Common use of Factual Basis Clause in Contracts

Factual Basis. Defendant will plead guilty because he is in fact guilty of the charges contained in Counts One and Count Two of the indictment. In pleading guilty, defendant admits the following facts and that those facts establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: On or about September 19, 2010, ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, attempted, without lawful authority, to use a weapon of mass destruction against people and property in a manner that would have affected interstate and foreign commerce in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(D), and attempted to damage and destroy, by means of an explosive, real property affecting interstate and foreign commerce in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i). In early June 2010, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told a law enforcement cooperating source (hereinafter, the “CS”) that he wanted to commit acts of violence in Chicago for monetary gain and to cause political instability. The CS asked ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ about his ideas for a terrorist attack. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ suggested bombing the commercial area surrounding Wrigley Field as one option. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ explained that an attack against an entertainment center like the one near Wrigley Field could “paralyze” Chicago commerce. In response, the CS told ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he/she had “friends” who might be willing to pay ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to perpetrate such an attack. Over the following weeks, the CS and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ continued to discuss ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ ideas for perpetrating a terrorist act. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ indicated that he wanted to meet with the CS’s contacts and was anxious to act against Chicago. The CS arranged a meeting between ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and an individual the CS represented to be one of his/her purported contacts on July 8, 2010. Then unbeknownst to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, the contact was an undercover FBI task force officer (hereinafter “UC-1”). During their initial meeting, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told UC-1 that he had been contemplating how to perpetrate terrorist attacks in Chicago. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ stated that he believed that a series of escalating violent acts could be used to undermine the city’s political establishment. When asked by UC-1 what ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ was personally willing to do, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ indicated that he would be willing to facilitate a car bombing or the assassination of Chicago police officers. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ assured UC-1 that he wanted to participate in some violent act. When asked if he was concerned about those who would be hurt by such violence, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ stated that casualties were the inevitable result of what he termed “revolution.” ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ met with UC-1 and an individual who UC-1 introduced to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ as a “good friend” and “brother” on July 21, 2010. Then unbeknownst to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, UC- 1’s associate was an undercover FBI special agent (hereinafter, “UC-2” and, together with UC-1, the “UCs”). UC-1 explained to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he had told UC-2 about their July 8, 2010 meeting and that UC-2 was interested in hearing ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ ideas concerning the commission of a terrorist act. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ then told UC-2 his idea of perpetrating a series of escalating violent attacks designed to damage Chicago’s sense of security, its economy, and trust in leadership. HASSOUN identified Chicago entertainment establishments, civic buildings, commercial high-rises, and transportation infrastructure as potential targets. During their July 21, 2010 meeting, the UCs gave ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ a digital camcorder to videotape potential targets. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ agreed. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ traveled to the commercial area surrounding Wrigley Field and filmed potential targets on August 8, 2010, August 12, 2010 and August 14, 2010. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ video focused on the bars, restaurants and potential security in the areas he observed. As he filmed, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ commented on the potential tactical advantages and risks of perpetrating an attack at the various locations he observed. In particular, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ noted the most populated bars and restaurants, and identified visible police presence and street security cameras. During their July 21, 2010 meeting, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told the UCs that he wanted to dedicate himself to the proposed attack and asked the UCs effectively to employ him planning the bombing. The UCs agreed and from July 21, 2010 to September 18, 2010, the UCs paid HASSOUN $2,700. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ met with the UCs again on August 16, 2010 to debrief the UCs on his reconnaissance efforts. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ provided the UCs the camcorder he had used to record his surveillance. After reviewing the videos, the UCs and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ discussed areas that could be targeted to cause maximum casualties with minimal operational difficulty and risk. The UCs and HASSOUN met again on August 31, 2010 to pick a final target location and discuss operational logistics. The UCs and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ traveled to the proposed target chosen by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ – a trash recepticle located at approximately ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ in Chicago, Illinois. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told the UCs he would deposit a proposed bomb in the container on a Saturday night when the area would be crowded with bar patrons. The target trash recepticle chosen by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ was located approximately five feet from the glass windows of a sports-themed bar that sold alcohol products manufactured throughout the United States and abroad. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told the UCs that he chose the particular location because it presented the opportunity to inflict a greater number of casualties than alternate locations. The UCs and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ agreed to execute their planned attack on the night of September 18, 2010. As prearranged, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ met with the UCs on the evening of September 18, 2010 at a hotel located in Rosemont, Illinois. There, the UCs provided HASSOUN a backpack that contained what UC-1 revealed as an explosive device. The enclosed device was comprised of a silver, one-gallon paint can, the interior of which was lined with ball- bearings, and which contained seven cylindrical tubes that appeared to be explosive material, and which were bound by black electrical tape, two of which were connected to blasting caps with electrical wire leads attached to a clear plastic box containing a 9 volt battery, blue activation light and a white mechanical timer. The UCs told ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ the device was a bomb and generally explained how it was constructed, would be armed and detonated. The UCs provided HASSOUN with a grey shopping bag which, they explained, could be used to conceal further the backpack and its enclosed bomb. Prior to September 18, 2010, the UCs had, on a number of different occasions, told ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that they did not need his assistance with the execution of the planned attack and that he could withdraw from their plan at any time. During their July 21, 2010 meeting, the UCs questioned ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ concerning whether he wanted to participate in the actual, planned attack. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ assured the UCs that he did. During that meeting, UC-1 told ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he could “walk away” at any time. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ responded by stating that he had come to the decision to perpetrate a terrorist act in Chicago on his own. When questioned by the UCs again on August 16, 2010, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ again assured the UCs that he wanted a role in the execution of the proposed bombing. The UCs and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ left the hotel at approximately 11:37 p.m. on the evening of September 18, 2010, and traveled together in a rented, white van from Rosemont, Illinois to the target area. While in route, the UCs and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ discussed how the area surrounding Wrigley Field would be crowded because the ballpark had been used for a concert that evening. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ further noted that many individuals would be in the surrounding bars having watched the Chicago Cubs play baseball on television. During their drive, the UCs described the purported explosive power of the device they were providing HASSOUN. The UCs explained that the bomb was surrounded by ball bearings and that its blast could destroy up to half a city block. As the UCs’ vehicle approached the target area, UC-1 opened the explosive device’s detonation mechanism and told ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he was setting the bomb’s timer for thirty minutes. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ told UC-1 that was too much time. UC-1 accordingly set the timer for approximately twenty minutes. UC-2 warned ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he had to be quick. UC-1 then activated the purported bomb’s arming mechanism in ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ presence. The UCs’ vehicle arrived close to the target location at approximately 12:10 a.m. in the early morning of September 19, 2010. As they had previously planned, the UCs parked their vehicle approximately one block southwest of the ▇▇▇▇▇ Street target location. UC-1 then handed HASSOUN the shopping bag containing the backpack, and with it, the alleged explosive device. As planned, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ exited the vehicle and walked directly to the target location, where HASSOUN deposited the device in the target trash container. At the time that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ dropped the bag containing the purported bomb in the trash container, the sidewalk was crowded with people, many of whom were within 20 feet of the target location.