Communication Overhead Clause Examples

Communication Overhead. In this part, we compare the communication over- head of the proposed scheme with several existing schemes. We assume that the sizes of the elements in G1 and G are 128 bytes and 40 bytes, respectively. In addition, let the output of a hash function and the size of the time stamp are 20 bytes and 4 bytes, respectively. Moreover, we assume that the origin messages are included in the finite field Z∗ and have a size of 20 bytes. whether T ′ − Tvi ≤ ∆t holds. We focus on the analysis of the communication 5) Modification attack An adversary may modify a message and rebroad- cast it. However, we use keyed hash function H to au- thenticate messages. Without the group key kug, it’s difficult to generate a valid Hash. Any modification of message {PIDi, M, Tvi , MV } will cause MV ƒ= Hkug(PIDi, M, Tv ). The message can’t be authenti- overhead in the following three processes: authentica- tion message generation, authentication message verifi- cation, and group-key generation. The communication overhead of several schemes is listed in Table 5. In the scheme proposed by He et al. [4] the au- thentication message is {Mi, AIDi, Ti, Ri, σi}, where AIDi = {AID1, AID2}, {AID1, AID2, Ri} ∈ G, σi ∈ q cated and accepted. Therefore, our scheme can resist modification attack. Z∗, Ti is the timestamp, so the size of the authentica- tion message is 40 × 3 + 20 × 2 + 4 = 164 bytes. Table 2 Notations Notations Descriptions . Σ Tbp the execution time of one bilinear pairing operation eˆ Uˆ, Vˆ , where U, V ∈ G1 Tea the execution time of one point addition operation on ECC Tep the execution time of one exponentiation operation on point Th the execution time of one hash function operation using SHA-1 Tch the execution time of chebyshev’ encryption THkey the execution time of one keyed hash function operation using chaos map THkey 0.061ms In the scheme proposed by ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [1] vehi- cles send messages as (M|| sig|| Yk|| Certk), where Certk = {Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}, {sig, Yk, Ei, DIDu , γu, γv} ∈ G1, {M, λ, σ1, σ2} ∈ Z∗, by adopting pseudonym changing at social spot strat- egy. Declarations Conflicts of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Data Availability All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article. References 1. ▇▇▇▇▇, M., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, P., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇.▇.: Eaap: c is a hash operation result. Therefore, the communi- cation overhead is 7 × 128 + 5 × 20 = 996 bytes. The authentication message ...
View SourceView Similar (2)
Communication Overhead. The communication overhead is measured by the number of the messages. That is to say the overall communication overhead of the scheme is the summation of messages exchanged in cluster and messages exchanged among clusters. In order to compare these protocol conveniently, we assume the size of group is n, and the size of the each cluster is k. In IKA phase, members in cluster perform BD protocol and the message overhead is C1 b =n k [2k+k(k−1)] = n+nk. Among clusters the members perform TGDH protocol. According to Table 2. we know that the message overhead which the leaf nodes need to send is k ∑n/k i=1 hi , where hi is the height of leaf node i. So the message overhead in performing TGDH is t C1 : K ∑ i=1 n/k hi <K ∙ n/k ∙ log n/k = n ∙ log n/k . Therefore, we can compute the overall communication overhead in IKA phase as C1=C1 + C1 =n + nk + n · log n/k. In AKA (we only discuss single member joining in for short), a new member join in a certain cluster, all the members in this cluster must choose the random value again, so the overhead of
View Source
Communication Overhead. Since LKE and iLKE are two in-situ key establishment schemes, messages are transmitted for keying information distribution as well as pairwise key establishment. Compared to the existent key predistribution schemes, the additional traffic may appear to be a deathful weakness for the two schemes. However, polynomial shares are only transmitted
View Source
Communication Overhead. The proposed scheme communication overhead as compared with other existing schemes [8], [12], [23] and the computed values are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 and then design graph according to these computed values which are shown in Fig. 5. Communication overhead of our proposed scheme with schemes [8], [12], [23] is represented in Fig. 5 where our scheme shows 84.2% as compared to scheme [8], 85.7% efficiency than scheme [12] and 78.57% than [23]. TABLE III. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [8] (1024+192)bits % = 84.2 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits TABLE IV. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [12] (1024+320)bits % = 85.7 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits TABLE V. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇▇▇ et al. [23] 2(160+160+128)bits % = 78.57 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits ( ) Proposed Scheme
View Source
Communication Overhead. To measure the overhead of the communication, we use the size of the package exchange between the source node and the destination node as the criterion. If the source node needs to transit too large a package, it will consume the frequency bandwidth excessively. Therefore, the efficiency of the bandwidth allocation would not be very high. And the power cost of message exchanges would also reduce the life expectancy of the network. In Du et al.’s scheme, the node only needs to compare the indices of the pre- distributed secrets. With these indices, the node can check whether there is any overlap secret in the other node. If a node is pre-distributed into s secret, the size of these indices is s log2 n and the communication overhead of the Liu et al. is the same.
View Source
Communication Overhead. As the establishment of direct keys between a pair of nodes does not require handshakes between them, the major com- munication overhead lies with the establishment of indirect keys. Just like most existing security schemes that require handshakes between end nodes to negotiate a shared key, this overhead is inevitable. However, few analytical results about server to facilitate key agreement between any two nodes. The trusted server can be a potential failure point. Distributed methods are more secure. A simple method is the full pairwise key distribution, in which each pair of nodes in a network of N nodes is preloaded with a distinct symmetric key. Each node, however, must keep N 1 symmetric keys. Another two basic distributed methods are proposed by ▇▇▇▇ [2] and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [3], which feature the same amount of memory cost as the full pairwise key approach. Those distributed methods lack scalability and thus only suitable in small networks. Probabilistic schemes [4]–[22] can provide a certain level of scalability with the tradeoff that they can not guarantee that every pair of nodes establish a shared key. The memory cost of those schemes increases linearly with respect to the total number of nodes if they need to achieve a certain level of security or communication efficiency [23]. Moreover, those schemes are targeted at the key establishment between neighboring nodes, while our scheme can achieve the end-to- end key agreement. Combinatorial design techniques are proposed in [24], [25]. They can ensure key sharing between any pair of nodes. In their schemes, however, each key is reused by many sensor nodes. This leads to poor resilience to node compromise in that one compromised node can expose keys belongs to other noncompromised nodes. In addition, the memory cost of their schemes is roughly ( N) where N is the total number of nodes, while the memory cost of our scheme can be ( k N ), which is more scalable. Then, Shamir’s (s+1,T ) threshold secret sharing scheme [31] can be applied. Specifically, T shares can be calculated as g(1), g(2),... , g(T ) , (33) where T s + 1. Next, node u transmits the T shares to node v through multiple secure paths by following the method proposed in [30]. Suppose u and v have j mismatches in their IDs, which means there are j disjoint secure paths between them. Then node u may transmit T/j shares along each secure path to node v. Once node v gets s + 1 out of T shares, it can recover the polynomial g(x) and get the k...
View Source

Related to Communication Overhead

  • Direct Website Communications (a) The Borrower may, at its option, provide to the Administrative Agent any information, documents and other materials that it is obligated to furnish to the Administrative Agent pursuant to the Credit Documents, including, without limitation, all notices, requests, financial statements, financial and other reports, certificates and other information materials, but excluding any such communication that (A) relates to a request for a new, or a conversion of an existing, borrowing or other extension of credit (including any election of an interest rate or interest period relating thereto), (B) relates to the payment of any principal or other amount due under the Credit Agreement prior to the scheduled date therefor, (C) provides notice of any default or event of default under this Agreement or (D) is required to be delivered to satisfy any condition precedent to the effectiveness of the Credit Agreement and/or any borrowing or other extension of credit thereunder (all such non-excluded communications being referred to herein collectively as “Communications”), by transmitting the Communications in an electronic/soft medium in a format reasonably acceptable to the Administrative Agent to the Administrative Agent at an email address provided by the Administrative Agent from time to time; provided that (i) upon written request by the Administrative Agent, the Borrower shall deliver paper copies of such documents to the Administrative Agent for further distribution to each Lender until a written request to cease delivering paper copies is given by the Administrative Agent and (ii) the Borrower shall notify (which may be by facsimile or electronic mail) the Administrative Agent of the posting of any such documents and provide to the Administrative Agent by electronic mail electronic versions (i.e., soft copies) of such documents. Each Lender shall be solely responsible for timely accessing posted documents or requesting delivery of paper copies of such documents from the Administrative Agent and maintaining its copies of such documents. Nothing in this Section 13.17 shall prejudice the right of the Borrower, the Administrative Agent, any other Agent or any Lender to give any notice or other communication pursuant to any Credit Document in any other manner specified in such Credit Document. The Administrative Agent agrees that the receipt of the Communications by the Administrative Agent at its e-mail address set forth above shall constitute effective delivery of the Communications to the Administrative Agent for purposes of the Credit Documents. Each Lender agrees that notice to it (as provided in the next sentence) specifying that the Communications have been posted to the Platform shall constitute effective delivery of the Communications to such Lender for purposes of the Credit Documents. Each Lender agrees (A) to notify the Administrative Agent in writing (including by electronic communication) from time to time of such Lender’s e-mail address to which the foregoing notice may be sent by electronic transmission and (B) that the foregoing notice may be sent to such e-mail address. (b) The Borrower further agrees that any Agent may make the Communications available to the Lenders by posting the Communications on Intralinks or a substantially similar electronic transmission system (the “Platform”), so long as the access to such Platform (i) is limited to the Agents, the Lenders and Transferees or prospective Transferees and (ii) remains subject to the confidentiality requirements set forth in Section 13.16. (c) THE PLATFORM IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE”. THE AGENT PARTIES (AS DEFINED BELOW) DO NOT WARRANT THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THE BORROWER MATERIALS OR THE ADEQUACY OF THE PLATFORM, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM LIABILITY FOR ERRORS IN OR OMISSIONS FROM THE BORROWER MATERIALS. NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR FREEDOM FROM VIRUSES OR OTHER CODE DEFECTS, IS MADE BY ANY AGENT PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BORROWER MATERIALS OR THE PLATFORM. In no event shall the Administrative Agent or any of its Related Parties (collectively, the “Agent Parties” and each an “Agent Party”) have any liability to the Borrower, any Lender, the Letter of Credit Issuer or any other Person for losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses of any kind (whether in tort, contract or otherwise) arising out of the Borrower’s or the Administrative Agent’s transmission of Borrower Materials through the internet, except to the extent the liability of any Agent Party resulted from such Agent Party’s (or any of its Related Parties’ (other than any trustee or advisor)) gross negligence, bad faith or willful misconduct or material breach of the Credit Documents. (d) The Borrower and each Lender acknowledge that certain of the Lenders may be “public-side” Lenders (Lenders that do not wish to receive material non-public information with respect to the Borrower, its Subsidiaries or their securities) and, if documents or notices required to be delivered pursuant to the Credit Documents or otherwise are being distributed through the Platform, any document or notice that the Borrower has indicated contains only publicly available information with respect to the Borrower may be posted on that portion of the Platform designated for such public-side Lenders. If the Borrower has not indicated whether a document or notice delivered contains only publicly available information, the Administrative Agent shall post such document or notice solely on that portion of the Platform designated for Lenders who wish to receive material nonpublic information with respect to the Borrower, its Subsidiaries and their securities. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower shall use commercially reasonable efforts to indicate whether any document or notice contains only publicly available information.

  • Communications and Contacts The Institution: [NAME AND TITLE OF INSTITUTION CONTACT PERSON] [INSTITUTION NAME] [ADDRESS] [TELEPHONE NUMBER] [FACSIMILE NUMBER] The Contractor: [NAME AND TITLE OF CONTRACTOR CONTACT PERSON] [CONTRACTOR NAME] [ADDRESS] [TELEPHONE NUMBER] [FACSIMILE NUMBER] All instructions, notices, consents, demands, or other communications shall be sent in a manner that verifies proof of delivery. Any communication by facsimile transmission shall also be sent by United States mail on the same date as the facsimile transmission. All communications which relate to any changes to the Contract shall not be considered effective until agreed to, in writing, by both parties.

  • Communications and Operations Management a. Network Penetration Testing - DST shall, on approximately an annual basis, contract with an independent third party to conduct a network penetration test on its network having access to or holding or containing Fund Data. DST shall have a process to review and evaluate high risk findings resulting from this testing.

  • Communications and Computer Lines Tenant may install, maintain, replace, remove or use any communications or computer wires and cables (collectively, the “Lines”) at the Project in or serving the Premises, provided that (i) Tenant shall obtain Landlord’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, conditioned or delayed, use an experienced and qualified contractor approved in writing by Landlord, and comply with all of the other provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of this Lease, (ii) an acceptable number of spare Lines and space for additional Lines shall be maintained for existing and future occupants of the Project, as determined in Landlord’s reasonable opinion, (iii) the Lines therefor (including riser cables) shall be appropriately insulated to prevent excessive electromagnetic fields or radiation, and shall be surrounded by a protective conduit reasonably acceptable to Landlord, (iv) any new or existing Lines servicing the Premises shall comply with all applicable governmental laws and regulations, (v) as a condition to permitting the installation of new Lines, Landlord may require that Tenant remove existing Lines located in or serving the Premises and repair any damage in connection with such removal, (vi) Tenant shall remove all Lines installed by or on behalf of Tenant, and repair any damage in connection with such removal, upon the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease (and if Tenant fails to complete such removal and/or to repair any damage caused by the removal of such Lines, Landlord may do so and Tenant shall reimburse Landlord for the cost thereof, as an obligation which shall expressly survive termination of this Lease), and (vii) Tenant shall pay all costs in connection therewith, including any fees charged by Landlord for Tenant’s use of the Building’s telecommunications capacity in excess of ▇▇▇▇▇▇’s pro rata share thereof. Landlord reserves the right to require that Tenant remove any Lines located in or serving the Premises which are installed in violation of these provisions, or which are at any time in violation of any laws or represent a dangerous or potentially dangerous condition.

  • General Communications The type of communications described and defined in Article