Related Literature Sample Clauses
The Related Literature clause identifies and references prior works, studies, or publications that are relevant to the subject matter of the agreement or document. In practice, this clause typically lists specific articles, books, or research papers that provide background, support, or context for the current work. By formally acknowledging these sources, the clause ensures transparency, gives credit to original authors, and helps readers understand the foundation upon which the current work is built.
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Related Literature. Sequential P4D deals with potential challengers share the logic developed by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1984), but with deterrence investment substituted with P4D deals and licensing an authorized generic (AG). Indeed, the strategy of launching an AG via a P4D deal with a challenger is similar to earlier studies that focus on licensing as a strategy to maintain market leadership and/or deter entry. For instance, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1984) shows the conditions where the incumbent licenses its production technology to a potential entrant in exchange for terminating research into competing for better technology, while ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1990) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1994) provide models where the incumbent licenses either the weaker competitor or a competitor from outside of the industry, so as to crowd the market and discourage stronger competitors from entering. By contrast, in our paper, the generic with the AG license is the de facto strongest competitor to the brand as it enters before other generics and grabs the first mover advantage. Additionally, instead of a license being introduced prior to the potential competitor incurring entry costs, in our paper the license is issued and AG launched only if the next potential entrant has incurred an entry cost (i.e., litigation cost), and is successful. A significant economic and legal literature builds around theory of harm and focuses on the legality of pay-for-delay deals (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2003a, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2005, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2008, ▇▇▇▇▇, 2012). Under ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ antitrust welfare criteria – that a settlement should leave the consumers at least as well off as the ongoing patent litigation – a payment that exceeds the expected litigation costs of the licensor is sufficient to establish that consumers lose from the settlement (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2003b, Elhauge and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2012). In line with this reasoning, several authors have argued that pay-for-delay settlements should carry a presumption of per se anticompetitive behavior (see for instance, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2003, Bulow, 2004, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2004, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2009). Others have pointed out that while the theory of harm is useful, it has limitations and cannot be applied directly to the more complex agreements between the parties, or that P4D deals can in fact be pro-competitive in some situations, and hence such deals should not be per se illegal (▇▇▇▇▇, 2002, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2004, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2010, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2013). For instance, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2015) critique ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2012) and...
Related Literature. We apply the theory of Bayesian games originally developed by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1967, 1968a,b) to model the interactions between the power plant and the distributor. Bayesian games have been applied to the electricity markets to model the suppliers’ bidding processes in which each power plant’s marginal cost is private information. Such a game has been analyzed in various market conditions by Ferrero et al. (1998), ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. (2002), ▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2005), and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2005), among others. Horta¸csu and Puller (2008) analyze bidding processes in which contract positions are private information. Unlike previous works, in this paper information asymmetry comes from the fact that the plant’s status cannot be directly observed by the distributor, and the unit-contingent power purchase agreement introduces incentive conflicts into the system. Several economics papers on contract theory are related to our work. For example, Laffont and Martimort (2002, Section 3.6) discuss an adverse selection problem with audits and costly state verification. The costly audit allows the principal to detect an untruthful agent’s report and impose penalties. The Revelation Principle still applies, and under the truth-revealing mechanisms, punishments are never used, but the existence of punishments reduces agent’s incentive to lie and, hence, reduces informational rents. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Png (1989) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ (1985) apply the adverse selection problems with costly state verification to insurance and taxation. In contrast to these papers, our analysis is focused on a particular contract form commonly seen in practice. Because of the restriction on the contract set, instead of invoking the mechanism design approach (as in Myerson 1981, 1979, Guesnerie and Laffont 1984), we find the equilibrium of the Bayesian game directly. of these games range from unobservable inspection and simultaneous moves (Diamond 1982) to observable inspection and sequential moves (Avenhaus and ▇▇▇▇▇ 2005). Our problem differs from the inspection games in two aspects. First, the players’ payoffs in our problem depend on both a publicly observable stochastic process and an inspectee’s private information process. The inspectee’s incentive to violate depends on both processes, while the inspector’s incentive to inspect depends on the public signal and the inspectee’s report. Second, in our setting, before the game begins, the inspector offers a contract to the inspectee that affects players’ ...
Related Literature. There is a wide choice of related literature concerning the aggregation of SLAs. Approaches of close relationship to our work can be roughly categorized in three areas whose boundaries blur to some extent. Models which aggregate the SLOs of single SLIs in a mathematical way are introduced in (▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2007; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. 2004; ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. 2008). Models which cover the PROSA characteris- tic of being a document, that is, they provide a framework for building a single document out of a set of SLA documents (SLAs of the single services invoked by one BP) are discussed in (▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2008; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. 2007; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2000). Finally, (▇▇▇▇ et al. 2002; ▇▇▇▇ et al. 2008) elaborate models which validate the SLOs on BP level by means of simulations. The related work delivers some valuable insights into two main aspects of the in hand research domain. On the one hand approaches to technically aggregate SLIs and on the other hand ap- proaches which deal with the SLA characteristic of being a document that is aggre- gating the single SLAs to one document. But some highly interesting and impor- tant issues are not covered. Presented models are bottom-up-approaches. Looking at the motivation our approach is customer-oriented. That is a customer who wants to facilitate his business processes by IT-services delivers the objectives concerning the SLOs of the PROSA to the provider(s). Therefore these objectives have to be drilled down to a deep level of technical services – a top-down- approach. Whereas a bottom-up-approach deals with the attributes of technical services and aggregates them bottom-up which is not suitable for our addressed issues. Additionally the mentioned approaches do not cover both aspects custom- er-orientation and provider-methodology. They are all driven by the providers’ perspective. In summary, current approaches deliver first contributions to the do- main of SLA aggregation. But they do not cover the customer as well as the pro- vider perspective in an adequate way. Especially the motivated customer orienta- tion is not represented as much as required.
Related Literature. Sequential P4D deals with potential challengers are similar to the logic developed by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [1984], but with deterrence investment substituted with P4D deals and licensing an AG. In fact, the strategy of launching an AG via a P4D deal with a challenger, as discussed in this paper, is similar to earlier studies that focus on licensing as a strategy to maintain market leadership and/or deter entry. For instance, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [1984] shows the conditions where the incumbent licenses its production technology to a potential entrant in exchange for terminating research into competing or better technology, while ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [1990] and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [1994] provide models where the incumbent licenses either the weaker competitor or a competitor from outside of the industry, so as to crowd the market and discourage stronger competitors from entering. Yet, despite these similarities, important differences exist between our paper and previous studies on licensing. In our paper the generic with the AG licence is the de facto strongest competitor to the brand as it enters before other generics and grabs the first mover advantage. Additionally, instead of a license being introduced prior to the potential competitor incurring entry costs, in our paper the license is issued and AG launched only if the next potential entrant has incurred an entry cost, (i.e., a litigation cost) and is successful. Several studies have documented the impact branded manufacturers have when they launch their own generic or an authorized generic (AG) via a third party on independent generic entry. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ [2003] argues that authorized generics deter independent generic entry in intermediate sized markets (and “probably” in other markets as well) while Reiffen and ▇▇▇▇ [2007] show that authorized generic entry may deter independent generic entry in small and intermediate sized markets only and raise the long run prices by 1-2%. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [2007] argue that the effect of authorized entry on independent generic entry and ultimately on consumer welfare is likely to be small but still positive. However, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ [2015] reports that early authorized entry has no impact on the likelihood of generic entry. As documented in a report by the Federal Trade Commission [FTC, 2011b, pp.17-18], authorized generics can be launched by the branded firm itself (in-house) or via third parties but require expertise in generic marketing. This is because whereas brand name drugs are typically marketed to physicians and consumers e...
Related Literature. We draw on multiple streams of work that have largely evolved independently of each other. We first discuss related work into the dynamics of consumers’ social media activity. We then discuss research in marketing that has delved into user-generated content with a focus on text analytics methods. We then discuss the limited research that has examined the textual dynamics and the marketing literature on which we draw to develop a discrete-state model of social media content. While prior research has examined temporal patterns in social media activity, much of this stream has focused on metrics such as volume and sentiment. For example, Godes and ▇▇▇▇▇ (2012) use product-level data to investigate the temporal and sequential evolution of online product ratings. Using individual-level data on online product reviews, Moe and Schweidel (2012) model a user’s decision of whether or not to contribute a review, as well as the sentiment of the review. The authors demonstrate dynamics in users’ incidence and evaluation decisions arising from heterogeneity across users. Schweidel and Moe (2014) also document the presence dynamics in the sentiment expressed and the venue to which social media posts are contributed. Research has also viewed product reviews as means by which early purchasers may provide potential buyers with more information than was initially available. Kuksov and Xie (2010) examine the impact that product reviews may have on the firm’s pricing decisions. Sun (2012) looks at the impact of a high variance in previously contributed reviews as providing information to consumers when the average ratings is low, as this may indicate that the product appeals to some customers but not all. Moe and Trusov (2011) also examine how previously contributed reviews affect sales. In doing so, they decompose the effects of previous reviews into a direct effect on sales and an indirect effect through their impact on subsequent reviews. Understanding the dynamics present in social media activity is essential to maintaining the brand, sensing market, and managing customer relationships. Schweidel and Moe (2014) demonstrate that the analysis of social media data can yield a measure of brand health that is a leading indicator of survey-based metrics. Looking at how brand perceptions within an entire industry may shift, ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2016) investigate the dynamics surrounding social media conversations following product recalls and find evidence of negative spillover effe...
Related Literature. Research on debtor-in-possession financing began receiving popularity in the mid-1990s, likely due to the emergence of the modern U.S. bankruptcy system in 1978 with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. According to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, the 1980s saw an explosion of activity in the junk bond markets, as well as the appearance of leveraged buyouts by then-niche private equity players like KKR and TPG (46). The U.S. as a whole was giving more freedom to the debtor in cases of distress, so corporations felt more comfortable issuing junk bonds to raise funds if they knew there was a strong market demand for high yield, and that in a distressed scenario, they did not have an obligation to pay down unsecured debt claims at-cost if the liquidation value of their firm would not cover the debt (▇▇▇▇▇▇ 44). A short series of financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s, notably, Black Monday in 1989, the early 1990s recession in the US after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and importantly, the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, may have prompted research into the implications of the new Bankruptcy Law (44). Initial financial economic research related to the effect of financial distress, and subsequent DIP financings, on equity- market reactions with time-series analysis. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ (2001), published in the Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, was one of the first papers to examine the effect of DIP financing on the outcomes of financial distress. This paper sought to investigate the recent explosion in financial distress and tested the interaction between the reception of the DIP and a host of dependent variables, including market reaction and emergence from Chapter 11. The paper found that equity returns in the two days after the announcement of the DIP were positive and statistically significant, following a worsening market reaction 4 and 5 days before the announcement of the DIP. Additionally, this paper found that the success rate for firms that receive DIP financing is 87.50%, compared to a 71.25% rate for firms that do not. With regards to bankruptcy duration, a variable I intend to regress, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ found that the reception of the DIP reduced the length of time in bankruptcy by 98 days, significant at the 10% level. These results were adjusted to incorporate the size of the DIP, but while the size of the DIP changes inter-group time in bankruptcy, controlling for size effect does not change the results between DIP and non-DIP financed firms. However, the aut...
Related Literature. In this section I will first take a quick glance at the video game industry and then go through scholarly works that have been done on the subjects of dynamic incentives and consumer investment. By reviewing the literature, I hope to spot the gap in the current literature and describe the contribution of my work.
Related Literature. The idea of using ISAs to finance professional education was first proposed in ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1945). Nerlove (1975) points out that participants’ behavioral responses (e.g., moral hazard) to ISAs may challenge the viability of risk-pooling ISAs. We show ISAs may not only be viable but also be more attractive than student-loan financing for both universities and students even in the presence of moral hazard. Grout (1983) shows ISAs are appealing to students when job market is highly uncertain and students are risk averse. We show ISAs maybe attractive even when students are risk neutral. ▇▇▇▇ (1998) focuses on how human-capital investments are financed and shows that if the investments are financed by contingent loans, which carry interests only if the borrower is employed, optimal investments can be obtained in a wide range of situations. We explicitly consider the role of student’s financial difficulty in the case of unfavorable employment outcome and show that ISAs may not be optimal from the university’s and social-welfare perspective, particularly if the student’s financial difficulty is small. As such, our findings challenge the ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2006) conclusion (on the basis of the extent literature) that ISAs are in general welfare increasing compared to either bank loans or up-front fees. We contribute to the literature on ISAs by explicitly considering students’ financial difficulties and generating new insights including about when ISAs may be welfare enhancing. A large stream of literature following ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1964) examines implications of consumers’ borrowing and repayment decisions for investment in human capital (more generally, in projects with notably poor collateral).7 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2005) show income inequality contributes to increased consumer borrowing to finance the purchase of durable goods. We show that a higher income inequality can lead universities to primarily focus on high-income 7Please refer to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2016) for a comprehensive overview of literature on student loans and repayments. students for profits by raising tuition. In the context of collateral-free loans, ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ (2012) show lenders use peer-lending decisions to infer creditworthiness of borrowers. In our model, the creditworthiness of students is decided by the offer of admission to the university. ▇▇▇, ▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇ (2018) develop a theory model to explain near-zero default rates even in the absence of any collateral in informal lending ma...
Related Literature. 3.1 Stability and Renegotiation Proofness Although our notion is not one of renegotiation-proofness, its connection to various theories of renegotiation-proofness is evident. First, both our theory and the notions of renegotiation proofness allow for coalitional deviations, although renegotiation proofness restricts coalitional deviations to those of the grand coalition. Secondly, the notion of stable agreements is defined by applying the notion of stability that was originated by ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1944) and extended by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1990); the theories of renegotiation-proofness exhibit various attempts to apply the notion of sta- bility. As ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1992) wrote “... the renegotiation literature (as well as the new approach suggested by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1990)) is returning to the internal and external consistency ideas suggested by ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1944). For example, (weak) renegotiation proofness of ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ (1989) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1989) imposes a version of internal stabil- ity (stronger than ours) while ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ (1991) Pareto perfect equilibrium imposes also external stability in addition to the same internal stability as ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ (1989) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1989). However, the notions of renegotiation proofness can be criticized for tak- ing Pareto criterion too far as discussed in the introduction. They stipulate that the grand coalition will renegotiate and abandon a punishment when- ever there is a Pareto dominating equilibrium available even though the later equilibrium may rely on punishments that are as severe. Implicitly, a deviat- ing player counts too heavily on renegotiation. Our notion explores a natural extension of the uncertainty aversion on the part of players embedded in the notion of subgame perfection. Our notion can be viewed as the weakest notion that accounts for coalitional deviations. For two-player games, it is easy to see that an efficient (weakly) renegotiation-proof45 equilibrium also belongs to the set of stable agreements for N. However, we do recognize the importance and relevance of renegotiation in formalizing notions stronger than ours. In a future project, we shall extend our analysis to account for credible renegotiation.
3.2 Perfectly Coalition-Proof ▇▇▇▇ Equilibrium and Strong Perfect Equilibrium ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1987) applied their coalition-proof ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium to dynamic games with finite horizon and proposed the notion of perfectly coalition−proof ▇▇▇▇...
Related Literature. Our paper is related to a number of literatures. There is an extensive literature on the costs of unproductive activities such as rent seeking, con ict, and in uence activities.13 Our focus, however, is not on the direct e ciency costs generated by these unproductive activities, but on the indirect e ects that they have in preventing ex-ante cooperation. More speci cally, we show that the diversity in opportunities or endowments between the parties who interact repeatedly can increase the magnitude of the endogenous externalities generated by an agreement.