Current Situation. In the one hundred-and-fourteenth session of WP.29, the following proposal was formulated for interpretation of Article 12 of the 1997 Agreement (TRANS/WP.29/609, para. 92): "specific authorization shall be required to carry out periodical technical inspections on behalf of another Contracting Party to the Agreement." The Administrative Committee (AC.4) of the 1997 Agreement discussed this interpretation during the one hundred-and-twenty-ninth session of WP.29. It agreed to resume the consideration at its third session, in June 2003. The Contracting Parties were invited to present their proposals for consideration, if their views diverged from the interpretation mentioned above (TRANS/WP.29/909, paras. 153-157).
Current Situation. This 2015 contract has been updated as follows: Revised to reflect recent Siemens Industry, Inc. Terms and Conditions; Added an updated device count for facilities covered under this agreement and provided an updated pricing structure.
Current Situation. The extensive range of Health and Social Care services across Caithness are described in detail in section 2.1. NHS Highland is the lead agency for delivery of adult social care services, a unique arrangement in Scotland. We directly manage care at home, social work, and care home services and our adult social care teams are integrated with our community health care teams. These comprise of Community Nursing, Community Mental Health, and Allied Health Professionals. Day Services are provided by NHS Highland and third sector partners. Primary care is provided by independent and salaried practitioners across eight different sites, and dental care by independent general dental practitioners and the public dental service. There is community hospital and acute hospital provision locally, with a wider range of specialist services available at the nearest District General Hospital in Inverness, over 100 miles away. There are five locations in Caithness which provide 24/7 services: • two NHS Highland run care homes (41 beds in total), Pulteney House in Wick and Bayview in Thurso; • two Community Hospitals (15 beds in total); Town and County in Wick and Xxxxxx Hospital in Thurso; and • one Rural General Hospital (43 beds); Caithness General Hospital in Wick.
Current Situation. At the end of 2017, the overall female employment rate within the Group was 35.7%. However there were significant discrepancies depending on the business line: 53% in Support Functions 44% in Customer Care 40% in Content and Multi-media 23% in Information Systems 22% in Innovation 15% in Networks. As a general rule, women are under-represented in technical roles, even if the situation is less clear- cut in certain countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal, or even in Romania.
Current Situation. Work-life balance is a key component of workplace gender equality. It is also a strong demand from all employees, particularly in employee satisfaction surveys.
Current Situation. The parties agree on the definition of discrimination as unequal treatment based on one unlawful criterion without objective justification. They note that discrimination criteria can vary depending on the country or region. As part of this agreement, the criteria taken into consideration are those which are recognised at an international level, i.e.: age, sex, origin, ethnicity, nationality or race, pregnancy, health, disability, genetic characteristics, sexual orientation, political beliefs, union activities, philosophical opinions, religious beliefs and the fact of belonging or not a particular religion.
Current Situation. The Group regularly communicates with its employees to raise awareness of gender equality and combatting discrimination, whether through the intranet, the Diversity communities on the Plazza corporate social network, or via communication campaigns or events organised worldwide, for example during International Women’s Day. Moreover, internal diversity networks in several countries (Wenity umbrella network, Orange Business Services DoubleYou networks, etc.) also play an important role in this field by offering conferences, personal development workshops and meetings with managers.
Current Situation. In July 2020, renewed skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia broke out. An exchange of drone and artillery strikes in the Tavush (Armenia) and Qazakh (Azerbaijan) regions resulted in the deaths of at least 17 military personnel, including an Azerbaijani major-general. This prompted opposition-led protests in Baku, which called for war. Through July and August, the Azerbaijani armed forces conducted military exercises with Turkish support. This appears to have foreshadowed a major offensive by Azerbaijan, which was launched on 27 September. Supported by Turkish drones, military advisors and, allegedly, jihadist mercenaries from Syria, the Azerbaijani armed forces succeeded in capturing Armenian-controlled territory to the south of Nagorno-Karabakh along the Iranian border, as well as the city of Shusha, which overlooks Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert. Baku and Ankara appear to have taken advantage of the distracted global environment, as well as the need to act before harsh winter weather set in. Over the course of the fighting, both sides also targeted infrastructure outside of Nagorno- Karabakh in artillery and rocket attacks. For example, Azerbaijani units destroyed a bridge linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Armenian military shelled Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, Ganja, on four occasions, narrowly missing oil pipeline infrastructure. As of 22 October, according to estimates cited by Russian President Xxxxxxxx Xxxxx, almost 5,000 people had been killed during the renewed hostilities, most of them in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The toll has likely risen considerably since then. Ultimately, the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were overwhelmed by the military superiority of the Azerbaijanis and Turks, losing approximately 100 tanks, 50 armoured combat vehicles and 130 artillery pieces – or some 35% of its inventory. On 9 November, Armenian Prime Minister Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx and Azerbaijani President Xxxxx Xxxxxx signed an agreement brokered by Russian President Xxxxx, which established a full ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the warring parties will retain control over the territories that they currently possess. However, by 1 December, Armenia is obliged to return to Azerbaijan the districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh that it has controlled since 1994, as well as two small Azeri exclaves in the north-eastern region of Tavush. Armenia will retain control of the Lachin corridor, the sing...
Current Situation. Among the security people at grid operators there is an uneasy feeling about cyber security threats. The day-to-day security problems are mostly in the office IT, viruses or ransomware on laptops, or attacks on the website. Maybe there are some metering fraud cases for variation. The new EU regula- tions on security, and especially privacy require a lot of attention (see Chapter 8). But overall, they however seem in control of cyber security. In the back of their mind however is a fear for a cyber- attack causing a major blackout. Scenarios in which cyber-attacks cause blackouts are not hard to imagine. The systems that control the grid, such as SCADA systems, contain a lot of legacy components. So they are widely known to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Stuxnet (2010) has shown in 2010 that it is possible that a cyber-attack causes physical damage. Similar attack scenarios on the electricity grid have been worked out in sector documents [1], and even in books for the general public [2] [3]. Most measures in this document are devised to meet these blackout attack scenarios. Because many legacy components in the grid are vulnerable, they need external protection. To prevent attacks, there is a need for a good security architecture (Chapter 5). To detect and respond to attacks, there is a need for security monitoring (Chapter 7). And improvements in software security (Chapter 0) are needed to ensure that the next generation of equipment is more secure on its own. This raises the question if these advanced security measures are really necessary: what it the real risk of the blackout cyber-attack scenarios? We know that nation states have been building up what they call offensive cyber capabilities. There are signs that some of these capabilities are aimed at the elec- tricity grid. The US ICS-Cert yearly report for instance shows that there are many incidents in the energy sector. Spear-phishing is commonly used, showing that the attacks are really targeted. Most are probably reconnaissance activities [4]. There is only one data point of a recent incident fulfilling the blackout scenario: a recent blackout in Ukraine [5]. The incident showed on the one hand that the at- tack scenarios were realistic. As the scenarios had predicted, the SCADA system was attacked through IT systems. On the other hand, the impact was however far from apocalyptic. There was major black- out with about a quarter million people without power. But power was restored soon despite DoS...
Current Situation. Currently most DSOs use qualitative or semi-quantitative risk assessment to evaluate their security risk. Not only is do qualitative risk assessments normally take less time, there is also usually not enough data available on security incidents to perform quantitative assessments. Estimating Smart Grid security incidents is especially difficult, because they involve risks with low probabilities, but catastrophic consequences. Current methods cannot frequency-based statistical methods estimate such risks with any accuracy [7] [8]. DSOs are used to apply quantitative methods to non-security risks, such as the risks of accidents or equipment failure. Risk owners in the DSO’s asset management department need to have quantitative assessments to be able to compare security risks to risks in other domains, so that they can correctly allocate budgets. Many people involved in assessing secu- DSO roadmap for vulnerability assessments: • Increase information sharing about security incidents • Gradually implement quantita- tive risk assessments rity risks feel that the qualitative methods currently used, are not sufficient for this purpose. The main problem is that they use relative scales that only compare security risks with each other, not with risks from other domains.
