Anonymous Public-Key Encryption Sample Clauses

Anonymous Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definition of anonymous public-key encryption from [3]. Σ ← ←0 10 1 1 Σ Definition 35 A CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme PE = (KGen, Enc, Dec) is anony- mous if the following is negligible for any ppt adversary A: .Pr (pk , sk ) KGen(1κ); (pk , sk ) KGen(1κ); m ← A(pk , pk ); b ← {0, 1}; c ← Encpk (m) : A(c) = b − 2 . .
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Anonymous Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definition of anonymous public-key encryption from [2]. Definition 28 A public-key encryption scheme PE = (G, K, E , D) consists of four algorithms: • Common-key generation: I = G(1κ), where I is a common key, which might be just the security parameter κ or include some additional information. • Key generation: (pk, sk) = K(I), takes as input the common key I and returns a pair of keys, where pk is the public key and sk is the secret key. • Encryption: c = Epk(m; r) denotes an encryption with key pk of a plaintext m with randomness r, to obtain ciphertext c.
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Anonymous Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definition of anonymous public-key encryption from [3].
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Anonymous Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definition of anonymous public-key encryption from [3]. Definition 35 A CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme PE = (KGen, Enc, Dec) is anony- mous if the following is negligible for any ppt adversary A: Pr (pk , sk ) KGen(1n); (pk , sk ) KGen(1n); m ← A(pk , pk ); b ← {0, 1}; c ← Encpk (m) : A(c) = b − 2 . D Proof of Theorem 16 The claims regarding the communication complexity, size of the setup, and the number MPC of invocations of Byzantine agreement follow because Πl runs a VACS protocol with l-output quality and inputs of length O(I · poly(n)) in step 2; |C| = O(n) (in expectation) reliable broadcast protocols on inputs of length O(O · poly(n)) in step 4; and a reliable consensus protocol on inputs of length O in step 5. To prove security of the protocol, we define a simulator S that works as follows: Setup: S generates the setup honestly, with two exceptions: • S uses the TFHE simulator to generate the TFHE public key, t − 1 decryption keys {dki}, and n + 1 ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn, crand. • S generates the CRS for the UC-NIZK proof system using the corresponding simulator. In particular, this defines a set C of the parties. Corruptions: Whenever A corrupts a party, S gives A the state held by that party at that point in time. Let S denote the set of parties that A corrupts that are (1) in C and (2) corrupted before executing step 2 of the protocol. If |S| ≥ t the simulator aborts (call this event abort1). Otherwise, when A corrupts the ith party in S, it is given dki as part of that party’s state. If A corrupts a party Pi before Pi has begun executing step 1 of the protocol, then S corrupts Pi in the ideal world to obtain Pi’s input (which it then gives to A along with Pi’s state). When A corrupts a party at any other point in the protocol, S delays its corruption of that party until after S sends XxxxXxx to the trusted party (as described below).
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Related to Anonymous Public-Key Encryption

  • Data Encryption Contractor must encrypt all State data at rest and in transit, in compliance with FIPS Publication 140-2 or applicable law, regulation or rule, whichever is a higher standard. All encryption keys must be unique to State data. Contractor will secure and protect all encryption keys to State data. Encryption keys to State data will only be accessed by Contractor as necessary for performance of this Contract.

  • HOW WE MAY USE YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION 8.1 We will use the personal information You provide to Us to:

  • Information Technology Accessibility Standards Any information technology related products or services purchased, used or maintained through this Grant must be compatible with the principles and goals contained in the Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards adopted by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board under Section 508 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §794d), as amended. The federal Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards can be found at: xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx-xxxxx.xxx/508.htm.

  • Encryption The Fund acknowledges and agrees that encryption may not be available for every communication through the System, or for all data. The Fund agrees that Custodian may deactivate any encryption features at any time, without notice or liability to the Fund, for the purpose of maintaining, repairing or troubleshooting the System or the Software.

  • Malicious Use of Orphan Glue Records Registry Operator shall take action to remove orphan glue records (as defined at xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xxx/en/committees/security/sac048.pdf) when provided with evidence in written form that such records are present in connection with malicious conduct.

  • Patient Information Each Party agrees to abide by all laws, rules, regulations, and orders of all applicable supranational, national, federal, state, provincial, and local governmental entities concerning the confidentiality or protection of patient identifiable information and/or patients’ protected health information, as defined by any other applicable legislation in the course of their performance under this Agreement.

  • Confidential System Information HHSC prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of Other Confidential Information. Grantee and all Grantee Agents will not disclose or use any Other Confidential Information in any manner except as is necessary for the Project or the proper discharge of obligations and securing of rights under the Contract. Grantee will have a system in effect to protect Other Confidential Information. Any disclosure or transfer of Other Confidential Information by Xxxxxxx, including information requested to do so by HHSC, will be in accordance with the Contract. If Grantee receives a request for Other Confidential Information, Xxxxxxx will immediately notify HHSC of the request, and will make reasonable efforts to protect the Other Confidential Information from disclosure until further instructed by the HHSC. Grantee will notify HHSC promptly of any unauthorized possession, use, knowledge, or attempt thereof, of any Other Confidential Information by any person or entity that may become known to Grantee. Grantee will furnish to HHSC all known details of the unauthorized possession, use, or knowledge, or attempt thereof, and use reasonable efforts to assist HHSC in investigating or preventing the reoccurrence of any unauthorized possession, use, or knowledge, or attempt thereof, of Other Confidential Information. HHSC will have the right to recover from Grantee all damages and liabilities caused by or arising from Grantee or Grantee Agents’ failure to protect HHSC’s Confidential Information as required by this section. IN COORDINATION WITH THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE UTC, Xxxxxxx WILL INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS HHSC FROM ALL DAMAGES, COSTS, LIABILITIES, AND EXPENSES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS) CAUSED BY OR ARISING FROM Grantee OR Grantee AGENTS FAILURE TO PROTECT OTHER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. Grantee WILL FULFILL THIS PROVISION WITH COUNSEL APPROVED BY HHSC.

  • Workstation/Laptop encryption All workstations and laptops that process and/or store DHCS PHI or PI must be encrypted using a FIPS 140-2 certified algorithm which is 128bit or higher, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The encryption solution must be full disk unless approved by the DHCS Information Security Office.

  • Information About You and Your Visits to the Website All information we collect on this Website is subject to our Privacy Policy. By using the Website, you consent to all actions taken by us with respect to your information in compliance with the Privacy Policy.

  • Information Services Traffic 5.1 For purposes of this Section 5, Voice Information Services and Voice Information Services Traffic refer to switched voice traffic, delivered to information service providers who offer recorded voice announcement information or open vocal discussion programs to the general public. Voice Information Services Traffic does not include any form of Internet Traffic. Voice Information Services Traffic also does not include 555 traffic or similar traffic with AIN service interfaces, which traffic shall be subject to separate arrangements between the Parties. Voice Information services Traffic is not subject to Reciprocal Compensation as Local Traffic under the Interconnection Attachment.

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