{"component": "clause", "props": {"groups": [{"size": 10, "samples": [{"hash": "dtY2HnRmEBW", "uri": "/it/contracts/dtY2HnRmEBW#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates Negotiation Notice", "score": 27.4465007782, "published": true}, {"hash": "gUXG0hgqOv4", "uri": "/it/contracts/gUXG0hgqOv4#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates Negotiation Notice", "score": 27.4191265106, "published": true}, {"hash": "WL5q776oTP", "uri": "/it/contracts/WL5q776oTP#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates Negotiation Notice", "score": 27.4191265106, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "risk-factors", "type": "definition", "offset": [143, 155]}, {"key": "base-prospectus", "type": "clause", "offset": [386, 401]}, {"key": "final-terms", "type": "definition", "offset": [494, 505]}, {"key": "terms-and-conditions", "type": "clause", "offset": [522, 542]}], "snippet": "No-one should purchase the Securities without having detailed knowledge of their method of operation, the total costs involved and the related risk factors. Only those who are in no doubt about the risks and are financially able to bear the losses that may be associated with them should purchase these types of Securities. Potential investors should therefore carefully read the whole Base Prospectus, in particular the risk factors including any supplements thereto as well as the respective Final Terms, understand the terms and conditions of the issue in detail and assess the suitability of the relevant investment, in each case taking into account their own financial, tax and other circumstances. In cases of doubt potential investors should seek advice by a competent investment, legal or tax advisor.", "hash": "de8bb0c2eac2cb798cd9c1658622fd9d", "id": 1}, {"size": 10, "samples": [{"hash": "4UZY417ikpj", "uri": "/it/contracts/4UZY417ikpj#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates Negotiation Notice", "score": 27.3662586212, "published": true}, {"hash": "adBMQpCf9sj", "uri": "/it/contracts/adBMQpCf9sj#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates Negotiation Notice", "score": 27.3423213959, "published": true}, {"hash": "Ct7py6ostz", "uri": "/it/contracts/Ct7py6ostz#introduction", "label": "Leverage Certificates", "score": 27.2982215881, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "base-prospectus", "type": "clause", "offset": [28, 43]}, {"key": "pursuant-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [44, 55]}, {"key": "european-economic-area", "type": "definition", "offset": [2094, 2116]}, {"key": "final-terms", "type": "definition", "offset": [2427, 2438]}, {"key": "united-states", "type": "definition", "offset": [3900, 3913]}], "snippet": "This document constitutes a base prospectus pursuant to Article 5, paragraph (4) of Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 as amended from time to time (the \"Prospectus Directive\") and as implemented into German law by \u00a7 6 of the German Securities Prospectus Act (Mertpapierprospeht\u03c6esetz \u2212 \"WpPG\") in connection with Regulation (EC) No. 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 as amended from time to time (the \"Base Prospectus\" or the \"Prospectus\"). The subject matter of the Base Prospectus is the issuance of or the increase of issued Constant Leverage Certificates (the \"Securities\") which either will be publicly offered or will be placed in application of an exceptional case pursuant to \u00a7 3 paragraph 2 WpPG and at the same time admitted to trading on a regulated market. The Issuer has made an application for approval of the Base Prospectus to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Buudesaustalt f\u00fcr Fiuauzdieustleistuu\u03c6saufsicht \u2013 \"BaFin\") as competent authority. The BaFin approved the Base Prospectus after completing a review of this document for completeness, including a review of the coherence and comprehensibility of the information provided pursuant to \u00a7 13 paragraph 1 sentence 2 WpPG. Following the date of approval of the Base Prospectus, events and changes may occur, which render the information contained in the Base Prospectus incorrect and/or incomplete. The Issuer will publish a supplement to the Base Prospectus in accordance with \u00a7 16 WpPG in case of a significant new factor or a material mistake or inaccuracy with respect to the information contained in the Base Prospectus. In order to be able to conduct a public offer and/or a listing of the Securities on a regulated market (within the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004) in Italy, the Issuer has applied for the notification of the Base Prospectus into Italy pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 17, 18 WpPG. The Issuer reserves the right to apply for the notification of the Base Prospectus into further member states of the European Economic Area. The Base Prospectus must be read in connection with the information contained in (i) the registration document of the Issuer and the registration document of the Guarantor which are incorporated by reference into the Base Prospectus (see chapter XIII. on page 187 of the Base Prospectus), (ii) the respective final terms of the offer as drawn up in connection with the Securities (the \"Final Terms\") and (iii) any supplement to the Base Prospectus pursuant to \u00a7 16 WpPG. The Base Prospectus, the respective registration documents and any supplements thereto are accessible on the webpage \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587://\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587 under the section <<Legal Documents>>, whereby the Final Terms for a particular issue are accessible by entry of the respective ISIN on the webpage \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587://\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587. No one has the right to disseminate any information or make statements that are not included in the Base Prospectus in connection with the issue, sale and offering of the Securities. The Issuer and the Offeror reject any liability for information from third parties that are not contained in the Base Prospectus. Neither the Base Prospectus or any supplements thereto nor the respective Final Terms shall constitute an offer or a solicitation to any person to buy any Securities and should not be construed as a recommendation of the Issuer to purchase securities. The distribution of the Base Prospectus and the offer and sale of Securities may be subject to legal restrictions in certain jurisdictions. Persons into whose possession the Base Prospectus or Securities pass are obliged to inform themselves about and comply with such restrictions, in particular restrictions in connection with the distribution of the Base Prospectus and the offer or sale of Securities in the United States of America and the offer or sale of Securities in the member states of the European Economic Area (see section VI.8 on page 63 et seq. of the Base Prospectus).", "hash": "a226c2afdb18c1fcbf9bbf454b521cad", "id": 2}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "e0UagtJmzp8", "uri": "/it/contracts/e0UagtJmzp8#introduction", "label": "Instruction and Maintenance Manual", "score": 22.9547519684, "published": true}, {"hash": "22mKYmFJzgd", "uri": "/it/contracts/22mKYmFJzgd#introduction", "label": "Instruction and Maintenance Manual", "score": 21.0177955627, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "snippet": "This manual has been prepared with the scope of supplying all the instructions required for the correct use of the appliance and to maintain it in optimal condition. It also contains important user safety information. The following professional roles are explained in order to define the responsibilities of each:", "hash": "36d5fce80159f3701d1bead8e1fc1a67", "id": 3}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "k3b9XKL7xsZ", "uri": "/it/contracts/k3b9XKL7xsZ#introduction", "label": "Shipping Agreement", "score": 35.2846984863, "published": true}, {"hash": "irwk0zShryG", "uri": "/it/contracts/irwk0zShryG#introduction", "label": "Shipping Agreement", "score": 27.5722103119, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "general-conditions", "type": "definition", "offset": [6, 24]}, {"key": "pursuant-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [55, 66]}, {"key": "the-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [108, 119]}, {"key": "the-principal", "type": "definition", "offset": [395, 408]}, {"key": "terms-and-conditions", "type": "clause", "offset": [515, 535]}], "snippet": "These General Conditions (unless otherwise established pursuant to express written agreement signed between the parties) shall govern the parties\u2019 obligations pursuant to any contractual agreements stipulated between the Customer (Principal of the Shipment) and the Freight Forwarder BOLLORE\u2019 Logistics Italy Spa. The parties therefore acknowledge and accept that any single \"Shipping Order\" by the Principal, as well as any \"Quotation\" by Freight Forwarder are strictly subject to the application of these General Terms and Conditions. The Principal therefore expressly accepts that the present General Conditions find full and immediate application to all contractual relationships arising with the Freight Forwarder Bollor\u00e9 Logistics Italy, as well as all actions and / or claims that could be exercised against this latter.", "hash": "11b190fb428e1bc737f065aae620bff0", "id": 4}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "6zIqcC2g2tn", "uri": "/it/contracts/6zIqcC2g2tn#introduction", "label": "Contract Based Synchronization", "score": 29.8143234253, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "service-level-agreement", "type": "clause", "offset": [483, 506]}, {"key": "service-provider", "type": "definition", "offset": [627, 643]}, {"key": "third-party", "type": "definition", "offset": [2411, 2422]}, {"key": "the-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [2670, 2681]}, {"key": "creative-commons", "type": "clause", "offset": [2889, 2905]}, {"key": "according-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [3484, 3496]}], "snippet": "A contract is a binding agreement stipulated between two or more parties, which dictates their rights and their duties, and the penalties each party has to pay in case the contract is not honoured. In the current practice of information technology, contracts are not that different from those legal agreements traditionally enforced in courts of law. Both software and services commit themselves to re- spect some (typically weak, if not \u201cwithout any expressed or implied warranty\u201d) service level agreement. In the case this is not honoured, the only thing the user can do is to take legal steps against the software vendor or service provider. Since legal disputes may require a lot of time, as well as relevant expenses, such kinds of contracts serve more as an instrument to discourage users, rather than making easier for users to demand their rights. Recent research has then addressed the problem of devising new kinds of contracts, to be exploited for specifying and automatically regulating the interaction among users and service providers. See e.g. [6, 8, 11, 13, 20], to cite a few. A contract subordinates the behaviour promised by a client (e.g. \u201cI will pay for a service X\u201d) to the behaviour promised by a service (e.g. \u201cI will provide you with a service Y\u201d), and vice versa. The crucial problems are then how to formalise the concept of contract, how to understand when a set of contracts gives rise to an agreement among the stipulating parties, and how to actually enforce this agreement in an open, and possibly unreliable, environment. In the Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) paradigm [23, 24], concurrent processes commu- nicate through a global constraint store. A process can add a constraint c to the store through the tell c primitive. Dually, the primitive ask c makes a process block until the constraint c is entailed by the store. Very roughly, such primitives may be used to model two basic operations on contracts: a tell c is for publishing the contract c, and an ask c\u2032 is for waiting until one has to fulfill some duty c\u2032. While this may suggest CCP as a good candidate for modelling contract-based interactions, some important features seem to be missing. Consider e.g. a set of parties, each offering her own contract. When some of the contracts at hand give rise to an agreement, all the involved parties accept the contract, and start interacting to accomplish it. A third party (possibly, an \u201celectronic\u201d court of law) may later on join these parties, so to provide the stipulated remedies in the case an infringement to the contract is found. To model this typical contract-based dynamics, we need the ability of making all the parties \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (Eds.): Third Interaction and Concurrency Experience (ICE 2010) EPTCS 38, 2010, pp. 67\u201382, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.38.8 \u20ddc \u2587. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 & \u2587. \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License. In this paper we study a variant of [2], an extension of CCP which allows for modelling such kinds of scenarios. Our calculus features two primitives, called fuse and join: the first fuses all the processes agreeing on a given contract, while the second joins a process with those already participating to a contract. Technically, the prefix fusex c probes the constraint store to find whether it entails c; when this happens, the variable x is bound to a fresh session identifier, shared among the parties involved in the contract. Such parties are chosen according to a local minimal fusion policy. The prefix joinx c is similar, yet it looks for an already existing session identifier, rather than creating a fresh one. While our calculus is undogmatic about the underlying constraint system, in the contract-based scenarios presented here we commit ourselves to using PCL formulae [2] as constraints.", "hash": "f2282b37718de97e719fb6302a5eeda0", "id": 5}, {"size": 2, "samples": [{"hash": "9nGD5rmNjKT", "uri": "/it/contracts/9nGD5rmNjKT#introduction", "label": "Public Procurement Contract", "score": 18.0, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "delivery-dates", "type": "clause", "offset": [1837, 1851]}, {"key": "contratti-pubblici", "type": "clause", "offset": [2046, 2064]}, {"key": "servizi-e-forniture", "type": "clause", "offset": [2076, 2095]}, {"key": "the-supplier", "type": "definition", "offset": [2617, 2629]}, {"key": "issue-of", "type": "definition", "offset": [3130, 3138]}, {"key": "according-to", "type": "clause", "offset": [4402, 4414]}, {"key": "the-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [7980, 7991]}], "snippet": "The deterioration of public finance and the increase in global competition have forced governments and public institutions to obtain \u201cthe best value for money\u201d through the purchase of goods, works and services in the form of procurement contracts. Efficient public procurement contracts (henceforth PPCs) are thus emerging as a \u201ccore necessity for ... the public\u2019s sector effectiveness in obtain- ing resources for social spending and/or lower taxes\u201d (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al., 2006). These contracts have recently recorded a rapid increase both in number and in value, reaching 16% of GDP in the EU, and around 20% in the United States.1 However, PPCs have both costs and benefits: their benefits (i.e. allocative and productive efficiency) can be quickly erased by the costs (i.e. inefficiency) which often arise from contractual incompleteness and all the issues that ensue therefrom.2 In this paper we specifically address the source of inefficiency which pertains to delays in PPC execution times3 by investigating the optimal penalty design which should provide the right incentive to prevent delays. Indeed, delays in de- livery dates in PPCs may negatively affect all the actors involved, i.e. they may determine direct costs for the procurer, lower firms\u2019 profits (i.e. firms other than the contractor) and reduce consumers\u2019 utility. The typical illustrative example in this regard is provided by a PPC for roadway resurfacing, rehabilitation and restoration: if these activities are undertaken in heavily urbanized areas, they may cause extreme traffic congestion and severe inconvenience to the travelling public and the business community. Thus, delays in the completion of these works prolong the negative impact on users (i.e. a social cost), and also cause overruns in the planned execution costs.4 There is evidence that delays in delivery dates have been particularly large and harmful in the recent Italian experience of PPCs. The data-base compiled by the Italian Authority in charge of controlling PPCs (Autorit\u00e0 per la Vigi- \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 \u2587\u2587\u2587 Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture - AVLP ) records all contracts of a value between 150,000 and 15,000,000 euros awarded by munic-\n1 Note that between 1995 and 2002 PPCs in the EU underwent a 31% increase in value (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, et al., 2006: Ch. 1). See also: \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587://\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587_\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587_\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587\n2 The economic and engineering literatures give different explanations for the main issues arising in PPCs. Most of the economic analysis on this topic focusses on the information asymmetry concerning production costs between the supplier and the procurer (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), while engineering and construction managment analysis concentrates on the uncertainty which affects the contract after it has been signed and its effects on both the supplier and the procurer (\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587, 1998). For an economic methodological discussion on contract incompleteness and unforeseen contingencies see Maskin and Tirole (1999).\n3 In the economic literature on PPCs, delivery delays in contract execution are often con- sidered along with the issue of the supplier\u2019s performance regarding contracted aims (i.e. quality). See on this: \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al. (2006b).\n4 Cost overruns in different procurement contracts have been investigated in the seminal paper by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (2001): they showed that cost plus contracts are better than fixed price contracts when the project carried out through the procurement is more complex. Focusing on fixed price contracts, Ganuza (2007) found that when the procurement market is more competitive, cost overruns are lower and decreasing with the design specification level. ipalities, local/regional public authorities and public firms. Our examination of this data-base highlighted that out of 43,863 fully exploited contracts in the period 2000-2006, about 32,731 had been completed with delays. For about 27,826 contracts, the delay contracted days ratio5 was always larger than 1, and it was higher, the greater the contract value (with a small slowdown in the trend for the more expensive contracts, see Table 1 below).6 Similar findings on the sustantial body of evidence on delays in the Italian PPCs have been recorded by other empirical analyses7 and call - primarily - for investigation into the effectiveness of the penalty rules currently adopted in such contracts. According to Italian law,8 the penalty fee in PPCs should be defined as a percentage - ranging between 0.03% and 0.1 % - of the total contract price for each day of delay in completion of the contracted works.9 Is there something wrong with the definition of these ranges? Answering this question should inform the decision on whether to insert a penalty rule in 5 This ratio has the following interpretation: for example, if 200 days are the ex-ante contracted time for the infrastructure\u2019s execution and then its delivering occurs with 220 days of delay, the delay contracted days ratio results equal to 1.1.\n6 These estimations and further analysis on the data-set are available from the authors on request.\n7 See Bentivogli et al. (2007) and ANCE (2002). The former study reports interviews conducted with 32 local Contracting Authorities managing about 280 PPCs: only one third of these contracting authorities declared that the contract had been executed within the con- tracted time, or with very small delays. In the latter study, a detailed investigation conducted at regional level by ANCE \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Romagna highlights that of the 776 PPCs concluded in the period 2001-2002, more than 68% recorded delays and/or increases in cost execution. Similar results have been found at national level (see ANCE, 2005 and AVLP, 2005 ).\n8 See Government Decree n\u25e6 163/2006 and D.P.R. 554/1999, art.117.\n9 This penalty rule for Italian PPCs is determined in similar fashion in other countries; in regard to the US, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al. (1995, Table 6, p. 276) show that for PPCs in highway construction, the contracting authority usually sets penalties ranging from 0.03% to 0.3% of the contract value for each day of delay. the PPC and what its optimal design should be. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, to provide a theoretical and general framework in which to investigate how the inclusion of a penalty fee affects the contract value; second, to verify whether the penalty range currently adopted in the Italian legislation on PPCs correctly induces the contractor to avoid delays. Our starting point is that the inclusion of a penalty clause in a PPC gives the contractor - to some extent - the option of deciding the investment timing for the contract\u2019s execution. Thus - in order to be effective - the penalty fee should consider the investment timing flexibility which, de facto, increases the supplier\u2019s contract value. To correctly approach the issue, we propose a simple Real Option model which allows us to ascertain the value of investment timing flexibility induced by the inclusion of the penalty clause in the contract.10 Then, calibrating the model, we verify the range of penalty fees defined by the Italian legislation on PPCs: quite surprisingly, we find that this range indeed seems able to induce the contractor to respect the contractual execution time. This result sheds new light on the determinants of investment delays in PPCs which include explicit penalty rules, and it adds a new aim to our study because it leads to other cause-and-effect explanations specifically related to the enforce- ment of the penalty clause itself. Following results generally acknowledged in the incomplete contract literature, failures by the Contracting Authority (hence- forth, CA) to enforce the penalty clause can arise when: i) the contractor\u2019s work execution time is non-verifiable11; ii) default by the contractor triggers costly and time-consuming litigation because the \u201cquality\u201d of the judicial system is unsatisfactory; iii) the court of law12 - to which the parties refer for settlement of the dispute on the penalty payment - reduces (or even does not enforce) the committed fee. The last two issues seem to play a major role in the Italian experience: indeed, \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al. (2007) found that, in the data-set of Italian PPCs that they investigated, only in less than 5% of verifiable delays was the penalty enforced by the CAs. Moreover, with specific regard to elements deter- mining the low enforcement of penalties in Italy, it is a matter of fact that in the period 2004-2005 the average duration of an Italian civil trial was around 876 working days13 : this, if anticipated by the contractor, may well override the incentive provided by the penalty design.\n10 As \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1985) and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1985; 1986) highlighted in their seminal works, there is a close analogy between security options and investment timing flexibility.\n11 \u201cTo ensure the contract enforceability, the court must first be able to verify that an agent has disobeyed the agreed clauses of the contract\u201d (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p.348). To our knowledge, since the seminal paper by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (1995), the analysis of the non-verifiability of quality aspects in procurement (and concession) contracts has been carried out - with differing emphases - by \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al. (2004), Calzolari and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (2006) and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 and \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (2007).\n12 See \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 et al. (2000) for discussion of the role of courts in enforcing contract clauses. 13 See the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (2007). Moreover, an old but impressive Report by the Commissione per la garanzia dell\u2019informazione statistica of the Italian Government (2000, pp. 27-28) found that in the period between 1988 and 1997, the average time taken by the administrative (regional) courts to make a final ruling increased from 2617 to 4261 working days. We thus characterize our model to investigate how the CA\u2019s ineffective en- forcement of a penalty rule would affect the extent of the optimal penalty. Accordingly, we assume in the model that the probability of enforcement is cor- related to a parameter identifying the \u201cquality\u201d of the judicial system (i.e. the average time taken to resolve disputes) and to the level of the penalty itself.14 Our calibration results show that the probability of penalty enforcement decreases both when i) the quality of the judicial system is low and ii) the civil court has high discretionality in reducing the penalty imposed. Specifically, the greater the level of the penalty that the CA would like to introduce in the contract, the lower the probability that it will be enforced by the court. This, in turn, calls for higher penalties - well beyond the range prescribed by the Italian legislation - to make the firm comply with the contracted execution time. However, if the degree of the court\u2019s responsiveness to the penalty imposed by the CA is high, the latter will find it convenient to set the fee considered reasonable by the court. Finally, a caveat concerning our analysis should be mentioned. In principle, delays in the PPCs\u2019 completion time weight differently on the contract value according to the procedure adopted in awarding it. Indeed, in the \u201cnegotiated\u201d procedure, the contract value is directly agreed between the parties and includes an explicit trade-off between the contract value and the investment\u2019s delivery time. Differently, in the \u201copen\u201d procedure, the investment\u2019s execution time can itself be part of the successful bid, thus representing a strategic variable in the competition among bidders.15 Although our simple model refers in principle to PPCs awarded through the negotiated procedure because it assumes an ex- ogenous and fixed price contracted between the CA and the contractor, it is interesting that the Italian delays contracted days ratio seem not to be cor- related with the nature of the awarding procedure - see second part of Table 1 above. This suggests that our results could be reasonably extended to the Italian PPCs awarded through the open procedure as well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a PPC basic model where a penalty fee is included. Section 3 presents an extension of the model which considers a simple and symmetric penalty/premium scheme where the contractor is punished/rewarded if it decides to delay/anticipate the delivery date. Section 4 concludes by providing a brief summary of our findings and policy implications. Finally, the Appendix contains all the proofs and shows how our framework can be used to define the optimal penalty in a concession 14 The enforcement of a penalty clause may also be ineffective (i.e. costly) in the case of \u201cmultiple contacts\u201d between the CA and the contractor. Indeed, when the latter has (or expects to have) other ongoing (or future) procurements with the same CA and perceives the committed fee as highly punitive sanction, it may take revenge on the other ongoing (or future) PPCs. Our model does not specifically address this case.\n15 Indeed, of the four EU procedures for procurement (\"open procedure\u201d, \u201crestricted proce- dure\u201d, \u201cnegotiated procedure\u201d, and \u201ccompetitive dialogue\"), only the \u201copen procedure\u201d and - partially - the \u201crestricted procedure\u201d make the trade-off between the contract\u2019s price and the delivery date explicit: the contractor makes a lower bid (i.e. asks for a lower price to execute the contract) if it can delay the construction time. For a survey on the current EU legislation on PPCs, see: \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587://\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587/\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587.\u2587\u2587\u2587 setting.", "hash": "2471b96c601bbdd56616adc03ce39dfd", "id": 6}, {"size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "k5jHqvlVnmu", "uri": "/it/contracts/k5jHqvlVnmu#introduction", "label": "Wakalah Contract", "score": 25.4585895538, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "snippet": "Sharia banking has a goal as mandated in Law Number 21 of 2008 concerning Sharia Banking, namely as a financial intermediary institution that is in accordance with sharia principles, supporting the implementation of national development in order to improve justice, togetherness, and equitable distribution of people's welfare (Pasal 2, Pasal 3, \u2587\u2587\u2587 Pasal 4 ayat (1) Undang-Undang Nomor", "hash": "0b315a3fb848c1385cd64124111e9b3d", "id": 7}, {"size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "7WZeBGSrKbM", "uri": "/it/contracts/7WZeBGSrKbM#introduction", "label": "General Conditions of Sale", "score": 23.4150695801, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "order-confirmation", "type": "definition", "offset": [172, 190]}, {"key": "the-parties", "type": "clause", "offset": [331, 342]}], "snippet": "1.1. These terms apply to all orders (hereafter known as \u201cOrders\u201d) of products (hereafter known as \u201cProducts\u201d) sold by the Seller.\n1.2. The special terms contained in each order confirmation issued by the Seller (hereafter, Order Confirmation) and these General Terms represent the entire content of the contract concluded between the parties (hereafter, the Contract) and they exclude and replace any other agreement reached previously between the same, both in writing and verbally.\n1.3. Any invalidity of one of these Terms will not automatically invalidate the Contract or the Orders.\n1.4. Any change or addition to the Orders, Order Confirmations or General Terms must be agreed by mutual agreement between the Parties (meaning, jointly, the Seller and the Purchaser) in writing.\n1.5. Any tolerance by one of the Parties towards the other may never be interpreted as an implicit waiver of the rights deriving from the Contract.", "hash": "e5ac29cb88eb434df330fb0bc99a338f", "id": 8}, {"size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "3RRmo3tUr8g", "uri": "/it/contracts/3RRmo3tUr8g#introduction", "label": "Accordo Di Programma Enea Mse Su Sicurezza Nucleare E Reattori Di Iv Generazione", "score": 26.736661911, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [], "snippet": "Several activities are ongoing in Europe and in particular in Italy around the development of the Generation-IV lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR) [1]. The main concepts which evolved over the years are those of the ELFR (the first-of-a-kind EU reactor) [2], of \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 (the EU demonstrator) [3] and of MYRRHA (the EU technology pilot plant) [4]. Indeed, Ansaldo Nuclear, ENEA and the Institute of Nuclear Research of Romania have signed at the end of December 2013 an agreement for the establishment of the Falcon Consortium (Fostering \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 Construction), whose objective is to construct \u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587\u2587 in Romania. Within that framework, the FRENETIC (Fast REactor NEutronics/Thermal-hydraulICs) code is being developed for the simulation of coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic transients in LFRs with the core arranged in hexagonal assemblies (HAs), enclosed in a duct [5]. The code has the objective to provide fast approximate solutions for core design and/or safety analysis, and this thanks to the fact that the 3D problem is solved with a simplified approach. The neutronic (NE) module in FRENETIC solves the multigroup neutron diffusion equations with delayed neutron precursors [6] using a nodal discretisation in space and a quasi-static discretisation in time. The thermal hydraulic (TH) module of FRENETIC solves the 1D (axial) mass momentum and energy conservations laws of the coolant, together with the 1D (axial or radial) heat conduction equation in the fuel pins, in each assembly [7]. The assemblies are then thermally coupled to each other on each horizontal cross section of the core, resulting in a quasi-3D model. The work carried out in 2015 continues the development [5, 8, 9, 10, 11] and validation [12, 13, 14] of this computational tool that first began in the year 2011. The work carried out during this year activity is focused on the following topics: \u2022 continuation of the coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic validation of the code using data from the sodium-cooled Experimental Breeder Reactor-II of Argonne National Laboratory; \u2022 further development of the neutronic module by introducing a new photon transport model and updating the existing decay-heat model.", "hash": "8de0be9c22fc419229da34d7ba7a75b8", "id": 9}, {"size": 1, "samples": [{"hash": "jdNeXqQwEcZ", "uri": "/it/contracts/jdNeXqQwEcZ#introduction", "label": "Investment Fund Agreement", "score": 23.1136207581, "published": true}], "snippet_links": [{"key": "board-of-directors", "type": "clause", "offset": [621, 639]}, {"key": "the-price", "type": "clause", "offset": [1032, 1041]}, {"key": "application-procedure", "type": "clause", "offset": [1176, 1197]}, {"key": "issue-price", "type": "definition", "offset": [1260, 1271]}], "snippet": "GAM Multicash (the \u201dCompany\u201c, \u201eGAM Multicash\u201c) is established as a \u201esoci\u00e9t\u00e9 d'investissement \u00e0 capital variable\u201c (SICAV) in accordance with the current version of the law of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg dated August 10, 1915 (\u201dthe 1915 Law\u201c), and authorised in Luxembourg as an undertaking for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) under Part I of the law dated December 17, 2010 (\u201dthe 2010 Law\u201c). The Company has an \u201cumbrella structure\u201d, which allows establishing subfunds (\u201cSubfunds\u201d) that correspond to different investment portfolios and that can be issued in different categories of shares. The Board of Directors of the Company is authorised to issue shares (\"Units\", \"Shares\u201c) without par value in various investment portfolios (\u201eSubfunds\u201c) relating to the Subfunds described in the section \u201cInvestment objectives and investment policy\u201c, and, as noted in the section \u201dDescription of Shares\u201c, the following share categories (\"Share Category\") with different characteristics may be issued for each Subfund The price of the Shares is denominated in the same currency of the Subfund in question. As described in the section \u201eIssue and sale of Shares / Application procedure\u201c, a selling fee of up to 2% may be charged in addition to the Issue Price.", "hash": "f00a8870e9e46cbe6956c84fd2b6b892", "id": 10}], "next_curs": "ClUST2oVc35sYXdpbnNpZGVyY29udHJhY3RzcjELEhZDbGF1c2VTbmlwcGV0R3JvdXBfdjU2IhVpbnRyb2R1Y3Rpb24jMDAwMDAwMGEMogECaXQYACAA", "clause": {"size": 97, "parents": [["introduction", "Introduction"], ["miscelanea", "MISCELANEA"], ["obblighi-dello-spedizioniere", "Obblighi dello Spedizioniere"], ["conclusions", "Conclusions"], ["diagnostica", "DIAGNOSTICA"]], "title": "Introduction", "children": [["introduction", "Introduction"], ["", ""], ["summary", "Summary"], ["anonymity", "Anonymity"], ["array-level-optical-degradation-or-fault-electrical-mis-matches-etc", "Array level: optical degradation or (fault), electrical mis- matches, etc."]], "id": "introduction", "related": [["norme-regolatrici-e-disciplina-applicabile", "Norme regolatrici e disciplina applicabile", "Norme regolatrici e disciplina applicabile"], ["revisione-del-prezzo", "Revisione del prezzo", "Revisione del prezzo"], ["revisione-dei-prezzi", "REVISIONE DEI PREZZI", "REVISIONE DEI PREZZI"], ["disciplina-applicabile", "Disciplina applicabile", "Disciplina applicabile"], ["uoc-procedure-concorsuali-e-selettive", "UOC PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI E SELETTIVE", "UOC PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI E SELETTIVE"]], "related_snippets": [], "updated": "2025-07-10T05:58:13+00:00"}, "json": true, "cursor": ""}}