Security Analysis Sample Clauses

Security Analysis. A A A A A A Theorem III.1. Under the assumption that the hash function satisfies the second preimage security, the probability of successfully performing the dependency attack is negligible.

Security Analysis. In this chapter, we go trough the security features that our base protocol in [11] pro- vides. Then we provide proofs that B-GKAP also assures the same security level for back- ▇▇▇▇ confidentiality and forward secrecy features of dynamic group operations as in the base protocol. Finally, we discuss security models of B-GKAP1 and B-GKAP2.

Security Analysis. 5.1.1 Informal security analysis Theoretical security analysis • Replay attack: the replay attack can be dangerous for such a scheme. In fact, a replay attack occurs when an attacker intercepts a previous message exchanged by a sensor node, and tries to replay it in order to impersonate the sensor node, respectively the gateway node, or the remote user. For this reason, we must take seriously the

Security Analysis. This section focus on security analysis that comprises the cryptographic algorithm and protocols like SSL encryption, RSA, and ECC. While buying an SSL certificate, you should have a clear understanding of both of these terms. It may be utilized for the creation of smaller, more efficient, and much faster cryptography keys. Instead of using the traditional method to generate a product of very large prime numbers, it uses an elliptic curve equation to generate keys. ECC is used in the well-known cryptocurrency (i.e. Bitcoin etc). For hackers, it is really hard to crack the ECC algorithm that operates upon the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The ECC certificate has often smaller size because the information that is needed for exchanging for validation is less. For organizations having long- term security solutions as a primary concern, ECC may be an ideal choice. Also, hybrid SSLs can be utilized to use ECC instead of RSA-trusted root keys. A simple comparison can be shown in terms of the length of ciphering key between the RSA and the ECC can be stated in Table 1 according to the NIST (i.e. the National Institute of Standards and Technology) 31. Table 1. Comparison between RSA and ECC key strength32. 3 3072 256 4 7680 384 5 15360 521 Here is a quick comparison between RSA and ECC according to the NIST publication. It will help us to decide which is better in terms of security. From the above Table 1, this research concludes that the ratio of a key in size and its strength for the ECC compared with RSA is as follows: No.1 (1:7), No.2 (1:10), No.3 (1:12), No.4 (1:20), No.5 (1:30).

Security Analysis. This section provides the security analysis of the proposed scheme focused on no requirement of global time synchronization, providing forward secrecy provision, and secure against password guessing attack, replay attack and user identity guessing attack.

Security Analysis. We analyze that some well-known security threats cannot work on our proposed scheme. Case 1. can observe the network activities of B. Since the trust of B believing the received message de- pends on the response of the server S, has to forge VA for passing the verification of S. By our Definition 2, it is hard for A to derive the secret point dA ∗ dS ∗ Q by using the points UA and US. Case 2. can observe the network activities of S. Since the trust of S believing the received message de- pends on the verification of VA and VB, A has to forge VA and VB for passing the verifications. The reason is the same as Case 1. By our Definition 2, this way is infeasible. Case 3. wants to forge the responses of S. Since the trust of A and B believing the responses are sent from S depends on the verification of VSA and VSB. The goal of is to forge VSA and VSB for passing the verifications. By our Definition 2, it is computationally infeasible for A to calculate the points rA ∗ dS ∗ Q and rB ∗ dS ∗ Q. It implies that cannot forge the points (VSA, VSB). The man-in-the-middle attack does not work in our scheme.

Security Analysis. This section provides security analysis in terms of password guessing attack, replay attack and stolen- smart card attack.

Security Analysis. A-TGDH satisfies our stated security goals with the following assumptions. Since key confirmation is essential for achieving perfect forward secrecy [4], we assume that it has been implemented as described in Section V-B. Also, we assume that there exists only a passive adversary E that monitors the flow of blinded key messages. We further assume that E cannot solve the ▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ problem [6] (i.e., given only α, p, αx mod p, and αy mod p, it is infeasible for E to compute αxy mod p) and the discrete logarithm problem (i.e., given only α, p, and αx mod p, it is infeasible for E to compute x). The following proof is based on [3], [14].

Security Analysis. In this subsection, security analysis of our protocol will be discussed. At the end of this subsection, the comparisons of the related works are given in Table 2. 1) User anonymity Anonymity is becoming a major concern in many se- curity requirements. The aim of user anonymity in wireless networks is to make sure that the real iden- tity of a mobile user is protected from anyone besides his home agent.