Negotiating history. Since TRIPS is a new and unprecedented Agreement in the WTO, and since it was clear that the adjustment of the internal legal regimes of developing and 1 In the framework of the WTO, the GATT 1947 is replaced by the identical GATT 1994. 2 On the other hand, the GATT admits grandfather clauses allowing countries that accede to it to maintain pre-existing domestic legislation inconsistent with GATT provisions. In addition, the GATT in Part IV (Trade and Development) contains some provisions on special treatment for developing countries. For instance, according to Article XXXVI:8 of the GATT, “developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties”. 3 See Article XXXVI:4 of GATT 1994. 4 See Article XXXVI:8 of GATT 1994.
Negotiating history. The negotiating history of these provisions suggests that the Agreement did not undergo any major changes. The most significant differences are outlined below. 58 See also Xxxxx Xxxxxx, Encouraging International Technology Transfer, UNCTAD-ICTSD, Geneva 2004, available at <xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/unctadictsd/projectoutputs.htm#casestudies>. [hereinafter Maskus, 2004]
Negotiating history. Neither the Anell Draft211 nor the Brussels Draft212 contained a provision on secu- rity exceptions. The Xxxxxx Draft,213 by contrast, did provide for security excep- tions. This provision was essentially the same as the current Article 73.
Negotiating history. Industrialized countries with established rules for the control of intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices were not interested in establishing such rules in the TRIPS context. Instead they focused on the formulation of adequate standards of intellectual property protection. Thus, it was the developing coun- tries, once it became clear that TRIPS negotiations would extend beyond matters of counterfeiting and piracy, who insisted on including the issue of anticompetitive practices in the Agreement.9 In part they were of the opinion that restrictive trade practices were the only trade-related aspects of intellectual property protection,10 6 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947 to Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related Documents (March 1948), at Chapter V, Restrictive Business Practices, Article 46. See Xxxxxxxxx
Negotiating history. The Union points to what it characterizes as prior attempts by the Employer “to narrow the language of Article 21.06 (and its predecessor provisions) without success”. This has involved seeking to exclude regular part-time employees from the provision during negotiations for the 1984-1989 Collective Agreement, and seeking to delete the words “called to work outside their regular shift” from the provision during negotiations for the 1989-1992 Collective Agreement. Neither proposal was agreed to by the Union. On the other hand, the Employer points to a proposal regarding Article 21.12 tabled by the Union on October 29, 2009 during the most recent round of negotiations (the proposed amendment is underlined): The Parties agree that the Company will pay a premium of an additional two (2) hours pay, at the employees regular hourly rate of pay, per shift (until employee returns to their regular shift) if an employee is called to work outside their regular shift, provided however, the employee receives less than twenty-four (24) hours notice to, report to a different shift. The premium shall be in addition the double time (2X) their regular rate paid to the employee who works outside their regular shift. If the employee receives more than twenty-four (24) hours notice to work outside their regular shift, the employee will be paid double time (2x) their regular rate. Nothing in this Article allows the Employer to alter the regular shift without following Article 19.01. This proposal was not accepted, and the Employer says it was put forward by the Union “because it did not have the entitlement it now argues for”. Xx. XxxXxxxx testified, however, that the Union bargaining committee wanted to clarify and not change the language, and advised the Employer at the table that this proposal did not represent a change in intent. He added that the proposal was prompted by two occasions where the Employer had wanted to move an employee without a shift bid, and the Union had agreed on a without prejudice basis. Finally, a series of exchanges between the parties during the most recent round of bargaining bears on the Employer’s estoppel argument. Xx. XxxXxxxx initiated the exchanges when he wrote to Xxxx Xxxxx, the Employer’s Manager of Labor Relations and its spokesperson in bargaining, on January 21, 2010: During the mediation process at the Labour Relations Board on January 20, 2010, at approximately 1:30pm, the employer tabled a proposal which contained the following langua...
Negotiating history. 25. The intcrprctation of Articlc 1105 has proved to bc particularly difficult for various tribunals and, indeed, for the NAFTA Parties themselves. This Tribunal has grappled with the xxxxx inconsistencies between the provisions of BITs and corresponding commitments in Article 1105.7 Other tribunals have laboured over the relationships between Articlc 1105 and other commitments in Chapter 11 as well as commitments made by the NAFTA Parties in other agreements.8 And the NAFTA Parties themselves found it necessary to promulgate the Interpretation.9
Negotiating history. The negotiating history of Article 68 was intertwined with the substantive aspects of the negotiations. Since the idea of substantive standards in TRIPS itself was not commonly accepted until the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round in April 1989, not much consideration was given to what kind of body would supervise the operation of an agreement in this area. Adding to this complication was the debate on what exactly the successor organization to the GATT would be. Developing countries, in general, insisted for a long time after the Uruguay Round was launched that both TRIPS and the Services Agreement should be on separate tracks and not on a par with negotiations in the goods area. Their idea was to make these two subjects non-justiciable under any possible dispute settlement rules. While this did not happen, it constituted the main reason for the developing countries’ entertaining the idea of a separate organ for supervision of TRIPS.
Negotiating history. Whereas at the outset of the TRIPS negotiations the United States proposals con- tained no mention of geographical indications,357 the initial substantive submis- sion by the European Community of July 1988 included a detailed provision on the protection of geographical indications in which can already be seen the outlines of the TRIPS Agreement rules.358
Negotiating history. As with other provisions, Article 10 was the subject of several different proposals. With regard to computer programs, earlier drafts of Article 10.1 reflected a struggle over a compromise agreement on what precisely the scope of such a provision might be.
Negotiating history
