject of a possible loss was not discussed in the inception of this venture.”); Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxx, 653 A.2d 579, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (“No thought was given to losses.”).
See, e g., XXXXXX X. XXXXXXX & XXXXXX X. XXXXX, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 6 (2007) (citing eight “Characteristics of Plain English”). 24 See, e.g., XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX, HEREOF, THEREOF, AND EVERYWHEREOF: A CONTRARIAN GUIDE TO LEGAL DRAFTING 5-6 (2002) (noting that for words of this kind, “their distance from common speech makes them prime candidates for the chop, and they are usually dispensed with”); XXXXX X. XXXXXX, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH EXERCISES 35 (2001) (classifying some of these words as “commonplace legalisms that skulk in every paragraph of listless legal writing”). See generally XXXXXXX & XXXXX, supra note 23, at 6, 309 (noting that the “absence of overly legal jargon” is a characteristic of plain English and that words like these are archaic and constitute legalese).
See, e g., Xxx Xxx (), Zhongguo Waijiao de Bian Yu Bu Bian—Lun Haiwai Liyi Baohu Yu “Bu Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxx” Yuanze ( ) [China’s Diplomacy is changing or not – On the Protection of Overseas Interests and the Principle of “Do Not Intervene in Internal Affairs”], PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE () (Sept. 23, 2014), http:// xxxxxx.xxxxxx.xxx.xx/x/0000/0000/x00000-00000000.xxxx (Xxx Xxx ar- gues that due to China new interests abroad and investments in foreign countries, its long-time support for an absolute principle of non-interference might also be revised).
See, e g., California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 (establishing cause of action for writ of mandamus with regard to official action); Santa Xxxxx County Counsel Attorneys Ass’n x. Xxxxxxxx, 869 P.2d 1142, 1149 (Cal. 1994) (“What is required to obtain writ relief is a showing by a petitioner of ‘(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent ; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty ’”) (quoting Xxxxxxx-Xxxx-Xxxxxxxx Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (Ct. App. 1962)).
See, e g., A Declaration of Local Disaster Emergency in and for the City of Louisville, Louisville, Colorado (Mar. 15, 2020) (finding a local disaster presents “the occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe damage, injury or loss of life or property resulting from COVID19”); Order of the Napa County Health Officer, Napa County, California (Mar. 18, 2020) (“This Order is issued based on evidence of increasing occurrence of COVID-19 throughout the Bay Area, increasing likelihood of occurrence of COVID-19 within the county, and the physical damage to property caused by the virus.”); Emergency Order 20-03, Broward County, Florida (Mar. 26, 2020) (finding COVID-19 is “physically causing property damage due to its proclivity to attach to surfaces for prolonged periods of time”); Amended Order of County Judge Xxxx Xxxxxxx, Dallas County, Texas (Apr. 6, 2020) (“The virus is physically causing property damage.”). 26 See xxxxx://xxxxxxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/content/sci/368/6490/489.full.pdf (last viewed Oct. 15, 2020. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 significant physical loss and damage to property in and around all 30 regular season stadiums (and other facilities and locations used by the Clubs and MLB Entities), leading expressly in many cases to the orders that shut down Baseball operations and now continue to prohibit or substantially limit the number of fans in the stands. Each such order was the result of local COVID-19 conditions and resulting property damage, which conditions also made travel difficult and dangerous in and around the stadiums. These orders, and other similar orders, prohibited, limited, restricted, or impaired access to the ballparks, precluding Clubs from playing baseball under pre-COVID-19 conditions.
See, e g., Iowa Oil Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. (In re Iowa Oil Co.), 2004 WL 2326377 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2004); Conister Tr. Ltd. v. Boating Corp. of Am., 47 U.C.C. Rep.
See, e g., Xxxxx Xxxxxxx, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 513–14 (2004) (“[T]he attempt to explain which contracts should be enforced in terms of whether their performance is possible or not has been a failure.”); Xxxxxx Xxxx, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 XXXXXXXX X.X. 1, 3 (1991) (observing that “judges and writers continue to defer to a supposed distinction between the doctrines [of mistake and frustration]” but that such a distinction is without a difference).
See, e g., UPAA § 1(1); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2(1); and Fla. Stat. § 61.079(2)(a).
See, e g., The WTO Dispute Settlement Unders tanding, art. 22(4) (“The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”). there may also be a reputational sanction, 48 there is no reason to think that reputation is sufficient to provide for an efficient level of breach between states. Reputational sanctions are limited in magnitude and can be unpredictable, and even a total loss of reputation may not be enough to deter a violation of international law. 49 Reputational sanctions are also likely to under-deter breach because the actions of the parties may not be obser vable to third parties. In the absence of a disinterested adjudicator, the breached -against party cannot credibly demonstrate that the other party was at fault. Before proceeding it is worth pausing to address a potential objection. It might be said that a rule of customary international law imposes on a violating state the obligation to “make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” 50 If one has sufficient belief in the power of customary international law one might ask if states rely on this background rule and, therefore, do not find it necessary to provide for damages in their agreements. Analogizing to the domestic sphere, the argument would be that private parties relying on the default remedies of contract law may not feel it necessary to include a liquidated damage clause of other contractual language governing damages. A realistic appraisal of both the power of customary international law and the status of this particular rule, however, makes it clear that this c laim is implausible. First, it does not seem to be the case that a rule requiring reparation in the event of a violation of
See, e g., XCO Int’l, 369 F.3d at 1001–02; Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1288–89 (7th Cir. 1985).
