Degree of Culpability. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence, and a lower multiplier for more simple negligence. A multiplier of 1.2 is assigned for these violations because a reasonably prudent person who applies for coverage under the General Permit would have necessary oversight and accountability measures in place to ensure that all workers involved in construction activities adhere to the requirements of the General Permit.
Degree of Culpability. The Discharger’s degree of culpability for these additional acute toxicity violations is considered by the Regional Water Board to be medium. This is because the Discharger is responsible for the proper operation and maintenance of its treatment plant and for ensuring that employees implement standard operating procedures in maintaining and operating equipment. While the cause of the November 2009 acute toxicity violations is unknown and the Discharger maintains that all standard operating procedures were observed, the Regional Water Board suspects that less-than-optimal operation and maintenance of the system may have contributed to these remaining violations. The October and December 2009 acute toxicity violations would likely have been prevented if (1) a filter had been properly used in the regenerator tower (which would have removed particulate from the material circulating in the tower and prevented the overflow of MDEA), and (2) the Discharger maintained its DAF Unit more aggressively than it did.
Degree of Culpability. The Settling Respondents are responsible for the cave spoil disposal activities into the areas described, including not obtaining and complying with all necessary permits.
Degree of Culpability. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence, and a lower multiplier for more simple negligence. A multiplier of 1.3 is assigned for this violation because the Discharger did not take corrective action, despite the City consultant notifying them of the BMP deficiencies and the upcoming rain event. A reasonably prudent person who applies for coverage under the General Permit would have necessary oversight and accountability measures in place to ensure that all workers involved in construction activities adhere to the requirements of the General Permit. The Discharger should have prepared and implemented a Rain Event Action Plan (REAP) to ensure that erosion and sediment control BMPs would achieved BAT and BCT prior to the forecasted storm event. The Discharger also should have conducted visual inspections prior to and during the storm event to ensure that BMPs had been properly implemented.
Degree of Culpability. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence, and a lower multiplier for more simple negligence. A multiplier of 1.3 is assigned for this violation because the Discharger failed to implement covers and berms on several occasions after Regional Board staff informed them of the deficiencies during inspections that occurred on April 13, 2018 and on May 4, 9, and 23, 2018. A reasonably prudent person who applies for coverage under the General Permit would have necessary oversight and accountability measures in place to ensure that all workers involved in construction activities adhere to the requirements of the General Permit.
Degree of Culpability. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence, and a lower multiplier for more simple negligence. A multiplier of 1.3 is assigned for this violation because the Discharger failed to ensure effective implementation of site perimeter controls and knew of the requirement as evidenced by having some perimeter control BMPs in place. A reasonably prudent person who applies for coverage under the General Permit would have necessary oversight and accountability measures in place to ensure that all workers involved in construction activities adhere to the requirements of the General Permit. The Discharger should have identified the deficiencies in perimeter controls during their weekly inspections and addressed them accordingly.
Degree of Culpability. 1.3 The discharger’s degree of culpability is determined by evaluating what a reasonable and prudent person would have done or not done under similar circumstances. This Adjustment Factor should result in a multiplier between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence, and a lower multiplier for more simple negligence. Ocean Field failed to submit the 2021 TNA Report, as required by the Agricultural Order, despite the Central Coast Water Board sending numerous reminders, a notice of violation, and follow-up letter. Because Ocean Field’s failure to submit this report demonstrates, at best, a negligent deviation from the standard of care, a score of 1.3 is appropriate.
Degree of Culpability. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5 with the lower multiplier for accidental and higher multiplier for intentional or negligent behavior. On June 30, 2020, the Regional Water Board received photographs and video evidence from the City of drilling fluid being discharged into a catch basin within a parking lot that flowed into a storm drain on June 25, 2020, by a company truck owned and operated by the Discharger. The drilling additive’s Safety Data Sheet’s Section 6, Accidental release measures, states that large quantity discharges of the drilling additive to drains should be prevented as an environmental precaution. As previously mentioned, 135 pounds of CETCO Super Gel X was mixed in the discharge. Also, the Safety Data Sheet’s Section 13 states that disposal of contents should be done in accordance with local, regional, and national regulations. In the Technical Report, the Discharger indicated they understand the serious nature of the incident and that the employee was disciplined as the unauthorized discharge of drilling fluids goes against its disposal policies. In addition to being against internal company policies, intentional discharges can be subject to administrative, civil, or criminal penalties. A reasonable and prudent person who owns and maintains a drilling service company would have additional oversight and accountability measures in place to prevent an unauthorized discharge as that occurred on June 25, 2020. Such measures include educating employees about the potential monetary liabilities related to intentional discharges, as well as possible costs to remediate environmental damage stemming from the discharge’s impacts. The Discharger’s employee intentionally discharged the drilling fluid onto a parking lot which drains to a nearby storm drain. Therefore, a multiplier of 1.5 was selected.
Degree of Culpability. 1.1 The Enforcement Policy states that higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. The culpability multiplier ranges between 0.5 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct or gross negligence. The overflow was caused by a malfunction of a switchboard PLC in the control system at the Facility. On December 25, 2020 at approximately 6:26 p.m., three electrical breakers tripped within the switchgear and cut power to multiple process equipment within the Facility, including the influent pump station, SCADA control and communication systems, and phone systems. Facility operators arrived at the Facility at approximately 6:50 p.m. Half of the station maintained power, allowing one influent pump to remain in use, which was capable of handling the plant’s full flow. Since the controls had lost power, Influent Pump No. 3 was placed into local bypass mode that allowed manual control operation at the default full-speed flow in on/off operation. Facility operators believed that manual operation of the influent pump was keeping pace with the influent flow. However, without the benefit of the level control through the SCADA system, the pumping rate was ultimately insufficient leading to the influent sewers backing up and eventually overflowing. The Discharger’s contingency plan prior to this overflow involved providing hydraulic relief to the Facility by automatically opening a sewer diversion gate valve at the Xxxxx and Xxxxxxxx Diversion Structure upon receipt of a high-level alarm in the wet well from the Facility’s Influent Pump Station. However, due to the loss of SCADA, a high- level alarm was not sent, and diversion of flow did not occur. Operators also had difficulty contacting the Discharger’s Central Alarm Center (CAC) due to spotty cellular phone coverage and the loss of telecommunications within the Facility. Had the Discharger had procedures in place to manually measure the level of the wet well during loss of power/influent wet well level sensor failure or contacting the CAC, the overflow may have been prevented or significantly reduced in size. At approximately 10:20 p.m., operators established phone communication with the CAC and wastewater was diverted to the Joint Water Pollution Control Plant in the City of Xxxxxx for treatment, reducing flow to the Facility by approximately 57%. Staff worked through the night to restore full power to the influent pump station and the S...
Degree of Culpability. The Discharger is culpable for the violations because it is responsible for the proper operation and maintenance of its collection system facilities, and for achieving full compliance with prohibitions and provisions of Orders No. 2006-0003-DWQ and No. 2008-0002-EXEC, and Section 301 of the Clean Water Act. As noted earlier, the shutdown of Pump Station 15, excessive I/I flows into the Discharger’s collection system, and debris or other material, including construction debris, in the system, led to the multiple SSOs that occurred December 17-19, 2010. As described below, a majority of these SSOs could have been mitigated with the implementation of an adequate contingency plan that included prior installation of emergency bypass systems and having a temporary repair coupler onsite prior to shutting down Pump Station 15. Additionally, the December 17-19, 2010, SSO #5 could have been mitigated with proper maintenance of the Corte Madera Creek siphon. As described below, the culpability for the December 22, 2010, SSOs is lower since it was originally caused by pipeline failure, which forced the Discharger to shutdown Pump Station 15. The pipeline failed without warning. The cause of the remaining SSOs was primarily blockages due to root and debris. These SSOs can be prevented with a more strategic cleaning and inspection program and system upgrades. December 17-19, 2010 SSOs The Discharger is culpable for the December 17-19, 2010, SSOs . The Discharger failed to timely put in place adequate contingencies and to properly maintain the Corte Madera Creek siphon.
