International Financial Institutions. No Group Company, nor any officer, director, authorised employee, Affiliate, agent or representative of any Group Company is listed by any international financial institution as excluded from the financings granted by any such institution and it has not otherwise been subject to any sanction from any such institution.
International Financial Institutions. Among others, the African Development Bank and the World Bank are effective partners in supporting sector-wide assessments and interventions, as well as in conducting large-scale advocacy initiatives. Project co- financing will be explored with IFIs.
International Financial Institutions. IFIs are large inter-governmental organizations that provide development assistance, stabi- lization through temporary loans, and foreign aid. The two primary international financial institutions today are the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (WB), two prod- ucts of the Bretton Xxxxx agreements at the end of World War II. The IMF is tasked with providing international financial stability, doing so by providing loans, grants, and imple- xxxxxxx programs in heavily indebted, unstable, or economically-troubled states. The IMF’s sister institution, the World Bank, primarily works on economic growth and development issues, helping states by providing grants, loans, and aid for a variety of infrastructural and developmental projects. I will only focus on the IMF in this paper, because I believe the mechanisms through which this institution affects behavior are unique and unlike those that condition the relationship between states and the World Bank. For example, the IMF often serves as the “lender of last resort,” and its sole mandate is to provide worldwide financial stability. The aims of the World Bank are focused on development and improving human capital. The two organizations have important differences that condition when, to whom, and why they give out funds, as well as different normative reasons for doing so and for following up on the consequences of these loans. As I detail below, the IMF often fails to take human rights into account – either on the front or back end of a loan package. This in turn can condition what happens in a loan-receiving state. To directly affect states’ behavior, the IMF can stipulate terms into agreements or loan packages that require states to fulfill certain criteria in order to maintain eligibility for financial incentives. Additionally, I argue that the IMF can also unintentionally change state behavior. The IMF frequently makes states implement austerity measures when the partner state signs onto an agreement. Signing onto a loan with such provisions may mean steep cutbacks in social services or welfare. This in turn could lead to backlash, protest, and repression as a response. I argue that this could be the case even when conditions on the loans may not be enforced by the IMF – for example, in the case of Pakistan, the IMF has little incentive to promote strict reforms because of that country’s important security alliance with the US. However, domestic interest groups still protest the loans and conditions....
International Financial Institutions. The literature on the topic of economic tools for affecting human rights tends to blend the work on economic sanctions, PTAs, foreign aid, and other trade issues that IFIs and states can use to change behavior. In the above paragraphs I have done the same in order to think broadly about the tools that might be at a body’s (i.e., state or IFI) disposal. Logically, it makes sense to first think about the broad questions, themes, and tools that might be at work. Now, I focus specifically on IFIs with this knowledge in mind. International financial institutions are large, powerful, and diverse actors on the world stage (Koremenos, Xxxxxx and Xxxxxx 0000). Xxxxxx apply for loans or programs in order to tap into the wealth and stability offered by such packages, often hoping to use them to deal with domestic fiscal troubles. Aside from the effectiveness of the loans at restoring economic balance and stability within a recipient country, what externalities arise from these loans? Specifically, what positive or negative externalities arise and what is their effect on citizens in that country, particularly with respect to physical integrity rights (e.g., freedom from torture, disappearance, political murder, and extrajudicial killing)? According to sources such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), IMF policies do not consider human rights and may contribute to worse outcomes.1 This is problematic, given that IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank hold sway over many developing states, and because their actions may have direct, measurable impacts on the lives of the everyday citizens in recipient countries. In the next section, I review more of the existing literature, which I think points to two major driving trends: IMF programs induce grievances and a disregard for human rights by this body leads to few mitigating responses by the organization. I derive these trends from the literature and then present several falsifiable hypotheses after that.
