Cryptography. Supplier will maintain policies and standards on the use of cryptographic controls that are implemented to protect Accenture Data.
Cryptography a) Jamf will maintain policies and standards regarding the use of cryptographic controls that are implemented to protect Customer Content. Such protections will include the pseudonymization and encryption of Personal Data, as further detailed below in Section 9. Jamf will implement Industry Standard key management policies and practices designed to protect encryption keys for their entire lifetime.
Cryptography. 6.1. The Supplier shall:
Cryptography. The application uses PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 hashing algorithm for storing the hashes of users’ passwords and authen- tication tokens. The cloud service does not encrypt any data with public-key or symmetric-key algorithms. SSL versions lower than 3.0 are prevented from accessing the service. At the moment the service supports encryption protocols TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.0. SSLv3 and SSLv2 are all supported. TLS 1.0 support will be removed by the end of 2020. Data loss prevention From Iris AI’s security documentation: Continuous Protection keeps data safe on SQL Server 2019. Every change to your data is written to write-ahead logs, which are shipped to multi-datacenter, high-durability storage. In the unlikely event of unrecoverable hard- ware failure, these logs can be automatically ‘replayed’ to recover the database to within seconds of its last known state. We also provide you with the ability to backup your database to meet your own backup and data retention requirements.
Cryptography. 6. Physical and environmental security 7. Operational safety
Cryptography refers to all methods used to transform the information contained in a readable data into a form that cannot be understood by unwanted parties.
Cryptography. Committer understands that cryptographic code may be subject to government regulations with which the Zope Foundation and/or entities using Committed Code must comply. Any code which contains any of the items listed below must either be checked-in to Zope module explicitly identified as containing cryptography, or must not be checked-in until the Zope Foundation Board of Directors has been notified and has approved such contribution in writing.
Cryptography. What we are interested in the present work is the latter, namely, the case when the two protocols are implemented in public key cryptography. Leaving out some of the technical details which are not directly relevant to our analysis, it becomes clear that both protocols follow the traditional signature-then-encryption ap- proach. Furthermore, we can see that the three-way key material exchange protocol is based on nonces, while the two-way protocol is based on a time-stamp (together with a nonce). Thus the three-way protocol achieves similar goals to those by our protocol DKEPUN de- scribed in Table 8, and the two-way protocol achieves similar goals to those by our protocol Three-Way Key Material Exchange Protocol Xxxxx (Initiator) Bob (Respondent) ) XXx; fIDbg; Ra; XxxX ega; fCertag )
Cryptography. Having strong cryptographic primitives is a fundamental requirement of any secu- rity oriented system. What is needed towards this direction is a good source of entropy that will be utilized in a secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) so that the keys gen- erated by the system are secure. To make good use of this source of entropy, we also must ensure that the cryptographic primitives deployed in the RAINBOW-equipped platforms and related systems are fit for purpose. Although in most cases, the security of cryptographic primitives is a matter of design, the system’s cryptographically secure pseudo-random gen- erator, which is used in particular to generate keys, is often left to implementers, with po- tentially disastrous consequences on the security of the whole system [52]. In the context of the RAINBOW, we assume security against strong adversaries [28]. Physical Security. TPMs are discrete hardware chips that interconnect with the Low Pin Count (LPC) bus of the system through. The LPC interface can be subject to attacks from xxxxx- dropping to injection. Many recent and old attacks [8, 50, 51, 71] have shown that through the LPC interface, an attacker can spoof PCR values and steal sensitive data (like the BitLocker disk encryption key), bypassing critical TPM trust guarantees. That is why the physical security of both the device as a whole and the actual pins that connect the TPM on the device motherboard should be carefully designed if the TPM is to be trusted. Another option that has been investigated by [10, 39], is to constantly require each device to provide a “heartbeat” attestation in a specific frequency. Because hardware attacks are time con- suming and require that the device is taken offline for a considerable amount of time, the TPM will not be able to provide the attestation messages timely. In this case, the device should be considered as untrusted or partially trusted depending on the policies and the trust requirements that are in place.
Cryptography a) Data Encryption: RingCentral will encrypt Customer Confidential Data, at Customer’s election, when stored at-rest within RingCentral Data Centers and backups, at-rest if stored on RingCentral laptops, and in-transit over public networks in connection with the performance of the Services pursuant to the Agreement, except for encryption over Public Switch Telephone Networks. Encryption will be implemented using commercial grade, industry- standard encryption with a key length of no less than 256 bits.
