NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION. Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any indi- vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is also unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” because of the employee’s national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(2). Similarly, the MHRA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge an employee” or “discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, com- pensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment” because of an employee’s national origin. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. Title VII also prohibits an employer from retali- ating against an employee for “oppos[ing] any prac- xxxx made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Under the MHRA, it is an “unfair discriminatory practice” for an employer to “intentionally engage in any reprisal” against a per- son because that person opposed “a practice forbidden under [the MHRA].” Minn. Stat. § 363A.15(1). The Court analyzes an employer’s liability under both Title VII and the MHRA using the same legal xxxx- dards. Xxxxxxxxx v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011); Xxxx v. Cappella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Minn. 2010). Although Shukh’s brief in response to the present motion is not a model of clarity regarding the scope of his claims, counsel clarified at oral argument that Shukh brings claims for discrimination based on a hostile work environment and his termination. He also brings claims for retaliation based on a hostile work environment, denial of a promotion to Grade 162 in 2008, and his termination. Seagate disputes that each of these claims was either properly pled, carved out in the Court’s March 2011 order on Sea- gate’s motion to dismiss, or adequately briefed in re- sponse to the present motion. Because the Court concludes that summary judgment in favor of Seagate is warranted on each of these claims, it will assume, without deciding, that Shukh properly raised and preserved the claims he identified at oral argument, and will address each of these claims in turn.
