Login Phase Clause Examples
Login Phase. (1) Ui inserts Ui’s smart card into a terminal, and inputs the IDi and PWi. The smart card compares IDi with the stored value IDi. If this condition is satisfied, the smart card acknowledges the legitimacy of the Ui, and proceeds with the next step. Otherwise, it terminates this phase.
(2) The smart card computes PWi = h(PWi||b) and k = h((Ni ⊕ PWi)||T1), then chooses a random nonce R1 ∈ {0, 1}l , and computes Ai = Ek(IDi||R1||T1).
(3) Finally, Ui sends a login request message (IDi, Ai, T1) to GWN through a public channel. From the above descriptions, in login phase of Xxxx et al.’s scheme, the message size of the login request (IDi, Ai, T1) can be computed as (8 + 20 + 19) = 47 bytes. User (U ) Gateway (GW ) Sensor (Sn)
i i Inputs (IDi, PWi) Checks ID =? stored ID PWi = h(PWi||b) k = h((Ni ⊕ PWi)||T1) Chooses a random nonce R1 ∈ {0, 1}l Ai = Ek(IDi||R1||T1) (IDi, Ai, T1) Checks |T1′ − T1| < ∆T k = h(h(IDi||xa)||T1) Dk(Ai) = {IDi, R1, T1} Checks IDi, T1 SK = h(IDi||h(xs||SIDn)||T2) Bi = h(h(xs||SIDn)||SK||SIDn||IDi||T2) (IDi, Bi, T2) Checks |T2′ − T2| < ∆T SK = h(IDi||h(xs||SIDn)||T2) ? Bi∗ = h(h(xs||SIDn)||SK||SIDn||IDi||T2) Checks Bi = Bi Ci = h(h(xs||SIDn)||SK||IDi||SIDn||T3) (Ci, T3) Checks |T3′ − T3| < ∆T Ci∗ = h(h(xs||SIDn)||SK||IDi||SIDn||T3) Checks C∗ =? C Di = Ek(IDi||SIDn||SK||R1||T4) (Di, T4) Checks |T4′ − T4| < ∆T Dk(Di) = {IDi, SIDn, SK, R1, T4} Checks IDi, R1, T4
Login Phase. At this phase, the drone Dj needs to periodically broadcast messages to prepare for vehicles that need to provide services. When receiving a broadcast message from the drone Dj, and if the user Ui wishes to receive the service from the drone Dj, the first step is to log into its vehicle. Figure 5 shows the user Ui login steps in its local system.
Fig. 5. User login phase.
1) The vehicle user Ui inserts his/her smart card SCi into a card reader of the vehicle Vi, and inputs the login credentials (such as UIDi, IDi and PWi).
2) The vehicle Vi computes UPWi = H1(UIDi||PWi), message M1 = Ci, Ri, ρi, Ti to the drone Dj over an open channel.
Login Phase. When Ui logins the system, he/she can perform the next steps. 3 • Ui inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and enters the identity IDi, password PWi. The smart card SC computes b = B ⊕ IDi ⊕ PWi, RPWi = h(b PWi), C1 = C2 RPWi, d = C4 h(C1 RPWi), t = h(C1 d), and compares Ct with C3 stored in the smart card. Only if the equation holds, SC per- forms the following steps. • SC generates a random number v and computes V = gv mod n, D = gd mod n, h(xǁyǁD) = C5 ⊕ h(C1ǁIDi), CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(V ǁh(xǁyǁD)), F1 = RPWi ⊕h(C1ǁIDi), F2 = C4 ⊕h(V ǁC1)⊕h(xǁyǁD), M1 = h(IDiǁRPWiǁV ǁC1ǁd). Then, Xx sends login
Login Phase. This phase describes the user’s login process. L1 Ui enters their corresponding IDi and PWi. L2 MTi executes the following operations: Initially, it com- putes ri as ri = Fi h(IDi PWi). This computation facilitates the generation of the pseudo-identity HIDi∗ = h(IDi ri) and the pseudo-password HPWi∗ = h(PWi ri). Following this, MTi derives Ri∗ through the equation Ri∗ = Ai h(HIDi∗ HPWi∗), equivalently calculated as Ri∗ = Di ri h(HIDi∗ HPWi∗). The next step involves calculating the temporary authentication token Authi′∗ = h(HIDi∗ HPWi∗ Ri∗) and the final authentication token Authi∗ = h(Authi′∗ HPWi∗ ri). Upon completing these calculations, MTi checks whether TABLE I: Xxx et al. Notations extraction of Ci linked to TIDi, setting the stage for Ui, XXx XXXx HPWi TIDi PWi MTi WDj IDWDj PIDW Dj TIDW Dj TIDold/TIDnew Ai, Bi, . . . , Fi, Xxxxx ri, Ri Ti ni Mi ∆T RC CS SK K h(·) ⊕ A ith user and his/her identity Pseudonymous identity of Ui Pseudonymous password of Ui Temporary identity of Ui Password of Ui Mobile terminal of Ui jth wearable device Identity of WDj Pseudo-identity of WDj Temporary identity of WDj Old/New temporary identity Authentication parameters bound to Ui. Random number bound to Ui ith Timestamp ith Nonce ith authentication message Maximum allowable transmission delay Trusted registration center Cloud server Session key Secret key of CS Hash function Bitwise XOR operation Concatenation operation Adversary subsequent computations. CS then calculates Ri∗ by combining Ci with a hash of TIDi and K, forming Ri∗ = Ci ⊕ h(TIDi K). This is followed by de- riving Bi∗ = h(TIDi Ri∗ K), and n∗3 through n∗3 = M3 ⊕ h(TIDi Ri∗ T3). The process continues with CS calculating M4∗ = h(TIDi Bi∗ n∗3 T3) and M∗ = h(TIDi TIDW D M2 M∗ n∗ T3).
Login Phase. To access a desired smart sensing device SDk in the flexible manufacturing environment, a registered user Ui undertakes the following actions to log in.
Step 1: Ui inputs its identity IDi and password PWl at It then uses these values, along with CT1 and MAC1 as well as by employing AEGIS, to compute PT2, = DKb (IV3, AD3, CT1, MAC1). If the verification of MAC1 fails, MCNj aborts the procedure. Otherwise, MCNj re- trieves SIDSDk r1 from plaintext PTi. MCNj then checks the registered user device UDi. UDi then computes Rl = that SID SDk is in PTi. If it is not, the process is aborted.
Login Phase. When A wants to communicate toB, A performs this login phase with TS. The details of this phase are as follows.
Step 1: A inputs XXX and PWA. A’s smart card computes WA’ = XXX⨁PWA and checks whether V2equals to h(WA’). If not, the smart card stops the phase.
Step 2: Otherwise, A’s smart card chooses a random number RA and computes XA = ê(RA, P), YA = ê(RA, F) ⨁ XXX, VA’ = V1 ⨁ WA’, MA = h(VA||XXX||IDB) and PA = EKA-TS(MA|| IDB). And then, sends the message <XA, YA, PA> to TS through a public channel.
Login Phase. When Ui logins the system, he/she can perform the next steps. • Ui inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and enters the identity IDi, password PWi. The smart card SC computes bt = B ⊕ IDi ⊕ PWi, Ct = C2 ⊕ h(bt ǁPWi) ⊕ h(IDi), Ct = h(Ct ), and phase, authentication phase and password change phase. 1 t 3 1 compares C3 with C3 stored in the smart card. Only if the equation holds, XX performs the following steps. • SC generates a random number v and computes V = gv mod n, h(xǁy) = c4 ⊕ h(bǁPWi), CIDi = h(IDi)⊕h(V ǁh(xǁy)), M1 = h(CIDiǁV ||C1). Then, Xx sends login request message {CIDi, V, M1} to Si.
Login Phase. During this phase the user with identity IDi can login to the server with the smart card and the password the user and the server will authenticate each other and establish a session key is used to secure further communications between that user and the server the attacker can initiate a log-in request on behalf of the user, or act as the server by sending messages to the user. An active attacker can also request any session keys adaptively (if the protocol supports key agreement). It is evident that an active attacker is more powerful than a passive attacker. On the other hand, smart-card-based password authentication provides two-factor authentication, namely something the user has: a valid smart card. Something the user knows: a correct password. Successful log-in requires a valid smart card and the correct password.
Login Phase. When A wants to communicate to B, A performs this login phase with B via TS. Figure 4 shows the steps of it and the detailed processes are as follows.
Step 1: A inputs XXX and PWA. A’s SC computes WA’ = IDAXOR PWA and checks whether V2equals to H(WA’). If not, the SC stops the phase. Step 2: Otherwise, A’s SC chooses a random number RA and computes XA = ê(RA, P), YA = ê(RA, F)XOR XXX, VA’ = V1 XOR WA’, MA = H(VA’||XXX||IDB) and CA-TS= KA-TS(MA||IDB). After that, A sends the message <XA, YA, CA-TS> to TS through a public channel.
Login Phase. If Ui wants to get information from the private cloud server Sm, Ui inserts the smart cart into the IoT-enabled device and provides ID∗,P ∗ and and B∗. The device computes A∗ = P ∗ ⊕ h (B∗) and C∗ = h (ID∗ ǁ A∗). Then, it verifies C∗ =?Ci. If C∗ = Ci, the device authenticates the real Ui; otherwise, it rejects this login of Ui. Next, the device generates an at least 128 bits random number Ni and executes the follow operations: b = Ωi ⊕ Ai PIDi = h (IDi ǁ b) Di = Ei ⊕ Ai Gi = h (PIDi ǁ SIDm ǁ Ni ǁ TSi ǁ Di) Fi = Di ⊕ Ni Zi = SIDm ⊕ h (Di ǁ Ni) where TSi is the current timestamp of the device, SIDm is the private server Sm’s identity. After that, the device transmits (Gi, Fi, Zi, PIDi, TSi) to Sm via a public channel.