See Appendix A. Where the majority of an employee’s normal hours fall between the hours of 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., a shift differential is not applicable. Should the majority of the employee’s normal hours fall between the hours of 3 p.m. and 11 p.m., the second (2nd) shift differential shall apply. Should the majority of the employee’s normal hours fall between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., the third (3rd) shift differential shall apply. An employee, whose regularly scheduled shift is five (5) consecutive workdays and always includes Saturday and Sunday, shall be paid the interrupted schedule shift differential. An employee may be temporarily transferred between shifts without changing status with respect to shift differential. Such temporary shift shall not exceed three (3) consecutive workweeks without adjustment to shift differential. Whenever possible, there shall be no permanent change of any employee’s shift without at least five (5) full working days prior knowledge.
See Appendix A. An employee request for indemnification shall be made promptly in writing to the Office of Vice President and General Counsel. The financial loss for damage to a privately owned vehicle used on Rutgers business is not reimbursable by the university.
See Appendix A b) A Long-Term Occasional teacher shall be placed on the current District 14 Secondary Teachers‟ Salary Grid in accordance with the teacher‟s recognized teaching experience and Category Placement effective on the tenth (10th) consecutive day of teaching and retroactive to the first day the teacher began the Long-Term Assignment.
See Appendix A. Since the marginal impact of share on the second derivate of payoff function is monotone, if this impact is non-negative, then the second order condition will always satisfy even with negative shares. This requires the highly concavity of ∂α
See Appendix A. Power Plant Temporary Shift – 10% per hour premium. Shift Workers: Operators/Relief Dispatchers/Operator Trainees 1st Shift (A) - 9:30 PM to 5:30 AM 2nd Shift (B) - 5:30 AM to 1:30 PM 3rd Shift (C) - 1:30 PM to 9:30 PM Troublemen 1st Shift (A) - 11:00 PM to 7:00 AM 2nd Shift (B) - 7:00 AM to 3:00 PM 3rd Shift (C) - 3:00 PM to 11:00 PM 4th Shift (D) - 4:00 PM to 12:00 Midnight 2nd Final Meter Reader
See Appendix A. 1 The following wage increases will apply to nurses during the term of this agreement.
See Appendix A. 12 The following wage increases will apply to nurses during the term of this agreement. All 13 wage increases will become effective the first day of the first pay period following the 14 increase effective date. 15 16 Effective July 1, 201210 2.0%1% Across The Board 17 Effective July 1, 201311 2.0% 2% Across The Board 18 19 E. 20 21 22 24 25 26 27 28
See Appendix A. With lemma 3.2 we can now focus on stationary relational contract without loss of generality. An optimal stationary relational contract can be described as: For any period t the contract solves the maximization problem, max yt − Σ c(ai) subject to the following constraints for each i: ai ∈ arg max E[si(yt) + pi(lt, yt)|air , a—i] − c(ari) 6The proof of the lemma to the non-deterministic case is similar, the proof would hold by substituting output y into expected output. p (lt, yt) + δ π (lt, yt) ≥ δ π¯ Note that although the enforcement of a relational contract also depends on the game being played infinitely, the incentive provision has significant difference to- wards explicit contracts. In a stationary relational contract, incentive is paid through discretionary payment period by period. Namely, everything is solved in the current period and self-enforcing constraint makes everyone willing to carry out the discretionary payment to each other in fear of breaking the long-run ben- efit. While in an explicit contract, payment can only be contingent to verifiable output y. The folk theorem tells us that when a game is played infinitely, players will work cooperatively to a more efficient outcome in the fear of falling back to the worst static equilibrium. In team setting, Winter [2009] shows that once the production function is concave, increasing one agent’s target effort level would not distort the incentive provision to other agents. In our model, each team member’s incentive can be divided into two parts: the share of the output and the discre- tionary payment. Let the difference of payment δv denote as the power of implicit incentive.7 7Since for any given y and l, the discretionary payment must sum up to 0 across all agents. Thus we can generalize the expected discretionary payment on the equilibrium path as 0 and focusing on solving the payment function off the equilibrium path, as only the incentive power matters
See Appendix A. Employees who work less than full-time shall pay an additional amount on a pro-rated basis, according to their full- time equivalent status.
