Common use of Fair Competition Clause in Contracts

Fair Competition. 1. The Parties agree that their air carriers shall enjoy fair and equal opportunities to compete in the provision of air transport services. 2. The Parties shall: (a) prohibit, and where they exist, eliminate, within their respective jurisdictions and using their respective internal procedures and processes, any forms of discrimination or unfair practices which would adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services; (b) not grant or permit subsidies to any air carriers if such subsidies adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services. 3. Notwithstanding point (b) of paragraph 2, the following may be granted: (a) support to insolvent or ailing air carriers, provided that: (i) such support is conditional on a credible restructuring plan based on realistic assumptions with a view to ensuring the return of the insolvent or ailing air carrier to long-term viability within a reasonable time; and (ii) the air carrier concerned, its investors or shareholders significantly contribute to the costs of restructuring; (b) temporary liquidity support to an ailing air carrier in the form of loans or loan guarantees limited to the amount needed merely to keep the air carrier concerned in business for the time necessary to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan; (c) provided that they are limited to the minimum amounts needed to achieve their objective and that the effects on the provision of air transport services are kept to a minimum: (i) subsidies to make good the damage caused by natural disasters; (ii) in the case of Qatar, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in its economy; and, in the case of the EU and its Member States, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of one or more EU Member States; (d) subsidies to air carriers entrusted with the operation of clearly defined public service obligations necessary to meet essential transport needs of the population which cannot be satisfied by market forces alone, provided that these subsidies are limited to a reasonable remuneration for the provision of the air services concerned. 4. The Parties shall ensure that each of its air carriers providing air transport services under this Agreement publicly issues, on at least an annual basis, a financial report and accompanying financial statement that is externally audited in compliance with internationally recognised accounting and corporate financial disclosure standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards; and that, in case a Party provides a subsidy, this subsidy is separately identified in the financial report. 5. Each Party shall, at the request of the other Party, provide to the other Party within 30 days, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, financial reports and any other information as may be reasonably available, including on the matters covered under paragraph 4, as may be reasonably requested by the other Party to verify that the provisions of this Article are being complied with. Such information, when commercially sensitive, shall be subject to confidential treatment by the requesting Party. 6. Each Party, using their respective internal procedures and processes, shall implement and apply measures that effectively prohibit and prevent their air carriers from: (a) engaging in concerted practices, resulting from an express or implicit agreement or decision between competitors, which have as their objective or effect the prevention, lessening or distortion of competition. This prohibition may be declared inapplicable where such agreements, decisions or practices contribute to improving the production or distribution of services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and do not: (i) impose on the companies concerned, restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; or (ii) afford such companies the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question, (b) abusing a dominant position in a way which may affect air transport services to/from that Party, and (c) concentrations between air carriers which significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 7. If a Party considers that its carriers' fair and equal opportunities to compete are adversely affected by: (a) discrimination or unfair practices prohibited under point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) a subsidy prohibited under point (b) of paragraph 2, other than those listed in paragraph 3; (c) non-compliance with the transparency obligations laid down in paragraphs 4, and 5; or (d) failure of the other Party to comply with the obligations laid down in paragraph 6, it ("the acting Party") may proceed in accordance with paragraphs 8 to 10. 8. The acting Party shall submit a written request for consultations to the other Party, accompanied by a written report with its observations and material evidence. Consultations shall start within a period of 30 days of the receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Consultations may be requested through the Joint Committee. 9. If the acting Party and the other Party fail to reach agreement on the matter within 60 days of the commencement of the consultations, or a different period agreed by the Parties or by the Joint Committee, the acting Party may take measures against the air carriers which have engaged in the contested conduct or which have benefited from the discrimination, unfair practices or subsidies in question. The acting Party shall notify the other Party, in writing, of the measures to be taken at least 15 days before the implementation of any such measure. 10. Measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be appropriate, proportionate and restricted in their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary, with a view to mitigating the injury to the carriers of the acting Party and removing the undue advantage gained by the carriers against which they are directed. 11. Any actions and measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be without prejudice to the right of either Party to refer to the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article 23. 12. Where matters pertaining to this Article are referred to the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article 23, the timelines stated in Article 23(10), (11), and (12) shall be halved. 13. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect, limit or jeopardise in any way the authority or powers of the competition authorities of the Parties or of the courts which review the decisions of those authorities. Any action taken pursuant to paragraph 9 by a Party shall be without prejudice to any possible actions and measures taken by the said authorities and courts, including those of the acting Party. The decisions of the courts which review the actions and measures of those competent authorities shall be excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article 23.

Fair Competition. 1. The Parties agree that their air carriers shall enjoy fair and equal opportunities to compete in the provision of air transport services. 2. The Parties shall: (a) prohibit, and where they exist, eliminate, within their respective jurisdictions and using their respective internal procedures and processes, any forms of discrimination or unfair practices which would adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services; (b) not grant or permit subsidies to any air carriers if such these subsidies adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services. 3. Notwithstanding point subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the following may be granted: (a) support to insolvent or ailing air carriers, provided that: (i) such this support is conditional on a credible restructuring plan based on realistic assumptions with a view to ensuring the return of the insolvent or ailing air carrier to long-term viability within a reasonable timetime to long- term viability; and (ii) the air carrier concerned, its investors or shareholders significantly contribute themselves to the costs of restructuring; (b) temporary liquidity support to an ailing air carrier in the form of loans or loan guarantees limited to the amount needed merely to keep the air carrier concerned in business for the time necessary to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan; (c) provided that they are limited to the minimum amounts needed to achieve their objective and that the effects on the provision of air transport services are kept to a minimum: (i) subsidies to make good the damage caused by natural disasters; (ii) in the case of QatarTerra ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in its economy; and, in the case of the EU OU and its Member States, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of one or more EU OU Member States; (d) subsidies to air carriers entrusted with the operation of clearly defined public service obligations necessary to meet essential transport needs of the population which cannot be satisfied by market forces alone, provided that these subsidies are limited to a reasonable remuneration for the provision of the air services concerned. 4. The Parties shall ensure that each of its air carriers providing air transport services under this Agreement publicly issues, on at least an annual basis, a financial report and accompanying financial statement that is externally audited in compliance with internationally recognised accounting and corporate financial disclosure standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards; and that, in case a Party provides a subsidy, this subsidy is separately identified in the financial report. 5. Each Party shall, at the request of the other Party, provide to the other Party within 30 days, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, financial reports and any other information as may be reasonably available, including on the matters covered under paragraph 4, as may be reasonably requested by the other Party to verify that the provisions of this Article are being complied with. Such The submission of such information, when commercially sensitive, shall be subject to confidential treatment by the requesting Party. 6. Each Party, using their respective internal procedures and processes, shall implement and apply measures that effectively prohibit and prevent their air carriers from: (a) engaging in concerted practices, practices resulting from an express or implicit agreement or decision between competitors, which have as their objective or effect the prevention, lessening or distortion of competition. This prohibition may be declared inapplicable where such agreements, decisions or practices contribute to improving the production or distribution of services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and do not: : (i) impose on the companies concerned, restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; or (ii) afford such companies the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question, (b) abusing a dominant position in a way which may affect air transport services to/from that Party, and (c) concentrations between air carriers which significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 7. If a Party (hereinafter referred to as "the acting Party") considers that its carriers' fair and equal opportunities to compete are adversely affected by: (a) discrimination or unfair practices prohibited under point subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2; (b) a subsidy prohibited under point subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, other than those listed in paragraph 3; (c) non-compliance with the transparency obligations laid down in paragraphs 4, and 5; or (d) failure of the other Party to comply with the obligations laid down in paragraph 6, ; it ("the acting Party") may proceed in accordance with paragraphs 8 to 10. 8. The acting Party shall submit a written request for consultations to the other Party, accompanied by a written report with its observations and material evidence. Consultations shall start within a period of 30 thirty (30) days of the receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Consultations may be requested through the Joint Committee. 9. If the acting Party and the other Party fail to reach agreement on the matter within 60 sixty (60) days of from the commencement of the consultations, or a different period agreed by the Parties or by the Joint Committee, the acting Party may take measures against the air carriers which have engaged in the contested conduct or which have benefited from the discrimination, unfair practices or subsidies in question. The acting Party shall notify the other Party, in writing, of the measures to be taken at least 15 fifteen (15) days before the implementation of any such measure. 10. Measures The measures taken pursuant to the preceding paragraph 9 shall be appropriate, proportionate and restricted in their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary, with a view to mitigating the injury to the carriers of the acting Party and removing the undue advantage gained by the carriers against which they are directed. 11. Any actions and measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be without prejudice to the right of either Party to refer to the dispute settlement mechanism procedure laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement. 12. Where matters pertaining to this Article are referred to the dispute settlement mechanism procedure laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement, the timelines stated in Article 23(10)paragraphs 10, (11), and (12) 12 of that Article shall be halved. 13. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect, limit or jeopardise in any way the authority or powers of the competition authorities of the Parties or of the courts which review the decisions of those authorities. Any action taken pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article by a Party shall be without prejudice to any possible actions and measures taken by the said authorities and courts, including those of the acting Party. The decisions of the courts which review the actions and measures of those competent authorities shall be excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement.

Fair Competition. 1. The Parties agree that their air carriers shall enjoy fair and equal opportunities to compete in the provision of air transport services. 2. The Parties shall: (a) prohibit, and where they exist, eliminate, within their respective jurisdictions and using their respective internal procedures and processes, any forms of discrimination or unfair practices which would adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services; (b) not grant or permit subsidies to any air carriers if such subsidies adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services. 3. Notwithstanding point (b) of paragraph 2, the following may be granted: (a) support to insolvent or ailing air carriers, provided that: (i) such support is conditional on a credible restructuring plan based on realistic assumptions with a view to ensuring the return of the insolvent or ailing air carrier to long-term viability within a reasonable time; and (ii) the air carrier concerned, its investors or shareholders significantly contribute to the costs of restructuring; (b) temporary liquidity support to an ailing air carrier in the form of loans or loan guarantees limited to the amount needed merely to keep the air carrier concerned in business for the time necessary to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan; (c) provided that they are limited to the minimum amounts needed to achieve their objective and that the effects on the provision of air transport services are kept to a minimum: (i) subsidies to make good the damage caused by natural disasters; (ii) in the case of Qatar, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in its economy; and, in the case of the EU and its Member States, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of one or more EU Member States; (d) subsidies to air carriers entrusted with the operation of clearly defined public service obligations necessary to meet essential transport needs of the population which cannot be satisfied by market forces alone, provided that these subsidies are limited to a reasonable remuneration for the provision of the air services concerned. 4. The Parties shall ensure that each of its air carriers providing air transport services under this Agreement agreement publicly issues, on at least an annual basis, a financial report and accompanying financial statement that is externally audited in compliance with internationally recognised accounting and corporate financial disclosure standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards; and that, in case a Party provides a subsidy, this subsidy is separately identified in the financial report. 5. Each Party shall, at the request of the other Party, provide to the other Party within 30 days, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, financial reports and any other information as may be reasonably available, including on the matters covered under paragraph 4, as may be reasonably requested by the other Party to verify that the provisions of this Article article are being complied with. Such information, when commercially sensitive, shall be subject to confidential treatment by the requesting Party. 6. Each Party, using their respective internal procedures and processes, shall implement and apply measures that effectively prohibit and prevent their air carriers from: (a) engaging in concerted practices, resulting from an express or implicit agreement or decision between competitors, which have as their objective or effect the prevention, lessening or distortion of competition. This prohibition may be declared inapplicable where such agreements, decisions or practices contribute to improving the production or distribution of services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and do not: (i) impose on the companies concerned, restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; or (ii) afford such companies the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question, (b) abusing a dominant position in a way which may affect air transport services to/from that Party, and (c) concentrations between air carriers which significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 7. If a Party considers that its carriers' fair and equal opportunities to compete are adversely affected by: (a) discrimination or unfair practices prohibited under point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) a subsidy prohibited under point (b) of paragraph 2, other than those listed in paragraph 3; (c) non-compliance with the transparency obligations laid down in paragraphs 4, and 5; or (d) failure of the other Party to comply with the obligations laid down in paragraph 6, it ("the acting Party") may proceed in accordance with paragraphs 8 to 10. 8. The acting Party shall submit a written request for consultations to the other Party, accompanied by a written report with its observations and material evidence. Consultations shall start within a period of 30 days of the receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Consultations may be requested through the Joint Committee. 9. If the acting Party and the other Party fail to reach agreement on the matter within 60 days of the commencement of the consultations, or a different period agreed by the Parties or by the Joint Committee, the acting Party may take measures against the air carriers which have engaged in the contested conduct or which have benefited from the discrimination, unfair practices or subsidies in question. The acting Party shall notify the other Party, in writing, of the measures to be taken at least 15 days before the implementation of any such measure. 10. Measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be appropriate, proportionate and restricted in their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary, with a view to mitigating the injury to the carriers of the acting Party and removing the undue advantage gained by the carriers against which they are directed. 11. Any any actions and measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be without prejudice to the right of either Party to refer to the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article article 23. 12. Where matters pertaining to this Article article are referred to the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article article 23, the timelines stated in Article article 23(10), (11), and (12) shall be halved. 13. Nothing in this Agreement agreement shall affect, limit or jeopardise in any way the authority or powers of the competition authorities of the Parties or of the courts which review the decisions of those authorities. Any any action taken pursuant to paragraph 9 by a Party shall be without prejudice to any possible actions and measures taken by the said authorities and courts, including those of the acting Party. The decisions of the courts which review the actions and measures of those competent authorities shall be excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article article 23.

Fair Competition. 1. The Parties agree that their air carriers shall enjoy fair and equal opportunities to compete in the provision of air transport services. 2. The Parties shall: (a) prohibit, and where they exist, eliminate, within their respective jurisdictions and using their respective internal procedures and processes, any forms of discrimination or unfair practices which would adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services; (b) not grant or permit subsidies to any air carriers if such these subsidies adversely affect the fair and equal opportunity of the air carriers of the other Party to compete in providing air transport services. 3. Notwithstanding point subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the following may be granted: (a) support to insolvent or ailing air carriers, provided that: (i) such this support is conditional on a credible restructuring plan based on realistic assumptions with a view to ensuring the return of the insolvent or ailing air carrier within a reasonable time to long-term viability within a reasonable timeviability; and (ii) the air carrier concerned, its investors or shareholders significantly contribute themselves to the costs of restructuring; (b) temporary liquidity support to an ailing air carrier in the form of loans or loan guarantees limited to the amount needed merely to keep the air carrier concerned in business for the time necessary to work out a restructuring or liquidation plan; (c) provided that they are limited to the minimum amounts needed to achieve their objective and that the effects on the provision of air transport services are kept to a minimum: (i) subsidies to make good the damage caused by natural disasters; (ii) in the case of Qatar, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in its economy; and, in the case of the EU and its Member States, subsidies to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of one or more EU Member States; (d) subsidies to air carriers entrusted with the operation of clearly defined public service obligations necessary to meet essential transport needs of the population which cannot be satisfied by market forces alone, provided that these subsidies are limited to a reasonable remuneration for the provision of the air services concerned. 4. The Parties shall ensure that each of its air carriers providing air transport services under this Agreement publicly issues, on at least an annual basis, a financial report and accompanying financial statement that is externally audited in compliance with internationally recognised accounting and corporate financial disclosure standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards; and that, in case a Party provides a subsidy, this subsidy is separately identified in the financial report. 5. Each Party shall, at the request of the other Party, provide to the other Party within 30 days, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, financial reports and any other information as may be reasonably available, including on the matters covered under paragraph 4, as may be reasonably requested by the other Party to verify that the provisions of this Article are being complied with. Such The submission of such information, when commercially sensitive, shall be subject to confidential treatment by the requesting Party. 6. Each Party, using their respective internal procedures and processes, shall implement and apply measures that effectively prohibit and prevent their air carriers from: (a) engaging in concerted practices, practices resulting from an express or implicit agreement or decision between competitors, which have as their objective or effect the prevention, lessening or distortion of competition. This prohibition may be declared inapplicable where such agreements, decisions or practices contribute to improving the production or distribution of services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and do not: : (i) impose on the companies concerned, restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; or (ii) afford such companies the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the services in question, (b) abusing a dominant position in a way which may affect air transport services to/from that Party, and (c) concentrations between air carriers which significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 7. If a Party (hereinafter referred to as "the acting Party") considers that its carriers' fair and equal opportunities to compete are adversely affected by: (a) discrimination or unfair practices prohibited under point subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2; (b) a subsidy prohibited under point subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, other than those listed in paragraph 3; (c) non-compliance with the transparency obligations laid down in paragraphs 4, and 5; or (d) failure of the other Party to comply with the obligations laid down in paragraph 6, ; it ("the acting Party") may proceed in accordance with paragraphs 8 to 10. 8. The acting Party shall submit a written request for consultations to the other Party, accompanied by a written report with its observations and material evidence. Consultations shall start within a period of 30 thirty (30) days of the receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Consultations may be requested through the Joint Committee. 9. If the acting Party and the other Party fail to reach agreement on the matter within 60 sixty (60) days of from the commencement of the consultations, or a different period agreed by the Parties or by the Joint Committee, the acting Party may take measures against the air carriers which have engaged in the contested conduct or which have benefited from the discrimination, unfair practices or subsidies in question. The acting Party shall notify the other Party, in writing, of the measures to be taken at least 15 fifteen (15) days before the implementation of any such measure. 10. Measures The measures taken pursuant to the preceding paragraph 9 shall be appropriate, proportionate and restricted in their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary, with a view to mitigating the injury to the carriers of the acting Party and removing the undue advantage gained by the carriers against which they are directed. 11. Any actions and measures taken pursuant to paragraph 9 shall be without prejudice to the right of either Party to refer to the dispute settlement mechanism procedure laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement. 12. Where matters pertaining to this Article are referred to the dispute settlement mechanism procedure laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement, the timelines stated in Article 23(10)paragraphs 10, (11), and (12) 12 of that Article shall be halved. 13. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect, limit or jeopardise in any way the authority or powers of the competition authorities of the Parties or of the courts which review the decisions of those authorities. Any action taken pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article by a Party shall be without prejudice to any possible actions and measures taken by the said authorities and courts, including those of the acting Party. The decisions of the courts which review the actions and measures of those competent authorities shall be excluded from the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in Article 2323 of this Agreement.